Ownership Concentration and Performance of Deteriorating Syndicated Loans

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariassunta Giannetti ◽  
Ralf Meisenzahl
2005 ◽  
pp. 53-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Kapeliushnikov ◽  
N. Demina

The paper provides new survey evidence on effects of concentrated ownership upon investment and performance in Russian industrial enterprises. Authors trace major changes in their ownership profile, assess pace of post-privatization redistribution of shareholdings and provide evidence on ownership concentration in the Russian industry. The major econometric findings are that the first largest shareholding is negatively associated with the firm’s investment and performance but surprisingly the second largest shareholding is positively associated with them. Moreover, these relationships do not depend on identity of majority shareholders. These results are consistent with the assumption that the entrenched controlling owners are engaged in extracting "control premium" but sizable shareholdings accumulated by other blockholders may put brakes on their expropriating behavior and thus be conductive for efficiency enhancing. The most interesting topic for further more detailed analysis is formation, stability and roles of coalitions of large blockholders in the corporate sector of post-socialist countries.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-21
Author(s):  
Bruno Elmôr Duarte ◽  
Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal

This article analyzes conflicts between principals that led to activism by one large Brazilian government-owned investor as a minority shareholder and verifies the antecedents, means employed, apparent motivations, and effectiveness of its reactions (Goranova & Ryan, 2014). It examines the cases of three large high ownership concentration listed companies using solely public sources. Poor performance was a frequent conflict antecedent. No evident trade-off between activism and corporate governance (CG) practices emerged. High ownership concentration influenced the way the investor reacted and its success because opposition through internal CG mechanisms was usually not successful and led to legal proceedings. The limitations of the regulatory framework became evident from the mixed outcomes of these proceedings. The investor was not exclusively financially motivated and it occasionally opposed the interests of other minority shareholders to follow government policy. These findings illustrated how high ownership concentration rendered difficult the mitigation of principal-principal conflicts even for a large government-owned investor and help explain the failure of previous econometric studies to relate activism, quality of CG practices and performance (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008)


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 953 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandra Horobet ◽  
Lucian Belascu ◽  
Ștefania Curea ◽  
Alma Pentescu

Our study addresses the link between ownership concentration and corporate performance in the manufacturing sector in the European Union in an economic environment stressed by the global financial and sovereign debt crises. This is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to tackle differences between companies with different origin-countries in EU from the perspective of ownership concentration and corporate performance in a period marked by the adverse impact of the global financial crisis. Ownership concentration is measured by the number of shareholders and the percentage of their individual and collective holdings, while performance is measured by accounting-based and market-based indicators. Our results, based on a detailed and methodical statistical analysis, show a clear division between Western and Eastern companies in terms of ownership concentration and performance, with an impact on businesses’ recovery patterns. Overall, there is a positive link between ownership concentration and corporate performance in the case of Western companies, but not for Eastern-based companies. Moreover, ownership concentration has supported business recovery in EU, but particularly for Western companies. On the other hand, our results suggest that market investors’ assessment of corporate performance is disconnected from business fundamentals and do not acknowledge the role of ownership concentration (either beneficial of detrimental) for performance assessment.


2001 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 299-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor Filatotchev ◽  
Rostislav Kapelyushnikov ◽  
Natalya Dyomina ◽  
Sergey Aukutsionek

2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 76-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto de Miguel Hidalgo ◽  
Julio Pindado ◽  
Chabela de la Torre

This paper analyses how the main institutional factors characterizing corporate governance systems around the world affect the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Our analysis gives rise to the following remarks. First, ownership concentration and insider ownership levels are determined by several institutional features such as investor protection, development of capital markets, activity of the market for corporate control, and effectiveness of boards. Second, the relationship between ownership concentration and performance is not directly affected by these institutional factors. Third, there is, however, a direct influence of corporate governance characteristics on the relationship between insider ownership and performance.


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