scholarly journals Research on differential game model of vertical cooperation of dual-channel low-carbon supply chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 832-839
Author(s):  
Mei-xiang Wu ◽  
Cheng-dong Shi ◽  
Qiang Sun
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Yang Zhang ◽  
Jingyi Li ◽  
Bing Xu

Nowadays, buy-online-and-pick-up-in-store (BOPS) is a popular sales project to promote product sales. Implementing BOPS in the dual-channel low-carbon supply chain (DLSC) can not only improve low-carbon manufacturers’ profit but also reduce energy consumption in it. This paper focuses on how to design the contract which can ensure the implementation of BOPS in the DLSC consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer considering consumers’ low-carbon preference. Based on the analysis of game theory, two kinds of BOPS contract (MW contract with the dominant manufacturer making decision on wholesale price and RW contract with the dominant retailer making decision on wholesale price) with fixed compensation are designed and compared to obtain the better contract which is more effective on the implementation of BOPS. The findings show that MW contract is better than RW contract for the DLSC to implement BOPS. When consumers’ low-carbon preference and BOPS preference and the anti-cross-price elasticity are high enough, the DLSC can implement BOPS under the MW contract because it has Pareto efficiency on the profit of the original DLSC. We further find the sales price is decreasing in consumers’ low-carbon preference and anti-cross-price elasticity, while the wholesale price is increasing in consumers’ low-carbon preference. Finally, the results are verified by numerical examples.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
pp. 1965 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baiyun Yuan ◽  
Longfei He ◽  
Bingmei Gu ◽  
Yi Zhang

Aiming at exploring the interplay principles of operations strategies among members of dvertising and emission reduction cost sharing contracts and coordination in low-carbon sulow-carbon supply chain, as well as their impact on system performance, we develop an evolutionary game model to capture emission reduction and low-carbon promotion actions, which are typically conducted by one manufacturer and one retailer in every two-echelon supply chain, respectively. We exploit the evolutionary game model to analyze players’ behavioral patterns of their interacting strategies, whereby we attain the evolutionary stable strategies and their associated existing preconditions under various scenarios. We acquire a number of managerial insights, and particularly find that the evolutionary stable strategies of the channel carbon reduction and promotion are remarkably influenced by incremental profits resulted from causes, such as every player’s unilateral participation in emission reduction. In addition, we investigate a player’s free-rider opportunistic practice in cooperative carbon reduction and joint participation in emission reduction. However, the magnitude of profit increment will heavily influence the result of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). Finally, the extensive computational studies enable us to verify the effectiveness of preceding models.


Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zonghuo Li ◽  
Wensheng Yang ◽  
Yinyuan Si

PurposeThis paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer offers coupons in the online channel and the retailer in the offline channel. The optimal pricing and coupon promotion policies are explored, and the brand image under different promotion scenarios is studied.Design/methodology/approachThree differential game models, namely no coupon is offered, coupons offered by the manufacturer and coupons offered by the retailer, are constructed.FindingsThe results show that the manufacturer and retailer intend to conduct coupon promotions under a large coupon redemption rate. Coupon promotion derives a higher price and profit for the issuers, and the manufacturer can free-ride on the retailer's coupon promotion. The retailer's profit in the retailer-promotion scenario may be lower than that in the manufacturer-promotion scenario in some special conditions. Besides, price, coupon face value, brand image and profit increase over time. After multiple cycles game, the operational strategy evolves to an optimal equilibrium status.Originality/valueThis paper provides guidance and advice for dual-channel supply enterprises to implement joint pricing and coupon promotion strategies under multiple sales seasons.


2017 ◽  
Vol 117 (10) ◽  
pp. 2468-2484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xu Chen ◽  
Xiaojun Wang

Purpose In the era of climate change, industrial organizations are under increasing pressure from consumers and regulators to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of product mix as a strategy to deliver the low carbon supply chain under the cap-and-trade policy. Design/methodology/approach The authors incorporate the cap-and-trade policy into the green product mix decision models by using game-theoretic approach and compare these decisions in a decentralized model and a centralized model, respectively. The research explores potential behavioral changes under the cap-and-trade in the context of a two-echelon supply chain. Findings The analysis results show that the channel structure has significant impact on both economic and environmental performances. An integrated supply chain generates more profits. In contrast, a decentralized supply chain has lower carbon emissions. The cap-and-trade policy makes a different impact on the economic and environmental performances of the supply chain. Balancing the trade-offs is critical to ensure the long-term sustainability. Originality/value The research offers many interesting observations with respect to the effect of product mix strategy on operational decisions and the trade-offs between costs and carbon emissions under the cap-and-trade policy. The insights derived from the analysis not only help firms to make important operational and strategic decisions to reduce carbon emissions while maintaining their economic competitiveness, but also make meaningful contribution to governments’ policy making for carbon emissions control.


Author(s):  
Muhammad Shabir Shaharudin ◽  
Yudi Fernando

The threat of climate change is due to increasing carbon emissions of manufacturing production and transportation. Currently, government is encouraging manufacturing to reduce carbon emission and conduct low carbon supply chain management (LCSCM). In order to solve the greenhouse gas emission dilemma, LCSCM is essential for manufacturing firms' stakeholders. Supply chain partners are expected to know the proper measurement of emissions to solve this problem. This chapter's aim is to review literature on how to measure LCSCM. In the past, the concept of green supply chain management (GSCM) was practiced to promote and reduce environmental risks. However, GSCM is a driver or practice to achieve environmental outcomes. The extended model of GSCM currently practices LCSCM through carbon footprint (CF) concept. In other words, LCSCM is an outcome that both interests researchers and persuades practitioners.


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