scholarly journals Runtuhnya Marxisme-Leninisme di Uni Soviet dalam Teori Ashabiyah Ibnu Khaldun

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 74
Author(s):  
Emil Dwi Febrian

This article examines history collapse of the Soviet Union with Ibn Khaldun's ashabiyah theory. The Soviet Union was first communist nation founded in 1922 after fall of the Russian-Monarchy due to the crisis and saparatist movement in 1917. Post World War II, the Soviet Union became a center of the communist movement around the world, and advanced in industrial sector, known as a superpower nation in the 20th century beside the United States. However, the Soviet Union was declared collapsed in 1991. This article found that Ibn Khaldun's ashabiyah can explain history of the Soviet Union in three stages of state metamorphosis; formation, glory, and collapse. Ashabiyah means a bond that unites the people, but it can be positive and negative. Analysis with negative ashabiyah, concluded that the collapse of Marxism-Leninism in Soviet Union was due to the denial of this philosophical teaching to create the privileges of the Communist Party became an authoritarian regime, and considered irrelevant and opposed by society. Authoritarianism happaned because of exclusivism and cult, and could occur in non-communist nations, including Indonesia in the New Order era, this shows that it is not ideology that created of authoritarian regimes, but political practices in specific nations.

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-44
Author(s):  
A. Yu. Borisov

It is unfortunate to note again today that World War II did not end, it continues in the form of the war of memory. Politicians and scholars who stand as ideological successors of collaborators are trying to rewrite the history of those tragic days, to downplay the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over fascism. They try to revive certain political myths, which have been debunked long ago, that the Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany bear equal responsibility for the outbreak of World War II, that the Red Army did not liberate Eastern Europe but ‘occupied’ it. In order to combat these attempts it is necessary to examine once again a turbulent history of the inter-war period and, particularly, the reasons why all attempts to form a united antifascist front had failed in the 1930s, but eventually led to the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition.The paper focuses on a complex set of political considerations, including cooperation and confrontation, mutual suspicions and a fervent desire to find an ally in the face of growing international tensions, which all together determined the dynamics of relations within a strategic triangle of the Soviet Union — the United States — Great Britain in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The paper shows how all attempts to establish a collective security system during the prewar period had shattered faced with the policy of appeasement, which allowed the Nazi Germany to occupy much of Europe. Only the Soviet Union’s entry into the war changed the course of the conflict and made a decisive contribution to the victory over fascist aggressors. The author emphasizes that at such crucial moment of history I.V. Stalin, F.D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill raised to that challenge, demonstrating realism, common sense and willingness to cooperate. Although within the anti-Hitler coalition there was a number of pending issues, which triggered tensions between the Allies, their leaders managed to move beyond old grievances, ideological differences and short-term political interests, to realize that they have a common strategic goal in the struggle against Nazism. According to the author, this is the foundation for success of the anti-Hitler coalition and, at the same time, the key lesson for contemporary politicians. The very emergence of the anti-Hitler coalition represented a watershed in the history of the 20th century, which has determined a way forward for the whole humanity and laid the foundations for the world order for the next fifty years.


2014 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Grant ◽  
Alice Fisher Fellow

Russian and Soviet nurse refugees faced myriad challenges attempting to become registered nurses in North America and elsewhere after the World War II. By drawing primarily on International Council of Nurses refugee files, a picture can be pieced together of the fate that befell many of those women who left Russia and later the Soviet Union because of revolution and war in the years after 1917. The history of first (after World War I) and second (after World War II) wave émigré nurses, integrated into the broader historical narrative, reveals that professional identity was just as important to these women as national identity. This became especially so after World War II, when Russian and Soviet refugee nurses resettled in the West. Individual accounts become interwoven on an international canvas that brings together a wide range of personal experiences from women based in Russia, the Soviet Union, China, Yugoslavia, Canada, the United States, and elsewhere. The commonality of experience among Russian nurses as they attempted to establish their professional identities highlights, through the prism of Russia, the importance of the history of the displaced nurse experience in the wider context of international migration history.


Refuge ◽  
1998 ◽  
pp. 43-48
Author(s):  
Boris Kovalev

Based on documents for the Russian archives, which in the early 1990s became open to the researchers, the author gives an account of the problem of collaborating with Nazi Germany in the USSR during World War II. He discusses the role of special punitive detachments, formed from the local populations in the occupied territories, in assisting Nazis in their policy of terror and genocide. A brief history of the infamous 667th punitive battalion, "Shelon, " and some of its members serves as an illustrative example. The author also explains why so many Nazi collaborators from the former Soviet Union managed to escape punishment and settle in the Western countries, Canada and the United States in particular, and also traces the history of some of them.


2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-702
Author(s):  
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet

In 1946, the entertainer and activist Paul Robeson pondered America's intentions in Iran. In what was to become one of the first major crises of the Cold War, Iran was fighting a Soviet aggressor that did not want to leave. Robeson posed the question, “Is our State Department concerned with protecting the rights of Iran and the welfare of the Iranian people, or is it concerned with protecting Anglo-American oil in that country and the Middle East in general?” This was a loaded question. The US was pressuring the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops after its occupation of the country during World War II. Robeson wondered why America cared so much about Soviet forces in Iranian territory, when it made no mention of Anglo-American troops “in countries far removed from the United States or Great Britain.” An editorial writer for a Black journal in St. Louis posed a different variant of the question: Why did the American secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, concern himself with elections in Iran, Arabia or Azerbaijan and yet not “interfere in his home state, South Carolina, which has not had a free election since Reconstruction?”


