The mediating effects of executive function on the relationship between children’s second-order theory of mind and prosocial lie-telling

Abstract It has been argued (e.g., by De Villiers and colleagues) that the acquisition of sentence embedding is necessary for the development of first-order Theory of Mind (ToM): the ability to attribute beliefs to others. This raises the question whether the acquisition of double embedded sentences is related to, and perhaps even necessary for, the development of second-order ToM: the ability to attribute beliefs about beliefs to others. This study tested 55 children (aged 7-10) on their ToM understanding in a false-belief task and on their elicited production of sentence embeddings. We found that second-order ToM passers produced mainly double embeddings, whereas first-order ToM passers produced mainly single embeddings. Furthermore, a better performance on second-order ToM predicted a higher rate of double embeddings and a lower rate of single embeddings in the production task. We conclude that children’s ability to produce double embeddings is related to their development of second-order ToM.

Download Full-text

Grice on Irony and Metaphor: Discredited by the Experimental Evidence?

International Review of Pragmatics ◽

10.1163/18773109-13050101 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 5 (1) ◽

pp. 1-33 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Marga Reimer

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Experimental Evidence ◽

Explanatory Power ◽

Experimental Studies ◽

Thought Experiments ◽

Order Theory ◽

The Other ◽

Figures Of Speech ◽

The One ◽

The Relationship

Recent experimental studies appear to discredit Gricean accounts of irony and metaphor. I argue that appearances are decidedly misleading here and that Gricean accounts of these figures of speech are actually confirmed by the studies in question. However, my primary aim is not so much to defend Gricean accounts of irony and metaphor as it is to motivate two related points: one substantive and one methodological. The substantive point concerns something Grice suggests in his brief remarks on irony: that the interpretation of an ironical (vs. metaphorical) utterance requires two distinct applications of second-order theory of mind (ToM). I argue that such a view has considerable explanatory power. It can explain an intuitive contrast between irony and metaphor, some interesting data on the ToM abilities of patients with schizophrenia, and some intuitive similarities between irony on the one hand and hyperbole and meiosis on the other. The methodological point concerns the relationship between the empirical psychologist’s (or experimental philosopher’s) experimental studies and the armchair philosopher’s thought-experiments. I suggest that the credibility of an experimentally supported claim is enhanced when it captures the reflective judgments captured in the armchair philosopher’s thought-experiments.

Download Full-text

Irony, deception and theory of mind in people with intellectual disabilities and dual diagnoses

Vojnosanitetski pregled ◽

10.2298/vsp180214142d ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 77 (6) ◽

pp. 620-630

Author(s):

Mirjana Djordjevic ◽

Nenad Glumbic ◽

Branislav Brojcin

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Cognitive Skills ◽

Intellectual Functioning ◽

Order Theory ◽

Speech Comprehension ◽

First Order Theory ◽

Comprehension Ability ◽

Dual Diagnoses ◽

Relationship Of ◽

The Relationship

Background/Aim. The ability to comprehend and produce irony and deception is rarely explored in people with intellectual disability (ID) or dual diagnoses (DD). The ability to understand irony and deception appears to be related to many cognitive skills, but some authors point out that the theory of mind is one of the most important factors for this ability. This research was conducted to determine the linguistic aspects of production and comprehension of irony and deception in adults with ID and DD, as well as the relationship of these abilities with theory of mind. Methods. The sample consisted of 120 people with ID aged between 20 and 56. Half of the sample comprised people with DD. Four subscales from the Assessment Battery for Communication were used to assess the participants? abilities to produce and comprehend irony and deception. False-belief tasks from ?appearance-reality? category were used in theory of mind assessment. The level of intellectual functioning was measured by the Raven?s progressive matrices, while the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test was used to assess speech comprehension ability. Results. The results show that participants with DD and ID comprehend and produce false statements better than ironic ones. Participants with ID were more successful in production than in comprehension tasks of both false and ironic statements, while the same was true for participants with DD only for ironic statements. Participants with ID were significantly more successful than participants with DD in irony comprehension tasks. In participants with ID, first-order theory of mind significantly correlated only with the ability to produce irony, and second-order theory of mind significantly correlated with producing irony and deception. There were no significant correlations between theory of mind and producing and comprehending irony and deception in participants with DD. Conclusion. Although differences in some aspects of assessed abilities were found between the two groups of participants, the similarities in the profile of these abilities were dominant. Results of variability can be explained by differences in speech comprehension ability more than by differences in nonverbal intellectual functioning or theory of mind acquisition. Future studies should assess the influence of other cognitive factors.

Download Full-text