A Spoonful of Sugar Makes the Medicine go Down: Pay for Delay and Market Definition in the Servier Judgment

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 86-94
Author(s):  
F. van der Kraan ◽  
W. Sauter
Keyword(s):  
Market Definition

An old friend is better than two new ones? Approaches to market research in the context of digital transformation for the antitrust laws enforcement

2020 ◽  
pp. 37-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. E. Shastitko ◽  
O. A. Markova
Keyword(s):  
Business Models ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Digital Transformation ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Type I ◽  
Type Ii ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Pass Through ◽  
Type Ii Errors

Digital transformation has led to changes in business models of traditional players in the existing markets. What is more, new entrants and new markets appeared, in particular platforms and multisided markets. The emergence and rapid development of platforms are caused primarily by the existence of so called indirect network externalities. Regarding to this, a question arises of whether the existing instruments of competition law enforcement and market analysis are still relevant when analyzing markets with digital platforms? This paper aims at discussing advantages and disadvantages of using various tools to define markets with platforms. In particular, we define the features of the SSNIP test when being applyed to markets with platforms. Furthermore, we analyze adjustment in tests for platform market definition in terms of possible type I and type II errors. All in all, it turns out that to reduce the likelihood of type I and type II errors while applying market definition technique to markets with platforms one should consider the type of platform analyzed: transaction platforms without pass-through and non-transaction matching platforms should be tackled as players in a multisided market, whereas non-transaction platforms should be analyzed as players in several interrelated markets. However, if the platform is allowed to adjust prices, there emerges additional challenge that the regulator and companies may manipulate the results of SSNIP test by applying different models of competition.

scholarly journals The impact of geographic market definition on the stringency of hospital merger control in Germany and the Netherlands

2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Varkevisser ◽  
Frederik T. Schut
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
The United States ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Hospital Mergers ◽  
Hospital Markets ◽  
Hospital Merger ◽  
The Impact

AbstractIn markets where hospitals are expected to compete, preventive merger control aims to prohibit anticompetitive mergers. In the hospital industry, however, the standard method for defining the relevant market (SSNIP) is difficult to apply and alternative approaches have proven inaccurate. Experiences from the United States show that courts, by identifying overly broad geographic markets, have underestimated the anticompetitive effects of hospital mergers. We examine how geographic hospital markets are defined in Germany and the Netherlands where market-oriented reforms have created room for hospital competition. For each country, we discuss a landmark case where definition of the geographic market played a decisive role. Our findings indicate that defining geographic hospital markets in both countries is less complicated than in the United States, where antitrust analysis must take managed care organisations into account. We also find that different methods result in much more stringent hospital merger control in Germany than in the Netherlands. Given the uncertainties in defining hospital markets, the German competition authority seems to be inclined to avoid the risk of being too permissive; the opposite holds for the Dutch competition authority. We argue that for society the costs of being too permissive with regard to hospital mergers may be larger than the costs of being too stringent.

Excessive Pharmaceutical Pricing as an Abuse of Dominant Position – The Case of CD Pharma (Denmark)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Behrang Kianzad
Keyword(s):  
Public Procurement ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Pharmaceutical Market ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Pharmaceutical Pricing ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position

Abstract On 31 January 2018, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority adopted a decision1 finding the Swedish company generic distributor CD Pharma in breach of Art. 102(a) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) by abusing its dominant position and having imposed excessive and unfair prices for the drug Syntocinon. The company increased the price of the drug by 2000% in the period April-October 2014 in the Danish pharmaceutical market. CD Pharma appealed to the Danish Competition Appeals Board,2 which on 29 November 2018 upheld the decision by the Authority. On subsequent appeal to the Danish Maritime and Commercial Court,3 the judgment by the previous court was upheld in a 3-2 decision on 2 March 2020, thus finding CD Pharma liable for infringement of Danish competition law as well as Art. 102(a) TFEU. The decision is final and not subject to further appeal. The case raises outstanding legal-economic issues regarding excessive pricing such as relevant market definition in pharmaceutical cases, the length of abuse, competitive price benchmarks, definition of economic value and the matter of dominance in public procurement and tenders. The case is rather unusual in that the alleged abusive period amounted to a six-month period, CD Pharma was the ‘losing’ party in the bidding process for the supply of the medicine in question, and CD Pharma subsequently had reduced prices through negotiations with the Danish central medicine procurer, Amgros. Similar to the Aspen Pharma decision4 by the Italian Competition Authority, where the Italian Medicine Agency (AIFA) reported the case to the Competition Authority, it was the Danish medicine procurer Amgros who had notified the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority about allegedly abusive practices. This subsequently led to an investigation and the adoption of the Decision. Following an introduction describing the Danish pharmaceutical market and specifics of the case, section two of this contribution details the proceedings at Danish Competition Authority. Section three depicts the proceedings at Competition Appeals Tribunal, and section four deals with the proceedings at the Maritime and Commercial Court. Section five concludes.

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