scholarly journals in Search of Leaders with Chinesecharacteristics: A Reflection of Indonesia's 2014 General Election

Humaniora ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 251
Author(s):  
Abdullah Dahana ◽  
Kelly Rosalin ◽  
Melani Wiannastiti

Article dealt with the questions of leadership transition in post–Mao Zedong/Deng Xiaoping era. During the time of Mao and Deng, factionalism played important roles in all segments of Chinese politics, including the election of a leader. After Mao and Deng, although factionalism persisted, it did not become contradiction, but rather it created a situation in which factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cooperated in all aspects of Chinese politics. The main objective of this research was the perpetuation of the party’s grip on political power . The article also dealt with the questions of recruiting and educating party cadres. Career paths of three post-Deng Chinese leaders, i.e., Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping were also explored to explain the period they reached their peak of their careers by blood and sweat. This article finds that it cannot be denied that what is happening in China now in the area of leadership is using a system of a political dynasty. 

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Abdullah Dahana ◽  
Kelly Rosalin

Since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping in 1997, factionalism and power struggle as the characteristic of leadership change in China has ended. Although factionalism still exists, it has been converted to collaboration among all factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The election of Xi Jinping to the presidency of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and to the position as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is therefore, as the result of cooperation among factions. This paper discusses various challenges, including nationalism as the most serious issue faced by Xi Jinping as a leader elected through compromise.


Subject China's 19th Communist Party Congress. Significance Preparations are underway for the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which is likely to be scheduled for October or November. Much political groundwork has been laid in support of President Xi Jinping and for progress on his vision for China. The Congress will set a direction towards the 100th anniversary in 2021 of the founding of the Party and the handover of power to a sixth generation of leaders shortly after. Impacts Beijing will probably be cautious in its foreign policy during the months running up to the Congress. Consolidating his position at the Congress should increase Xi's ability to press his economically reformist, politically illiberal agenda. Bar any serious reversal, Xi will be in a position to dominate Chinese politics after he retires from formal offices.


2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 187-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Holbig

In late 2017, the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed the “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” Most observers interpreted this step as just another update of the party's ideological canon to accommodate Xi's ambition to increase his personal power, following in the footsteps of Mao Zedong. This contribution argues that we can achieve a better understanding of the claim about a “new era,” if this claim is analysed diachronically as an ongoing process of constructing “chrono-ideological narratives” that link past and future, as well as synchronically in the larger context of recent constitutional and organisational changes. It finds that the “new era” discourse might, in the longer term, have ramifications not only for China's domestic politics but also for the country's self-image in the international arena too.


2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-97
Author(s):  
KJELD ERIK BRØDSGAARD ◽  
NIS HØYRUP CHRISTENSEN

The 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in BeijingOctober 18-24 2017. Leading up to the congress there was intense speculation concerning the new line-up of the most important leadership bodies of the CPC: the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee. Would the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) continue to consist of seven members, or would it be expanded to nine members, as was the case during Jiang Zemin's era, or would it instead be reduced to five members, as was the case during the late 1980s? Would unwritten rules such as '68 down, 67 up' be observed? Or would veteran leaders such as Wang Qishan (69) continue to serve on the committee? Would Xi Jinping pack the Politburo and the PSC with his own close allies, or would he try to achieve a factional balance observing the interests of former leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao? There was also much speculation concerning Xi Jinping's status. Would the 'Chairman of Everything' have hisname and thought written into the CPC Constitution alongside that of MaoZedong and Deng Xiaoping and ahead of his two immediate predecessors?Xi Jinping's report to the Party congress was also awaited with muchinterest. Such a report is usually a long document setting out the Party'spriorities and policy objectives for the next five-year period. Would XiJinping's report signal new policy initiatives, and would it outline strategicguidelines reaching beyond 2022? This article examines these questionsand assesses the future impact of the Party congress on Chinese politics.


Subject Prospect for politics in China in 2018. Significance Last month’s 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party saw President Xi Jinping confirmed as the single most powerful person in China. He can now pursue his ambitions for the country with tighter coordination and greater intensity. These include transforming China into a dominant influence on the world stage.


