Pricing irrigation water under asymmetric information and cost recovery constraints

2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
pp. 189-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Gallerani ◽  
M. Raggi ◽  
D. Viaggi
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Irrigation Water ◽  
Cost Recovery ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Optimal Pricing Strategy ◽  
Principal Agent Model

The objective of this paper is to discuss how policy makers may deal with irrigation water pricing under asymmetric information, positive transaction costs on payments and cost recovery constraints. The issue is dealt with through the development of a principal agent model and its application to a pilot case study in Emilia Romagna, Italy. The results show that using a menu of contracts may improve the overall social welfare derived from irrigation. However, differences in performance among instruments (and hence the choice of the optimal pricing strategy) are critically determined by the amount of the full cost of water and of transaction costs. Moreover, differentiation among farmers may encounter policy obstacles as a potential source of conflicts.

Explaining the Gaps between Mandate and Performance: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform

2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 10-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamar Gutner
Keyword(s):  
World Bank ◽  
Policy Process ◽  
Environmental Performance ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
The World ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
And Performance

This article seeks to explain why the World Bank's environmental performance is so uneven despite numerous reform efforts. I argue that a principal-agent model offers a potentially powerful tool for analyzing gaps between the mandates and performance of international organizations (IOs) such as the World Bank. The model is particularly useful when it is calibrated to recognize problems of antinomic delegation and the dual role an IO may have as both agent and principal. Antinomic delegation occurs when states ask IOs to take on complex tasks that are difficult to institutionalize. Recognizing that many IOs may be principal and agent at different stages of the policy process reveals more opportunities for agency slack that are not well addressed by the IO literature. This article presents these modifications to the principal-agent model and applies the model to the case of the World Bank. The case study demonstrates that the nature of the tasks being delegated and the incentives shaping both sides of the principal-agent relationship are key sources of disconnect between the institution's stated goals and its performance.

Agency, Information, and the Structure of Moral Problems in Business

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan W. Husted
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Information Economics ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Ethical Problems ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Principal Agent Model

Many ethical problems in business can be characterized as having elements of incomplete and/or asymmetric information. This paper analyzes such problems using information economics and the principal-agent model. It defines the nature of moral problems in business and then applies principal-agent models involving adverse selection and moral hazard to these problems. Possible solutions to conditions of information asymmetry are examined in order to support the development of organizational virtue.

Involvement of private actors in the provision of urban sanitation services; potential challenges and precautions

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 270-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sanitation Services ◽  
Urban Sanitation ◽  
Principal Agent Model

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to use relevant models and theories to conceptualize the prospects and challenges associated with private sector involvement in the provision of sanitation and environmental services in urban settlements of developing African economies. Design/methodology/approach – The study adopts the public choice theory and principal-agent model in its conceptualization and analysis. Retrospective literature analysis within the qualitative research approach has been employed for the study. It draws extensively on existing classical theoretical and current empirical literature on privatization of urban sanitation services in developing countries. Findings – The study observes that privatization is a necessary tool for enhancing quality and responsive sanitation service delivery but there must be some mechanisms to prevent any latent challenges. The study also observes that the same problems associated with the public sector could transcend into the private sector if key measures are not taken into consideration. Practical implications – The process of privatizing or contracting out must ensure competition, enough communication to all stakeholders as well as involving expertise in the bidding process. The process also requires strict monitoring and supervision; these call for an appropriate legal framework to regulate privatization. The paper reminds urban administrators and policy makers to be circumspect in the privatization process. If the process of privatization is carried out effectively, urban sanitation services will be provided effectively and efficiently. Originality/value – The paper adapts the public choice and principal-agent model to assess privatization processes in developing African countries. This study will be of importance to urban administrators, public officials and policy makers in general.

The reform of the Frontex Agency in the view of the principal-agent model. A case study of an attempt of supranationalisation

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 179-190
Author(s):  
Jakub Bornio
Keyword(s):  
Principal Agent ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Principal Agent Model

W niniejszym artykule zbadano, w jaki sposób Komisja Europejska podczas reformy Agencji Frontex próbowała uzyskać niezależność i zdobyć nowe kompetencje. Analiza mechanizmów próby supranacjonalizacji oraz jej końcowy efekt stały się głównym problemem badawczym niniejszego opracowania. Podstawą teoretyczną analizy jest model mocodawca-agent. W artykule dodatkowo zweryfikowano użyteczność eksplanacyjną modelu i jego główne założenia, przez co artykuł posiada również walor badania teoretycznego. Badanie wykazało, że próba uzyskania przez Komisję Europejską nowych kompetencji została efektywnie zablokowana przez państwa członkowskie. Udowodniono użyteczność modelu mocodawca-agent w badaniu prób usamodzielniania się agenta.

scholarly journals Pricing Unmetered Irrigation Water under Asymmetric Information and Full Cost Recovery

Water ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alban Lika ◽  
Francesco Galioto ◽  
Alessandra Scardigno ◽  
Pandi Zdruli ◽  
Davide Viaggi
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Irrigation Water ◽  
Cost Recovery ◽  
Full Cost ◽  
Full Cost Recovery
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