scholarly journals Public Policy and Market Competition: How the Master Settlement Agreement Changed the Cigarette Industry

Author(s):  
Federico Ciliberto ◽  
Nicolai V Kuminoff

Abstract This paper investigates the large and unexpected increase in cigarette prices that followed the 1997 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). We integrate key features of rational addiction theory into a discrete-choice model of the demand for a differentiated product. We find that following the MSA firms set prices on a more elastic region of their demand curves. Using these estimates, we predict prices that would be charged under a variety of industry structures and pricing rules. Under the assumptions of firms’ perfect foresight and constant marginal costs, we fail to reject the hypothesis that firms collude on a dynamic pricing strategy.

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Xiong-zhi Wang ◽  
Wenliang Zhou

In this article, we investigate a joint pricing and inventory problem for a retailer selling fresh agriproducts (FAPs) with two-period shelf lifetime in a dynamic stochastic setting, where new and old FAPs are on sale simultaneously. At the beginning of each period the retailer makes ordering decision for new FAP and sets regular and discount price for new and old inventories, respectively. After demand realization, the expired leftover is disposed and unexpired inventory is carried to the next period, continuing selling. Unmet demand of all FAPs is backordered. The objective is to maximize the total expected discount profit over the whole planning horizon. We present a price-dependent, stochastic dynamic programming model taking into account zero lead time, linear ordering costs, inventory holding, and backlogging costs, as well as disposal cost. Considering the influence of the perishability, we integrate a Multinomial Logit (MNL) choice model to describe the consumer behavior on purchasing fresh or nonfresh product. By way of the inverse of the price vector, the original formulation can be transferred to be jointly concave and tractable. Finally we characterize the optimal policy and develop effective methods to solve the problem and conduct a simple numerical illustration.


Author(s):  
Jörg Schimmelpfennig

The purpose of this chapter is to rectify the at best unprofessional intermingling of objectives and constraints and present a proper theory of first-best and second-best pricing in urban rail networks. First, in view of the flaws of both Dupuit's – though nevertheless ingenious idea of – consumer surplus as well its cannibalized version found in most of today's economics textbooks, a proper definition of economic welfare resting on Hicks'sian variations instead is provided. It is used to derive efficient pricing rules that are subsequently applied to specific questions arising from running an urban railway network such as overcrowding, short-run versus long-run capacity or competing modes of transport like the private motor car. At the same time, another look is taken at economic costs, and in particular economic marginal costs, differing from commercial or accounting costs. Among other things, it is shown that even with commercial marginal costs being constant first-best pricing might not necessarily be incompatible with a zero-profit budget.


Author(s):  
Jihui Chen

This manuscript per the author provides a broad survey of recent literature on online price dispersion in the fields of economics, information system, and marketing, and offers a number of explanations documented in various electronic retailing markets from both the demand and supply sides, such as branding/reputation, market competition, consumer heterogeneity, dynamic pricing, and oligopoly strategies, to name a few. In addition, it also discusses several potential directions for future research in this area.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
David S. Timmons ◽  
Benjamin Weil

Purpose Many institutions of higher education have committed to carbon neutrality. Given this goal, the main economic issue is minimizing cost. As for society as a whole, dominant decarbonization strategies are renewable electricity generation, electrification of end uses and energy efficiency. The purpose of this paper is to describe the optimum combination of strategies. Design/methodology/approach There are four questions for eliminating the primary institutional greenhouse gas emissions: how much renewable electricity to produce on-site; where and at what price to purchase the balance of renewable electricity required; how to heat and cool buildings without fossil fuels; and how much to invest in energy efficiency. A method is presented to minimize decarbonization costs by equating marginal costs of the alternates. Findings The estimated cost of grid-purchased carbon-free energy is the most important benchmark, determining both the optimal level of campus-produced renewable energy and the optimum efficiency investment. In the context of complete decarbonization, greater efficiency investments may be justified than when individual measures are judged only by fossil-fuel savings. Practical implications This paper discusses a theoretically ideal plan and implementation issues such as purchasing carbon-free electricity, calculating marginal costs of conserved energy, nonmarginal cost changes, uncertainty about achieving efficiency targets, and dynamic pricing. The principles described in this study can be used to craft a cost-minimizing decarbonization strategy. Originality/value While previous studies discuss decarbonization strategies, there is little economic guidance on which strategies are optimal, on how to combine strategies to minimize cost or how to identify a preferred path to decarbonization.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 784-791
Author(s):  
Keith D Harris ◽  
Yair Daon ◽  
Vidyanand Nanjundiah