1953 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-167
Author(s):  
S. Bernard

The advent of a new administration in the United States and the passage of seven years since the end of World War II make it appropriate to review the political situation which has developed in Europe during that period and to ask what choices now are open to the West in its relations with the Soviet Union.The end of World War II found Europe torn between conflicting conceptions of international politics and of the goals that its members should seek. The democratic powers, led by the United States, viewed the world in traditional, Western, terms. The major problem, as they saw it, was one of working out a moral and legal order to which all powers could subscribe, and in which they would live. Quite independently of the environment, they assumed that one political order was both more practicable and more desirable than some other, and that their policies should be directed toward its attainment.


Author(s):  
James Mark ◽  
Quinn Slobodian

This chapter places Eastern Europe into a broader history of decolonization. It shows how the region’s own experience of the end of Empire after the World War I led its new states to consider their relationships with both European colonialism and those were struggling for their future liberation outside their continent. Following World War II, as Communist regimes took power in Eastern Europe, and overseas European Empires dissolved in Africa and Asia, newly powerful relationships developed. Analogies between the end of empire in Eastern Europe and the Global South, though sometimes tortured and riddled with their own blind spots, were nonetheless potent rhetorical idioms, enabling imagined solidarities and facilitating material connections in the era of the Cold War and non-alignment. After the demise of the so-called “evil empire” of the Soviet Union, analogies between the postcolonial and the postcommunist condition allowed for further novel equivalencies between these regions to develop.


2015 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 261-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cole Roskam

The current international attention devoted to contemporary Chinese-financed and constructed development in Africa has tended to obscure complex and multivalent histories of the relationships between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and numerous African nations; and many of these histories date back decades. The ideological origins behind socialist China’s engagement with Africa, and the geopolitical dynamics that continue to propel them forward, trace back to the time of Chairman Mao Zedong, who first coined the term ‘intermediate zone’ in 1946 to position the vast expanse of contested territories and undecided loyalties existing between the ideological poles of the Soviet Union and the United States after World War II. Nine years later (1955), at the first Non-Aligned Movement conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai declared thatever since modern times most of the countries of Asia and Africa in varying degrees have been subjected to colonial plunder and oppression, and have thus been forced to remain in a stagnant state of poverty and backwardness […]. We need to develop our countries independently with no outside interference and in accordance with the will of the people.


2021 ◽  

Assessments of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s performance as the Supreme Allied Commander during World War II and the nation’s thirty-fourth president have evolved across the more than seventy-five years from the conclusion of World War II in 1945 to the dedication in 2020 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial in Washington, DC. Historians have sought to explain Eisenhower’s unlikely rise from his modest upbringing in Abilene, Kansas, to his ascendance to command of western allies in the European theater. Selected over several senior officers in 1942 to command the invasion of North Africa (Operation Torch), Eisenhower initially experienced a series of setbacks and controversies resulting from inexperienced troops, incompetent subordinate leaders, a formidable enemy, and political deals with leaders of Vichy France. Although historians continue to debate his decisions regarding command and strategy in the European theater, they generally praise Eisenhower’s ability to maintain the western alliance amid national rivalries, professional jealousies, strong personalities, and competing political ambitions. Assessments of Eisenhower’s performance as president have undergone a remarkable transformation. Initially ranked in 1961 near the bottom in assessments of presidential leadership, he currently appears within the top tier. Initial accounts in the 1960s portrayed Eisenhower as a bumbling, docile president who appeared to be out of touch with the basic policies and operations of his administration. He appeared unwilling to address the major issues confronting American society, and to defer to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, on matters of foreign policy and national security. For his critics, Eisenhower perilously, inflexibly, and imprudently relied upon the superiority of the nation’s nuclear arsenal to contain communist expansion, then allowed the Soviet Union to beat the United States into space and create a missile gap. Scholars collectively labeled “Eisenhower Revisionists” assessing declassified documents beginning in the mid-1970s forged a revised consensus that Eisenhower was clearly thoughtful, informed, and firmly in command of his administration. Moreover, the nation’s nuclear arsenal retained and even strengthened its predominance of power. “Postrevisionist” analysts generally concur that Eisenhower was clearly the dominant decision-maker and developed an effective policy development process, but they question the efficacy of some of his decisions and policies, including his management of crises in this dangerous period of the Cold War, his increased use of covert operations and propaganda, his approach to decolonization, and his efforts to ease tensions and slow the nuclear arms race.


Author(s):  
David M. Edelstein

This chapter traces the deterioration of Soviet-American relations at the end of World War II and into the beginning of the cold war. While the United States and the Soviet Union found common cause during World War II in defeating Hitler’s Germany, their relationship began to deteriorate as the eventual defeat of Germany became more certain. The chapter emphasizes that it was growing beliefs about malign Soviet intentions, rather than changes in Soviet capabilities, that fuelled the origins of the cold war. In particular, the chapter details crises in Iran, Turkey, and Germany that contributed to U.S. beliefs about long-term Soviet intentions. As uncertainty evaporated, the enmity of the cold war took hold.


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