Global Finance after the Crisis: Reform Imperatives and Vested Interests

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 1850228
Author(s):  
Wim Naude

The global financial crisis of 2008-09 has stimulated a number of re-assessments of global development. But after two years, not much progress has been made in dealing with the deep causes of the crisis. While it is better understood now why the crisis occurred, more progress is needed in terms of financial reform on the global level in order to prevent future financial crises. A remaining challenge is to strengthen the global financial architecture (GFA). This paper focuses on the GFA and its relationship to the global financial crisis. Recent reform initiatives are discussed. Strong resistance against re-regulation of the financial sector is noted, reflecting the general opposition of vested interests to GFA reform.

Author(s):  
Yukon Huang

Deng Xiaoping’s most celebrated achievement was to reshape economic incentives and concentrate development along China’s coast. In doing so, he set the stage for what is referred to as China’s unbalanced growth process. Premier Zhu Rongji kept the growth momentum going by overhauling key financial and economic institutions in response to the Asian Financial Crisis. These reforms led to unprecedented double-digit GDP growth over the three decades prior to 2010. Both Deng Xiaoping and Zhu Rongji were “policy entrepreneurs.” Through their ideas and actions, they were able to overcome vested interests, all while taking risks and launching new reform initiatives. Progress on the reform agenda slowed in the years leading up to the Global Financial Crisis as the subsequent leadership was lulled into a false sense of confidence because of China’s strong economic performance.


2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 37-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mireya Solís

AbstractJapan’s response to the global financial crisis has emphasized global initiatives and downplayed the regional agenda, in sharp contrast with its approach to the Asian financial crisis. This rebalancing in Japan’s economic diplomacy reflects the greater political space that it has enjoyed at the global level since its long-held views on the benefits of flexible International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending practices and controls on volatile capital flows became mainstream. Meanwhile, at the regional level Japan faces stiff competition from China in shaping the regional integration agenda and unchartered territory in coleading a multilateral Chiang Mai Initiative. Despite its enhanced profile, Japan’s new globalism is uneven: it has made a very significant financial contribution to expand the IMF’s resources and to restore trade financing; but Japan has not played a major role in the debate surrounding the most pressing issues of a future financial architecture, such as tackling global imbalances and promoting foreign exchange-rate cooperation. Japan’s muted voice, despite its large financial commitments, reflects its difficult adaptation to the G20 summitry process, as well as political volatility at home, which prevents it from developing measures to deal with the global downturn.


2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 653-659 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilene Grabel

I advance three claims in the paper. First, the Asian and especially the global financial crisis occasioned discontinuities and continuities that are imparting incoherence to the global financial governance architecture and developmental finance. Second, the emergent incoherence is productive of development rather than debilitating. Third, productive incoherence can be understood most fully within a “Hirschmanian mindset,” that is, an understanding of social and regime change informed by Albert O. Hirschman’s key theoretical and epistemic commitments.


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