Abstract The handicap principle was originally proposed to resolve the question of why, in their competition for mates, certain species invest in exaggerated ornaments that are often detrimental to their survival. Zahavi suggested that the traits that are most suitable to serve as signals are precisely those that require the burden of extra investment to increase in magnitude: that burden enables the signal to be correlated with the signaler’s quality. According to his model, the additional investment in signaling results in a functional advantage. It does so by providing more accurate information regarding the signaler as it increases the distinction between males of similar quality. There are a number of formalizations of this model, and experimental studies of the handicap principle have focused on testing them. Nonetheless, there is little consensus whether 1) ensuring reliability requires an additional investment or 2) traits that require a relatively higher investment to increase (have higher marginal costs) are selected as signals over those with lower marginal costs. Here, we present an agent-based mate choice model that quantifies the relative stability of signals with different marginal costs. Our model demonstrates how quality-independent constraints (in signal production and perception) affect the range of marginal costs for which a signal is informative. In turn, receiver preference for informative signals drives the selection of signals according to marginal cost. The presence or absence of signaling constraints can determine the outcome of costly signaling models and, thus, explain the different conclusions of Zahavi’s verbal model and its subsequent formalizations.


2012 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 965-980 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef Broder ◽  
Paat Rusmevichientong
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Meg Reganon ◽  
Madeiline Joy Aloria

Author(s):  
Will Ma ◽  
David Simchi-Levi ◽  
Jinglong Zhao

This work is motivated by our collaboration with a large consumer packaged goods (CPG) company. We have found that whereas the company appreciates the advantages of dynamic pricing, they deem it operationally much easier to plan out a static price calendar in advance. We investigate the efficacy of static control policies for revenue management problems whose optimal solution is inherently dynamic. In these problems, a firm has limited inventory to sell over a finite time horizon, over which heterogeneous customers stochastically arrive. We consider both pricing and assortment controls, and derive simple static policies in the form of a price calendar or a planned sequence of assortments, respectively. In the assortment planning problem, we also differentiate between the static vs. dynamic substitution models of customer demand. We show that our policies are within 1-1/e (approximately 0.63) of the optimum under stationary demand, and 1/2 of the optimum under nonstationary demand, with both guarantees approaching 1 if the starting inventories are large. We adapt the technique of prophet inequalities from optimal stopping theory to pricing and assortment problems, and our results are relative to the linear programming relaxation. Under the special case of stationary demand single-item pricing, our results improve the understanding of irregular and discrete demand curves, by showing that a static calendar can be (1-1/e)-approximate if the prices are sorted high-to-low. Finally, we demonstrate on both data from the CPG company and synthetic data from the literature that our simple price and assortment calendars are effective. This paper was accepted by Hamid Nazerzadeh, big data analytics.


Author(s):  
Jihui Chen

This chapter provides a broad survey of recent literature on online price dispersion in the fields of economics, information system, and marketing, and offers a number of explanations documented in various electronic retailing markets from both the demand and supply sides, such as branding/reputation, market competition, consumer heterogeneity, dynamic pricing, and oligopoly strategies, to name a few. In addition, it also discusses several potential directions for future research in this area.


Author(s):  
Jörg Schimmelpfennig

The purpose of this chapter is to rectify the at best unprofessional intermingling of objectives and constraints and present a proper theory of first-best and second-best pricing in urban rail networks. First, in view of the flaws of both Dupuit's – though nevertheless ingenious idea of – consumer surplus as well its cannibalized version found in most of today's economics textbooks, a proper definition of economic welfare resting on Hicks'sian variations instead is provided. It is used to derive efficient pricing rules that are subsequently applied to specific questions arising from running an urban railway network such as overcrowding, short-run versus long-run capacity or competing modes of transport like the private motor car. At the same time, another look is taken at economic costs, and in particular economic marginal costs, differing from commercial or accounting costs. Among other things, it is shown that even with commercial marginal costs being constant first-best pricing might not necessarily be incompatible with a zero-profit budget.


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