scholarly journals The Ecology of Collective Action: A Public Goods and Sanctions Experiment with Controlled Group Formation

Author(s):  
Umut Ones ◽  
Louis G. Putterman
2000 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
James S. Wunsch

The political revolution of contemporary Africa has so far largely been limited to the centre and to re-establishing the same institutional forms and processes which failed Africa in the 1960s. These regimes are already showing signs of erosion. This problem can be understood through the theory of public goods. Key collective or ‘public’ goods problems impede the collective action necessary for institutional development. Top-down strategies cannot surmount these problems because they cannot integrate and unify the population or structure consensual and sustained collective action.As currently constituted, national levels of government in Africa will be poor partners with local communities in development, be it of democracy or of the economy. In many cases, national regimes only exist at all because minimal contributing sets or political monopolists controlled, were given, or mobilised the resources to establish constituting rule systems which they used to sustain their existing relative advantages during the break-up of imperial systems. As this advantage is usually at the expense of the majority which lives outside the capitals, resources and policies to improve these areas are slow in coming. The slow, bottom-up process by which a true public constitution is built, one which reflects and elaborates generally held values, is built on existing political relationships, and protects social diversity, has never been allowed to develop.Refounding the African state must resolve these problems if it is to succeed. Ethnically and religiously diverse peoples will rule themselves better under federal and consociational systems which give local leaders space to lead local institutional development, authority to play a role in national governance, a process to develop consensus on central policy and to check the centre when there is no consensus. This requires a foundation of viable, real, developed structures of local governance if it is to succeed.


Author(s):  
Oksana Shymanska

The article substantiates Elinor Ostrom’s contribution to the theory of collective management of property. The author outlines solutions to problems of the most optimal use of scarce natural resources and their economically relevant preservation in a long-term perspective. The research paper affirms the idea that it is not only the government who can solve the problem of efficient use of resources for public purposes. It is proved that collective decisions can be made in the management of resources, under which the latter are maintained in good conditions while being used for general public. The most accepted models (‘the tragedy of the commons’, ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’, ‘the logic of collective action’) are examined. The above- mentioned models are frequently used as tools to study cases of economic policy-making in allocating scarce resources for public purposes, and as a concept for analyzing problems of individuals who seek to achieve collective benefits. It is emphasized that there is a need for a balanced application of the above models as metaphors, which substitute solid foundations of the economic policy, since the limitations suggested for easing the analysis are accepted without reservation as permanent empirical requirements that remain as such until adjustments are made by the government. Special emphasis is placed on the importance of developing the theory of human organization based on realistic assessments of human possibilities and limitations that arise when a number of various situations related to using public goods are to be resolved. It is stressed that the empirically supported theories of human organization as an important component of study on economic policy are able to complement the solutions with estimates of the most likely effect of using many ways of organizing human activities. It is concluded that E. Ostrom’s experimental research in the field of natural resources management can be used to solve large-scale range of issues related to the production of public goods.


2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-167
Author(s):  
Ivan Ermakoff

This book may be read from two complementary and enlightening perspectives: as a history of political thought centered on the role played by fear in group formation, and as a theoretical treatise on “negative association,” that is, collective action based on a principle of identification in opposition to others. Both perspectives sustain each other. The first draws attention to a rich and insightful reinterpretation of classical and lesser-known texts. The peculiarity of this history of political thought is that it records not inflection points but continuity and resilience. The second perspective is intended to bring about positive knowledge. This conflation of genres is an appealing facet of the book. In tracing a continuity of thought, Ioannis Evrigenis purports to demonstrate the validity of a theoretical claim about the centrality of negative association. By the same token, the historical exposé lays bare the set of premises that sustains the claim.


Author(s):  
Rubén A. Mendoza ◽  
T. Ravichandran

XML-based vertical standards are an emerging compatibility standard for describing business processes and data formats in specific industries that have emerged in the past decade. Vertical standards, typically implemented using eXtensible Markup Language (XML), are incomplete products in constant evolution, continually adding functionality to reflect changing business needs. Vertical standards are public goods because they are freely obtained from sponsoring organizations without investing resources in their development, which gives rise to linked collective action dilemmas at the development and diffusion stages. Firms must be persuaded to invest in development without being able to profit from the output, and a commitment to ensure the diffusion of the standard must be secured from enough potential adopters to guarantee success. In this paper, the authors explore organizational drivers for participation in vertical standards development activities for supply- and demand-side organizations (i.e., vendors and end-user firms) in light of the restrictions imposed by these dilemmas.


2019 ◽  
pp. 153-178
Author(s):  
Jason Potts

Chapter 7 examines a life-cycle view of an innovation trajectory that begins with an innovation commons, and considers what happens after the innovation commons collapses when entrepreneurial firms emerge (i.e., the fundamental transformation). This chapter explores how the governance role of an innovation commons will often reform and reconstitute to provide industry-specific public goods through collective action, usually in the form of an industry association. This governance function is associated with what in evolutionary theory is called niche construction. This evolutionary governance model of an innovation trajectory shows the complexities of innovation policy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (S1) ◽  
pp. S70-S84
Author(s):  
Jetta Frost ◽  
Fabian Hattke

Academic research and education are, more than ever, a collective endeavour. This article discusses how different modes of governance facilitate or obstruct collective action in universities. Based on theories of public goods and the resource-based perspective, we develop the concept of university commons in order to analyse the challenges arising from the governance of collective action. We examine how to effectively balance collegial and managerial governance to create a sustainable portfolio of university commons.


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