scholarly journals China after Reform: The Ideological, Constitutional, and Organisational Makings of a New Era

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 187-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Holbig

In late 2017, the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed the “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” Most observers interpreted this step as just another update of the party's ideological canon to accommodate Xi's ambition to increase his personal power, following in the footsteps of Mao Zedong. This contribution argues that we can achieve a better understanding of the claim about a “new era,” if this claim is analysed diachronically as an ongoing process of constructing “chrono-ideological narratives” that link past and future, as well as synchronically in the larger context of recent constitutional and organisational changes. It finds that the “new era” discourse might, in the longer term, have ramifications not only for China's domestic politics but also for the country's self-image in the international arena too.

Humaniora ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 251
Author(s):  
Abdullah Dahana ◽  
Kelly Rosalin ◽  
Melani Wiannastiti

Article dealt with the questions of leadership transition in post–Mao Zedong/Deng Xiaoping era. During the time of Mao and Deng, factionalism played important roles in all segments of Chinese politics, including the election of a leader. After Mao and Deng, although factionalism persisted, it did not become contradiction, but rather it created a situation in which factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cooperated in all aspects of Chinese politics. The main objective of this research was the perpetuation of the party’s grip on political power . The article also dealt with the questions of recruiting and educating party cadres. Career paths of three post-Deng Chinese leaders, i.e., Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping were also explored to explain the period they reached their peak of their careers by blood and sweat. This article finds that it cannot be denied that what is happening in China now in the area of leadership is using a system of a political dynasty. 


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Abdullah Dahana ◽  
Kelly Rosalin

Since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping in 1997, factionalism and power struggle as the characteristic of leadership change in China has ended. Although factionalism still exists, it has been converted to collaboration among all factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The election of Xi Jinping to the presidency of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and to the position as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is therefore, as the result of cooperation among factions. This paper discusses various challenges, including nationalism as the most serious issue faced by Xi Jinping as a leader elected through compromise.


1977 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
pp. 528-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Lieberthal

Mao Tse-tung died on 9 September 1976. On 6 October, with the arrest of four leading members of the Politburo, Hua Kuo-feng became Mao Tse-tung's successor. Since then the Chinese media have vilified the “gang of four” as “splittists” who had worked together for years to divide the Party and promote their own personal fortunes. According to the victors, policy issues had little to do with the activities of this nefarious “gang.” Rather, lust for personal power and desire for wealth alone inspired them to wage partisan warfare within the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 87
Author(s):  
Wei Zheng ◽  
Qing-Xiang Feng

Since the 18th CPC national congress, the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered into a new era. In the new context of development, Chinese President Xi Jinping has put forward the Belt and Road Policy. The Belt and Road Policy is not only a major decision for China to promote regional economic integration and international economic and trade exchanges, but also a project to spread traditional Chinese culture. The Belt and Road Policy initiative bears the mission of spreading the Chinese civilization and building a community with a shared future for humanity. It attempts to provide a set of Chinese solutions to the bottleneck of global development and demonstrates the cultural confidence of the CPC.


Since taking power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party has consistently tried to enforce a monopoly on the writing and interpretation of history. However, since 1998 individual initiatives have increased in the field of memory. Confronting official amnesia, victims of Maoist movements have decided to write their versions of history before it is too late. This chapter presents a typology of these endeavours. Annals of the Yellow Emperor (Yanhuang chunqiu), an official publication, enjoyed some freedom to publish dissenting historical accounts but was suppressed in 2016. With the rise of the internet, unofficial journals appeared that were often dedicated to a specific period: Tie Liu’s Small traces of the Past (Wangshi weihen) published accounts of victims of the Anti-Rightist movement for almost a decade before the editor was arrested; Wu Di’s Remembrance (Jiyi) founded by former Red Guards and rusticated youth circulates on line. The third type is the samizdat: targets of repression during Mao’s reign recount their experience in books that are published at their own expense and circulated privately. Most of these “entrepreneurs of memory” are convinced that restoring historical truth is a pre-requisite to China’s democratization. Since Xi Jinping came to power, they have suffered repression.


2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 15-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael M. Sheng

In October 1950 the Chinese leader Mao Zedong embarked on a two-front war. He sent troops to Korea and invaded Tibet at a time when the People's Republic of China was burdened with many domestic problems. The logic behind Mao's risky policy has baffled historians ever since. By drawing on newly available Chinese and Western documents and memoirs, this article explains what happened in October 1950 and why Mao acted as he did. The release of key documents such as telegrams between Mao and his subordinates enables scholars to understand Chinese policymaking vis-à-vis Tibet much more fully than in the past. The article shows that Mao skillfully used the conflicts for his own purposes and consolidated his hold over the Chinese Communist Party.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 153-179
Author(s):  
Neil J. Diamant ◽  
Feng Xiaocai

This article uses comments, questions, and conversations about the PRC's draft constitution of 1954 to assess state legitimacy and how people felt more generally about the Communist regime. Taking advantage of untapped archival sources in Hong Kong and the mainland—including classified intraparty reports and transcripts from meetings in factories, police stations, universities, and villages—this article challenges the conventional view that the constitution bolstered support for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Instead, the document generated a great deal of anxiety among ordinary citizens, as well as among CCP officials and the regime's favored classes. This “text-based” cause of emotional turmoil was a supplement to the classic forms of political terror that dominate the literature on Communist dictatorships. Despite widespread confusion, people's identification of problematic sections of the constitution turned out to be remarkably prescient in light of political disasters in the 1950s and 1960s and ongoing constitutional controversies in the era after Mao Zedong.


Modern China ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Trevaskes

This article explores the political significance of “governing the nation in accordance with the law” 依法治国 ( yifa zhiguo) in the Xi Jinping era. It examines party statements and propaganda about the necessity of exercising party leadership over all key aspects of law-based governance, particularly the politico-legal system. The aim is to understand the strategic need for yifa zhiguo as part of the ideological repertoire of the Xi leadership. The argument is that yifa zhiguo is essentially an ideological and strategic message about power relations under Xi and the capacity of the party to withstand various threats to its credibility and thus ultimately to bring about the nation’s and party’s rejuvenation.


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