Author(s):  
Massimo Introvigne

The confrontation between the Chinese regime and The Church of Almighty God does not happen in a vacuum. The chapter reconstructs the different attitudes the Chinese Communist Party has had toward religions. Mao originally believed that, with the progress of Communism in China, religion will naturally disappear. Meanwhile, he tried to control it through five national associations (Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Buddhist, and Daoist), to which all believers should mandatorily adhere. This strategy, however, failed to prevent the growth of independent religious bodies, and the Cultural Revolution tried to wipe religion out entirely. After the dust of the Cultural Revolution settled, Deng Xiaoping restored the five national associations and granted religion a limited tolerance. The chapter also shows that, under Xi Jinping, the attitude toward religion became again more negative. The groups banned as xie jiao suffer more than all the others.


Author(s):  
Roy Anthony Rogers

Since 1978 when Deng Xiaoping took over the leadership of China after the demise of Mao Zedong in 1976, the country witnessed dramatic changes in the human rights situation. These included freedom in performing religious obligations such as pilgrimage, for the Muslim Uyghurs and freedom to practice their culture and language. Hence, there was an overall improvement in human rights situation in Xinjiang province. However, in the late 1990s the Chinese Communist Party reverted to harsh policies once again. They declared the policy of ‘Strike Hard’ which sanctioned the use of torture and arbitrary detention as well as extra-judicial killings of the Uyghurs. This article examines the factors that have influenced China’s policies on the human rights condition in Xinjiang from 1978 until 2007. It also analyses the role of Uyghur diasporas in their struggle to internationalise the human rights issues in Xinjiang and China’s reaction towards the international pressures.  


1984 ◽  
Vol 97 ◽  
pp. 24-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Young

The legacies of the Cultural Revolution have been nowhere more enduring than in the Chinese Communist Party organization. Since late 1967, when the process of rebuilding the shattered Party began, strengthening Party leadership has been a principal theme of Chinese politics; that theme has become even more pronounced in recent years. It is now claimed that earlier efforts achieved nothing, and that during the whole “decade of turmoil” until 1976, disarray in the Party persisted and political authority declined still further. Recent programmes of Party reform, therefore, still seek to overcome the malign effects of the Cultural Revolution in order to achieve the complementary objectives of reviving abandoned Party “traditions” and refashioning the Party according to the new political direction demanded by its present leaders.


Since taking power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party has consistently tried to enforce a monopoly on the writing and interpretation of history. However, since 1998 individual initiatives have increased in the field of memory. Confronting official amnesia, victims of Maoist movements have decided to write their versions of history before it is too late. This chapter presents a typology of these endeavours. Annals of the Yellow Emperor (Yanhuang chunqiu), an official publication, enjoyed some freedom to publish dissenting historical accounts but was suppressed in 2016. With the rise of the internet, unofficial journals appeared that were often dedicated to a specific period: Tie Liu’s Small traces of the Past (Wangshi weihen) published accounts of victims of the Anti-Rightist movement for almost a decade before the editor was arrested; Wu Di’s Remembrance (Jiyi) founded by former Red Guards and rusticated youth circulates on line. The third type is the samizdat: targets of repression during Mao’s reign recount their experience in books that are published at their own expense and circulated privately. Most of these “entrepreneurs of memory” are convinced that restoring historical truth is a pre-requisite to China’s democratization. Since Xi Jinping came to power, they have suffered repression.


2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 15-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael M. Sheng

In October 1950 the Chinese leader Mao Zedong embarked on a two-front war. He sent troops to Korea and invaded Tibet at a time when the People's Republic of China was burdened with many domestic problems. The logic behind Mao's risky policy has baffled historians ever since. By drawing on newly available Chinese and Western documents and memoirs, this article explains what happened in October 1950 and why Mao acted as he did. The release of key documents such as telegrams between Mao and his subordinates enables scholars to understand Chinese policymaking vis-à-vis Tibet much more fully than in the past. The article shows that Mao skillfully used the conflicts for his own purposes and consolidated his hold over the Chinese Communist Party.


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