Ownership Concentration and Performance of Privately-Held Firms with Multiple Owners and the Moderating Effect of Managerial and Corporate Ownership: Evidence from Post-Socialist European Countries

Author(s):  
Aleš Kubíček ◽  
Ondřej Machek
2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 331-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvatore Sciascia ◽  
Pietro Mazzola

Research on the performance of family firms is growing, but results are mixed, especially for nonlisted companies. Thus, on the basis of the co-presence of benefits and disadvantages of family involvement in ownership and management, we explored the presence of nonlinear effects of these two variables on performance. We run regression analyses on data drawn from 620 privately held family firms in Italy: A negative quadratic relationship between family involvement in management and performance was found, but we did not find any association between family involvement in ownership and performance. Our results suggest that in privately held firms the positive effects that previous literature associates with the presence of family managers do not appear strong enough to compensate for the disadvantages deriving from a nonmonetary goal orientation, nor do they compensate for the costs deriving from the need to solve conflicts between family managers and the impossibility of enlarging the company's social and intellectual capital through the employment of nonfamily managers. Moreover, the quadratic nature of the relationship calls for greater attention to be paid to these effects by family business owners, especially in those cases where family involvement in management is high.


2005 ◽  
pp. 53-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Kapeliushnikov ◽  
N. Demina

The paper provides new survey evidence on effects of concentrated ownership upon investment and performance in Russian industrial enterprises. Authors trace major changes in their ownership profile, assess pace of post-privatization redistribution of shareholdings and provide evidence on ownership concentration in the Russian industry. The major econometric findings are that the first largest shareholding is negatively associated with the firm’s investment and performance but surprisingly the second largest shareholding is positively associated with them. Moreover, these relationships do not depend on identity of majority shareholders. These results are consistent with the assumption that the entrenched controlling owners are engaged in extracting "control premium" but sizable shareholdings accumulated by other blockholders may put brakes on their expropriating behavior and thus be conductive for efficiency enhancing. The most interesting topic for further more detailed analysis is formation, stability and roles of coalitions of large blockholders in the corporate sector of post-socialist countries.


2001 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 655-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bin Ke

This study empirically investigates how taxes affect managerial compensation for a sample of privately held insurers whose managers own a large percentage of the firm's stock (I refer to these as management-owned insurers) during 1989–1996. Shareholder/managers receive two types of income from the firm they own: compensation income as employees, and investment income as shareholders. Although compensation income is taxable to employees and deductible by employers, investment income is subject to double taxation. Thus, the mix of the two is an important tax-planning decision for management-owned insurers. I predict and find that as individual tax rates increased relative to corporate tax rates from 1989–1992 to 1993–1996, shareholder/managers paid themselves less tax-deductible compensation relative to a control sample of nonmanagement-owned insurers (i.e., privately held insurers with no managerial ownership). The study's results expand our understanding of management-owned, privately held firms' tax-planning strategies, and have implications for the efficiency of the federal income tax system.


Author(s):  
Ted Azarmi ◽  
Florian Eisele ◽  
Christine Haecker

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">The objective of this case is to teach and initiate a classroom discussion about the optimal market timing for the sale of a mid-cap privately held firm.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The discussion is facilitated by a real world case example that focuses on the sale of a Little Rock, AK based plastic injection molding company with approximately $20 million in revenues.</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="font-size: 8pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">Theoretical and practical issues central to receiving maximum price in relation to selling at the right time are addressed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Considered are the desired time to close the deal from the owner&rsquo;s point of view, the time required for successful completion of the sale process, business conditions in this industry, firm-specific business conditions, and ability of agents to time this market.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="font-size: 8pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">This case also discusses various reasons for the sale of private companies and the effect of respective sale motives on the placement of these firms.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Principally, the retirement decision by the owners of small privately held firms as the most frequent reason for the sale of these companies is explored.</span></span></p>


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