A Veto Alternative to Punishment: The Power to Annul an Economic Exchange Promotes Investment During Fairness and Trust Games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sinthu Sridharan ◽  
Rashmi Sudarsan ◽  
Ruibo Dong ◽  
Chi Cheong ◽  
Lasana Harris
Keyword(s):  
Economic Exchange ◽  
Trust Games

Alternatives to Punishment: The power to annul an economic exchange promotes self- rather than other-regarding preferences in fairness and trust games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sinthu Sridharan ◽  
Rashmi Sudarsan ◽  
Ruibo Dong ◽  
Chi Cheong ◽  
Lasana Harris
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Economic Exchange ◽  
Social Motives ◽  
The Public ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Games Studies ◽  
Economic Transaction ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

Fairness and trust appraisals that engender economic exchange rely on thoughts about another person’s mind to satisfy self- (profit maximising) and other-regarding (social motives) preferences. Punishment should promote fairness and trust within economic exchange, guarding against free-riding and trust violations, but depends on other-regarding preferences concerned with the violator. Here, we explore an alternative to punishment that may instead promote self-regarding preferences—the opportunity for the decision-maker to annul (veto) the economic transaction. We test this veto approach by having participants assume the role of investor(s) in modified versions of the public goods (Studies one and three) and trust games (Studies two and four). Across four studies both online and in laboratory with two economic games, investor(s) could veto a transaction—annul a previous exchange—if the return from the other player(s) was deemed unsatisfactory. We find that this manipulation increased investment by the investor(s), consistent with games where second-party punishment is possible. Moreover, self-regarding preferences predicted veto behaviour, while other-regarding preferences predicted punishment behaviour. We argue that this veto approach can be an alternative to punishment that can safe-guard fairness and trust during economic exchange.

Contested Illegality

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annette Hübschle
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Economic Exchange ◽  
Political Decision ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Effective Implementation ◽  
Cultural Legitimacy ◽  
The Way

This chapter shows that the illegalization of an economic exchange is not a straightforward political decision with fixed goalposts, but a protracted process that may encounter unexpected hurdles along the way to effective implementation and enforcement. While political considerations informed the decision to ban trade in rhino horn initially, diffusion of the prohibition has been uneven and lacks social and cultural legitimacy among key actors along the supply chain. Moreover, some market actors justify their participation in illegal rhino horn markets based on the perceived illegitimacy of the rhino horn prohibition. The concept of “contested illegality” captures an important legitimization device of market participants who do not accept the trade ban.

Lavish returns on cheap talk: Two-way communication in trust games

2011 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avner Ben-Ner ◽  
Louis Putterman ◽  
Ting Ren
Keyword(s):  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Trust Games

scholarly journals Gratitude as moral sentiment: Emotion-guided cooperation in economic exchange.

Emotion ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
David DeSteno ◽  
Monica Y. Bartlett ◽  
Jolie Baumann ◽  
Lisa A. Williams ◽  
Leah Dickens
Keyword(s):  
Moral Sentiment ◽  
Economic Exchange

Contexts and structures

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Lake
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Economic Exchange ◽  
The Social ◽  
Gender Hierarchy ◽  
Political Narratives ◽  
Institutional Structures

This introductory chapter provides an outline of some of the ideological, political, and institutional structures and contexts within which the plays under discussion in this study were produced and consumed. Shakespeare's stagings of history were peculiarly intense in their concentration on the doings of kings and princes. In an emergently absolutist personal monarchy and during a period in which issues of succession and legitimacy were much on people's minds, plays that were so insistently about kings and queens were also quintessentially political plays. As a great deal of recent work has shown, such political concerns could well structure and, in their turn, be structured by, parallel sets of concerns and beliefs about the workings of the social order and the gender hierarchy. Political narratives then became useful ways to figure and interrogate the dynamics of economic exchange and value determined by the market or the workings of the gender hierarchy.

scholarly journals Support of Economy in CIS Countries during the Pandemic

2020 ◽  
pp. 80-93
Author(s):  
A. Lampsi ◽  
◽  
◽  
Keyword(s):  
International Economic ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Economic Exchange ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Number Of Factors ◽  
Self Sufficiency ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
Cis Countries ◽  
National Economies ◽  
In Cis

The COVID-19 pandemiс has dealt a severe blow to economy of the post-Soviet countries. Measures undertaken by governments of the CIS countries for supporting national economies have been determined by a number of factors, and political reasons often were playing a role no less important than economic ones. As a result, the situation with supporting economy during the pandemiс clearly revealed similarities and differences not only in economic, but also in political systems of the CIS countries, their orientation towards certain international economic institutions, the level of self-sufficiency of economies, their dependence and interdependence from different directions of economic exchange.

scholarly journals Intergroup emotional exchange: Ingroup guilt and outgroup anger increase resource allocation in trust games.

Emotion ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-616 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danielle M. Shore ◽  
Magdalena Rychlowska ◽  
Job van der Schalk ◽  
Brian Parkinson ◽  
Antony S. R. Manstead
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Trust Games

Preventing proliferation: the impact on international politics

1981 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
George H. Quester
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International System ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Nuclear Industry ◽  
Economic Exchange ◽  
Military Interventions ◽  
Political Clout ◽  
The World ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Pariah States

Nine predictions are advanced on the impact on the international system of a successful effort to contain nuclear proliferation.The world will see a modest dilution of the prerogatives of sovereignty, very much tailored to the halting of nuclear weapons spread. Some breakthroughs will be achieved in the multinational management of nuclear industry. Current “pariah states” may escape such status, simply through the latent possibility of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons will continue to go unused in combat, just as they have since 1945. Soviet-American cooperation on the nuclear proliferation front will continue. The traffic in conventional arms may by contrast go relatively unchecked, as most countries conclude that this kind of weapons spread is less bad than nuclear proliferation. All of this will be carried through by statements distorted by the normal deceptions of diplomacy. The world will nonetheless generally become more sophisticated in discounting any glamor or political clout in nuclear weapons programs. Most of the barrier to proliferation will come through normal political and economic exchange, rather than through any violent or military interventions.

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