scholarly journals Coalition Formation under Uncertainty: The Stability Likelihood of an International Climate Agreement

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rob Dellink ◽  
Michael Finus ◽  
Niels Olieman
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
International Climate ◽  
The Stability ◽  
International Climate Agreement

scholarly journals The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement

2007 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 357-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rob Dellink ◽  
Michael Finus ◽  
Niels Olieman
Keyword(s):  
International Climate ◽  
The Stability ◽  
International Climate Agreement

scholarly journals The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements

2006 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Peter Weikard ◽  
Michael Finus ◽  
Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera
Keyword(s):  
Climate Agreements ◽  
Surplus Sharing ◽  
International Climate Agreements ◽  
International Climate ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Impact

Policy Preferences in Coalition Formation and the Stability of Minority and Surplus Governments

2017 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 250-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Bassi
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
The Stability

scholarly journals Climate policy and equity principles: fair burden sharing in a dynamic world

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 517-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucas Bretschger
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
Burden Sharing ◽  
Carbon Budgets ◽  
International Climate Policy ◽  
International Climate ◽  
International Climate Agreement ◽  
Equity Principles

AbstractThe paper argues that negotiation costs can prevent the international community from finding a new international climate agreement. To define a feasible way of facilitating the negotiation process, I analyze basic equity principles and their relationship to climate policy and economic development. Based on the most relevant principles, I propose a general synthetic rule for burden sharing in international climate policy. The rule avoids complexity and comprises both egalitarian and cost-sharing aspects, which appears to be crucial for achieving a climate agreement. Carbon budgets for the different countries are calculated under different parameter assumptions.

Lessons from the EU’s ETS for a New International Climate Agreement

2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomas Wyns
Keyword(s):  
International Climate ◽  
International Climate Agreement

scholarly journals Designing the Optimal International Climate Agreement with Variability in Commitments

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jordan H. McAllister ◽  
Keith E. Schnakenberg
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Information Collection ◽  
Abatement Costs ◽  
Independent Information ◽  
International Climate ◽  
Mitigation Costs ◽  
International Climate Agreement

Abstract We analyze the design of an international climate agreement. In particular, we consider two goals of such an agreement: overcoming free-rider problems and adjusting for differences in mitigation costs between countries. Previous work suggests that it is difficult to achieve both of these goals at once under asymmetric information because countries free ride by exaggerating their abatement costs. We argue that independent information collection (investigations) by an international organization can alleviate this problem. In fact, though the best implementable climate agreement without investigations fails to adjust for individual differences even with significant enforcement power, a mechanism with investigations allows adjustment and can enable implementation of the socially optimal agreement. Furthermore, when the organization has significant enforcement power, the optimal agreement is achievable even with minimal investigative resources (and vice versa). The results suggest that discussions about institutions for climate cooperation should focus on information collection as well as enforcement.

AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF COMPONENTS OF CLIMATE ARCHITECTURES

2017 ◽  
Vol 08 (04) ◽  
pp. 1750013
Author(s):  
MAX MEULEMANN
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
Unique Data ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Or Groups ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Personal Attitudes ◽  
International Climate ◽  
International Climate Agreement ◽  
The Eu

Based on unique data from a worldwide survey among participants of international climate conferences, I investigate the acceptance of the most discussed components of architectures for an international climate agreement, namely: global quantitative targets, sector targets, research and development, geoengineering, land use, and adaptation. Regional and economic differences as well as personal attitudes play an important role for the perception of the different components. Global quantitative targets and adaptation are the most accepted in contrast to a low acceptance of geoengineering. People that are more affected by climate change and value fairness a lot care more about global and sector targets and research and development. Surprisingly, being vulnerable to climate change does not increase the preference for adaptation by much. Furthermore, I analyze which countries or groups of countries are expected to play a leading role for each component. The EU is seen as a key player and not much is expected from the USA and China. I detect a normative bias that increases expectations on China, the EU, and the USA for some of the components.

scholarly journals The Impact of Surplus Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Agreements

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Peter Weikard ◽  
Michael Finus ◽  
Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera
Keyword(s):  
Climate Agreements ◽  
Surplus Sharing ◽  
International Climate Agreements ◽  
International Climate ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Impact

DRIVERS OF STABILITY OF CLIMATE COALITIONS IN THE STACO MODEL

2011 ◽  
Vol 02 (02) ◽  
pp. 105-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROB DELLINK
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Allocation Scheme ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Climate Agreements ◽  
Applied Model ◽  
Permit Allocation ◽  
International Climate Agreements ◽  
Project Costs ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Global Agreement

This paper investigates which drivers affect the formation and stability of international climate agreements (ICAs). The applied model STACO is used to project costs and benefits of an international agreement on climate change mitigation activities. The simulation results show that an incentive-based permit allocation scheme is an essential driver in stabilizing larger coalitions. Regional damage shares turn out to be another driver of coalition formation but global damages do not seem to be, thus illustrating that international coalition formation is a matter of relative costs and benefits across regions. No allocation scheme can, however, assure the stability of a global agreement due to huge free-rider incentives. This requires alternative rules, such as a condition that some players are essential in a coalition, or accepting a small loss from cooperation.

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