CEO Compensation Gap between Gender and Women’s Risk-Averse Tendency

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
SungChang Kang
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Compensation Gap

Minding the gap: the effect of CEO underpayment on firm-specific knowledge

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (9) ◽  
pp. 2107-2125
Author(s):  
Linlin Wang ◽  
Zhaofang Chu ◽  
Wan Jiang ◽  
Yifan Xu
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Equity Theory ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Specific Knowledge ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Compensation Gap ◽  
Specific Human Capital

Purpose This study aims to build on equity theory to assess the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) underpayment on the accumulation of firm-specific knowledge, accounting for the moderating effects of the CEO compensation gap and the clarity of the board’s informal hierarchy. Design/methodology/approach This study starts with all firms listed in the Execucomp database for the period 1992 to 2006. Then, all data sources are merged and entries with missing information are excluded. The final data set used for model estimations includes 1,152 firm-year observations. The command xtreg in Stata 12 with the fixed-effect option (fe) is used to estimate the relationship between CEO underpayment and firm-specific knowledge. Findings This study proposed and examined the role of CEO underpayment in discouraging CEO willingness to invest firm-specific human capital and, accordingly, to adopt a strategy of accumulating lower levels of firm-specific knowledge assets. The empirical analyses strongly support this argument. Moreover, CEO compensation gaps and the informal hierarchy of boards negatively moderated this relationship. That is, CEO underpayment had a weaker negative effect on firm-specific knowledge when the CEO compensation gap and the clarity of the board’s informal hierarchy were high. Originality/value Prior studies from the knowledge-based perspective have focused on the importance of firm-specific knowledge in enabling a firm to achieve superior financial performance. However, relatively little attention has been paid to CEOs’ willingness to accumulate firm-specific knowledge. The present study contributes to the knowledge-based view of the firm. This study integrates equity theory with the knowledge-based view of the firm by highlighting how unfair compensation of CEOs may discourage them to fully realize a firm’s potential to generate specific knowledge. By incorporating the fairness issue of CEO compensation into the knowledge-based view, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the origins of firm-specific knowledge.

scholarly journals The Relation Between CEO Compensation Gap and Future Performance －Evidence from Korea－

2017 ◽  
Vol null (72) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
김정애 ◽  
Jong-Seo Choi
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Compensation Gap

Life after Heart Transplantation

2002 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 285-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucia Savadori ◽  
Lorella Lotto ◽  
Rino Rumiati
Keyword(s):  
Heart Transplantation ◽  
Frame Of Reference ◽  
Physician Communication ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Medical Team ◽  
Perceived Knowledge ◽  
Surgical Technology ◽  
Postoperative Therapy ◽  
Life Expectation ◽  
Risk Judgments

Progress in surgical technology and in postoperative therapy has remarkably increased life expectation after heart transplantation. Nevertheless, patients still show a resistance to resume a normal life after transplantation, for example, to return to work. In this study we assume that after surgery patients become risk averse because they achieve a positive frame of reference. Because of this propensity toward risk aversion, they withhold from engaging in behavior that their physical condition would allow them in principle. Coherent with this assumption we found that compared to the medical team patients overestimate the degree of risk for routine activities. The study also showed that the representation of risk by the patients could be captured by a dreadfulness factor and a voluntariness factor. Patients' risk judgments were strongly and specifically predicted by the perceived degree of dreadfulness of the activity and, to a lesser extent, by the perceived knowledge of the consequences. Implications for patient-physician communication were explored.

Too Much of a Good Thing? Risk-averse parents do their children no favors

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ungar
Keyword(s):  
Good Thing ◽  
Risk Averse

Risk Attitude and Corporate Investment under Output Market Uncertainty: Evidence from The Mekong River Delta, Vietnam

2016 ◽  
pp. 59-70
Author(s):  
Ninh Le Khuong ◽  
Nghiem Le Tan ◽  
Tho Huynh Huu
Keyword(s):  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Business Strategies ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Market Uncertainty ◽  
Firm Investment ◽  
Output Market ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

This paper aims to detect the impact of firm managers’ risk attitude on the relationship between the degree of output market uncertainty and firm investment. The findings show that there is a negative relationship between these two aspects for risk-averse managers while there is a positive relationship for risk-loving ones, since they have different utility functions. Based on the findings, this paper proposes recommendations for firm managers to take into account when making investment decisions and long-term business strategies as well.

The Impact of CEO' Compensation Incentive on the Future R&D Investment of the Company

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-210
Author(s):  
Seho Kwon ◽  
◽  
YoungJun Kim
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Impact ◽  
D Investment

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document