Audit Committee’s Cash Compensation and Earnings Management: The Moderating Effects of Institutional Factors

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Radwan Alkebsee
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Institutional Factors ◽  
Moderating Effects ◽  
Cash Compensation

The Importance of Reporting Incentives: Earnings Management in European Private and Public Firms

2006 ◽  
Vol 81 (5) ◽  
pp. 983-1016 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. Burgstahler ◽  
Luzi Hail ◽  
Christian Leuz
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Institutional Factors ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Accounting Quality ◽  
Legal Form ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Reporting Incentives ◽  
Private And Public

This paper examines how capital market pressures and institutional factors shape firms' incentives to report earnings that reflect economic performance. To isolate the effects of reporting incentives, we exploit the fact that, within the European Union, privately held corporations face the same accounting standards as publicly traded companies because accounting regulation is based on legal form. We focus on the level of earnings management as one dimension of accounting quality that is particularly responsive to firms' reporting incentives. We document that private firms exhibit higher levels of earnings management and that strong legal systems are associated with less earnings management in private and public firms. We also provide evidence that private and public firms respond differentially to institutional factors, such as book-tax alignment, outside investor protection, and capital market structure. Moreover, legal institutions and capital market forces often appear to reinforce each other.

The association between CEO incentive rewards and earnings management

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Habib Jouber ◽  
Hamadi Fakhfakh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Institutional Factors ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Decisions ◽  
Shareholder Protection ◽  
Governance Model ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality ◽  
Corporate Governance Model

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether or not there is a link between CEO incentive-based compensation and earnings management and to examine how institutional environment's features influence such link. Design/methodology/approach – To test the predictions, the authors use a panel of 1,500 American, Canadian, British, and French firm-year observation over the period 2004-2008. Findings – The authors find a significant association between earnings management and CEO incentive-based compensation. Moreover, the analysis provides evidence that institutional factors are strong determinants of this association. Specifically, the results show that firms from countries within the Anglo-American corporate governance model, which provides greater protection of shareholder rights, ensures strict enforcement of law, and scores high on board oversight, tend to have lower level of earnings management. The analysis shows however, that beside the formal corporate governance quality, it is relevant to consider weaker shareholder protection and lower law enforcement indexes to explain earnings management in firms from countries within the Euro-Continental corporate governance model. Originality/value – This paper is the first to provide insights regarding the extent to which CEO incentive rewards imply management discretion and to indicate how much institutional features matter. The analysis contributes to two distinct strands of research. It extends prior research on the association between executive compensation and earnings management and adds to the literature demonstrating a relationship between institutional factors and financial decisions.

The Moderating Effects of Family Control on the Relation between Managerial Overconfidence and Earnings Management

2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (02) ◽  
pp. 1350010 ◽  
Author(s):  
I-Cheng Li ◽  
Jung-Hua Hung
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Positive Relation ◽  
Moderating Effects ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Managerial Overconfidence ◽  
Management Behaviors

This study investigates the relation between managerial overconfidence and earnings management and whether this relation is moderated by family control. Using a sample of Taiwan-listed firms, we estimate managerial overconfidence from manager dealings and determine the following: First, overconfident managers are more likely to engage in earnings management behaviors; second, family control negatively moderates the positive relation between managerial overconfidence and earnings management; and third, the negative moderating effects of family control primarily result from family chief executive officers.

Whose cash compensation has more influence on real earnings management, CEOs or CFOs?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Radwan Alkebsee ◽  
Adeeb A. Alhebry ◽  
Gaoliang Tian
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Least Squares ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Least Squares Regression ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Equity Compensation ◽  
Cash Compensation ◽  
Management Literature ◽  
The Relationship

PurposeScholars have investigated the association between executives' incentives and earnings management. Most of the extant literature focuses on equity executives' incentives, while most of the earnings management literature focuses on accrual earnings management (AEM), not real earnings management (REM). This paper investigates the association between chief executive officers’ (CEOs) and chief financial officer (CFOs) cash compensation and REM and explores who has more influence on REM, the CEO or the CFO.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use the data of all listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the period from 2009 to 2017 and ordinary least squares regression as a baseline model and the Chow test to capture whether the CEO's or the CFO's cash compensation has more influence on REM. To address potential endogeneity issues, the authors use a firm-fixed effect technique and two-stage least squares regression.FindingsThe authors find that CEOs' and CFOs' cash compensation is significantly associated with REM, suggesting that paying non-equity compensation to the CEO and CFO is negatively associated with REM. The authors also find that the CFO's cash compensation has a more significant influence on REM than the CEO's cash compensation, suggesting that the CFO's accounting and financial knowledge strengthens his or her power on the quality of financial reporting.Practical implicationsThe study contributes to the literature of agency and contract theories by using cash-based compensation to provide strong evidence that CEO's and CFO's compensation is associated with REM. It also contributes to the earnings management literature by examining the effect of CEOs' and CFOs' cash compensation on earnings management using proxies for REM-related activities. The study also contributes to the institutional theory by providing empirical evidence on the governance role of executives' cash compensation in deterring REM. Finally, it is the first to examine the relationship between CEO's and CFO's cash compensation and REM, and the first to explore who is more influential regarding REM in emerging markets, the CEO or the CFO.Originality/valueAs a response to the call for investigations of the role of non-equity-based compensation in earnings management and the call to consider non-developed institutional contexts in governance research, this study extends prior studies by providing novel evidence on the relationship between CEOs' and CFOs' non-equity compensation and REM in China's emerging market. The study documents that the CFO has a greater influence on REM than the CEO does.

Evidence of the adaptive market hypothesis in shares traded by B3 listed banking companies

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paulo Vitor Souza de Souza ◽  
César Augusto Tibúrcio Silva ◽  
Fabiano Guasti Lima
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Institutional Factors ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Intrinsic Factors ◽  
Management Efficiency ◽  
Management Of Resources ◽  
Resilience Management ◽  
Unbalanced Panel Data

PurposeThe authors aim to verify the indicators that influence the efficiency reported by Brazilian listed financial companies.Design/methodology/approachThe sample consists of companies in the financial segment that have shares traded in B3, comprising nine institutions from 2000 to 2018 were selected. The authors adopted the regression model with unbalanced panel data to analyze the data. The dependent is the efficiency, which the authors calculated using Hurst Exponent. As independent variables, we used the sector-specific indicators: earnings management, banking resilience, management efficiency, and profitability. The authors controlled the models by size and type of control.FindingsThe findings indicate that the efficiency of financial companies' securities is affected by aspects related to management, resilience, and efficiency in administration. The lower the earnings management, the greater the banking resilience, the efficiency in the management of resources, and the efficiency of stock prices of these companies. These results show that efficiency is affected by intrinsic factors of the entities, corroborating the hypothesis that markets adapt, among others, to institutional factors.Originality/valueMany users of financial institutions understand whether their stock prices reflect the information provided by accounting. The findings are original because they provide evidence that institutional factors affect the efficiency of companies in the Brazilian financial segment.

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