Эволюция инструментов и подходов в рамках расширенной Глобальной сети финансовой безопасности в ответ на кризис COVID-19 (Evolution of Tools and Approaches within the Enlarged Global Financial Safety Net in Response to the COVID-19 Crisis)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evgeny Vinokurov ◽  
Artem Levenkov ◽  
Gennady Vasiliev ◽  
Sergey Potapov
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry Huizinga ◽  
Ata Can Bertay ◽  
Asli Demirgüç-Kunt

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 111-125
Author(s):  
Peter J. Morgan

This paper argues that there is a role for regional-level institutions of banking regulation in the ASEAN region. This is particularly important in an environment of increasing financial integration and harmonization, including exposures to shocks from volatile capital flows and cross-border banking institutions. The paper examines four aspects of financial regulation: microprudential regulation, macroprudential regulation, resolution capacity and deposit insurance, and a financial safety net. The paper argues that EU regional banking regulation provides a useful reference point, but the lower degree of credit market openness in ASEAN implies that a more nuanced approach can be adopted, and makes specific recommendations.


Policy Papers ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (15) ◽  
Author(s):  

PRGT-related policies following the 2015 enhancement of the financial safety net for LICs, while options to better assist countries confronting sudden balance of payments needs due to large natural disasters are under consideration. Demand for PRGT resources has increased. Demand for concessional resources has exceeded historical averages in recent years, mainly in response to sustained low commodity prices and deteriorated global financial market conditions. Demand is expected to reach new highs in 2017 and longer-term estimates have been raised somewhat.


Policy Papers ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  

This Handbook provides guidance to staff on the financial facilities and non-financial instruments for low-income countries (LICs), defined here as all countries eligible to obtain concessional financing from the Fund. It updates the previous version of the Handbook that was published in February 2016 (IMF, 2016d) by incorporating modifications resulting from Board papers and related decisions since that time, including Financing for Development—Enhancing the Financial Safety Net for Developing Countries—Further Considerations (IMF, 2016c), Review of Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust – Review of Interest Rate Structure (IMF, 2016b), Eligibility to Use the Fund’s Facilities for Concessional Financing (IMF, 2017a), Large Natural Disasters—Enhancing the Financial Safety Net for Developing Countries (IMF, 2017b) and Adequacy of the Global Financial Safety Net – Proposal for a New Policy Coordination Instrument (IMF, 2017c). Designed as a comprehensive reference tool for program work on LICs, the Handbook also refers, in summary form, to a range of relevant policies that apply more generally to IMF members. As with all guidance notes, the relevant IMF Executive Board decisions, including the terms of the various LIC Trust Instruments that have been adopted by the Board, remain the sole legal authority on the matters covered in the Handbook


Policy Papers ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (70) ◽  
Author(s):  

liquidity in the face of increased vulnerabilities calls for enhancing the liquidity support provided through the global financial safety net (GFSN). The global economy is experiencing a period of protracted uncertainty, marked by frequent episodes of volatility. Demand for liquidity has intensified, in particular from emerging markets, which are experiencing a build-up of vulnerabilities and the depletion of their fiscal buffers. The enhanced GFSN meets only partially this higher demand for liquidity. The IMFC and G20 have called on the Fund to further strengthen the safety net. The uneven use of the Fund’s toolkit for crisis prevention suggests the need to reconsider its design. Despite a major overhaul of the Fund’s lending instruments available for precautionary financing, only a modest number of countries have used them. In particular, the lack of access to a liquidity backstop for members with strong policies—similar to the standing bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) among central banks—limits the availability of Fund support over the whole duration of the shock during protracted periods of global uncertainty. Moreover, the need to resort to Fund financing still carries a high political cost (stigma) for some members. To enhance further the Fund’s toolkit for crisis prevention, consideration could be given to revisiting the existing toolkit and introducing new instruments. The toolkit could thus be enhanced by: establishing a new facility for precautionary financing that would provide a "standing" liquidity backstop to members with strong fundamentals and policies for use when hit by liquidity shocks; and adjusting the existing toolkit to maintain cohesion. Any change to the Fund toolkit would need to take into account the tradeoffs between reducing stigma and containing moral hazard, while simultaneously safeguarding Fund resources. A Fund policy monitoring instrument could improve the cohesion of the global safety net. As the GFSN has expanded and become more multi-layered, there is a need to improve cooperation across the different layers to unlock financing and signal commitment to reforms. Creating a policy monitoring instrument that is available to all Fund members could help in this regard. Next steps . In light of Directors’ views on these points, staff could come back with subsequent papers that lay out specific and detailed proposals for reforming the lending toolkit. While these papers focus on the GRA lending toolkit, a separate forthcoming paper will assess some aspects of the concessional lending toolkit.


Policy Papers ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
Author(s):  

protracted global uncertainty combined with frequent episodes of capital flow volatility have intensified demand for liquidity support. In response to calls from the IMFC and the G20, the Fund has identified gaps in the global financial safety net (GFSN) and the Fund’s lending toolkit for crisis prevention, including insufficient coverage against liquidity pressures resulting from volatile capital flows. The proposals in this paper draw on the previous Fund work on the adequacy of the GFSN, the review of the Fund’s current toolkit for crisis prevention, and extensive consultations with the membership. The review of the FCL concludes that the FCL has been effective in providing precautionary support against external tail risks. Successor FCL arrangements and associated access levels have been in line with the assessment of external risks and potential balance of payments needs. However, there is scope to strengthen the transparency and predictability of the qualification framework by adding indicator-based thresholds to complement and inform judgment. To enhance crisis resilience while improving the Fund’s toolkit coherence and resource use, the paper proposes three complementary reforms: The establishment of a Short-term Liquidity Swap to provide renewable and reliable liquidity support against potential short-term moderate volatility of capital flows. The proposed instrument is for members with very strong fundamentals and economic policies, and tailored to improve reliability and appeal to users. The use of a core set of indicators with thresholds to guide judgment in FCL qualification. This will improve predictability and transparency while keeping the standards unchanged. The elimination of the PLL to maintain a streamlined and coherent toolkit, given the low use of the PLL, likely reflecting issues of tiering with the FCL. The paper also discusses possible reforms of the current commitment fee policy to promote a more balanced use of Fund resources. Possible options include increasing the commitment fee at high access levels or introducing a new time-based commitment fee.


Policy Papers ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (59) ◽  
Author(s):  

The Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) is comprised mainly of countries' own reserves and external public sources of insurance and financing. The main external official arrangements are central bank bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs), regional financial arrangements (RFAs), and the Fund. The safety net seeks to provide countries with insurance against crises, financing when shocks hit, and incentives for sound macroeconomic policies.


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