scholarly journals Non-culpable ignorance and Just war theory

2007 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 59-68
Author(s):  
Jovan Babic
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Culpable Ignorance ◽  
Just Peace ◽  
Contemporary Context

The so called ?non-culpable ignorance? is an instrument to justify participating in a war on a defeated side, on condition that fighters sincerely believe that they are defending a just cause and had some valid reasons to believe in having a chance to win. Within the just war theory this instrument is needed to make both sides prima facie right, otherwise the theory would imply that those who lose are guilty in advance, especially if they are the weaker side. However, in contemporary context of criminalizing war the very concept of war is changing and becoming extremely vague. As wars are more and more ?asymmetric?, just war theory might face serious challenges regarding incorporation of ?non-culpable ignorance? within its scope, as well as difficulties in showing that justice goes with the victory, opening thus the issues of articulation of a just peace.

Civil War and Revolution

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Parry
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Popular Support ◽  
Civil Conflicts ◽  
Ethics Of War ◽  
National Defence

The vast majority of work on the ethics of war focuses on traditional wars between states. This chapter aims to show that this is an oversight worth rectifying. The strategy is largely comparative, assessing whether certain claims often defended in discussions of interstate wars stand up in the context of civil conflicts and whether there are principled moral differences between the two types of case. Firstly, the chapter argues that thinking about intrastate wars may help us make progress on important theoretical debates in recent just war theory. Secondly, it considers whether certain kinds of civil wars are subject to a more demanding standard of just cause, compared to interstate wars of national defence. Finally, it assesses the extent to which having popular support is an independent requirement of permissible war and whether this renders insurgencies harder to justify than wars fought by functioning states.

Ending War

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rodin
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Moral Assessment

In “The Ethics of America's Afghan War,” Richard W. Miller argues that reflecting on whether and how to end the war in Afghanistan exposes serious deficiencies in just war theory. I agree, though for different reasons than those canvassed by Professor Miller. Miller argues that by focusing on the traditional categories of just cause, proportionality, and necessity (or last resort), just war theory obscures the importance of broader geostrategic considerations that he believes are the most plausible—though ultimately for Miller insufficient—rationale for continuing with the strategy of large-scale counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. I doubt that geostrategic considerations can play the role in moral assessment that Miller believes they do. But the phenomena he is pointing to do illuminate important defects in traditional just war theory.

scholarly journals A fundamental asymmetry in judgments of soldiers at war

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanne M Watkins ◽  
Geoffrey Goodwin
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Two Factors

How should we judge a soldier who is fighting for an unjust cause? Is such a soldier the moral equal of a soldier fighting for an opposing, just cause? According to traditional just war theory (Walzer, 2006), soldiers on either side of a war are moral equals, regardless of the justness of the cause for which they fight (the “principle of combatant equality”). According to revisionist just war theory, however, the justness of the soldiers’ cause should inform moral judgments of their actions; on this view, our judgments of soldiers on either side of a war should therefore be asymmetric (McMahan, 2009). Despite intense philosophical debate between these two theories, little work has examined how they align with lay views. Assessing this correspondence is important because people’s attitude towards soldiers may have a variety of consequences, ranging from their support for war, to their acceptance, rejection, or valorization of individual combatants. Across eight studies, we find consistent evidence that ordinary individuals’ judgments of soldiers’ actions are influenced by the justness of the soldiers’ causes, contrary to the principle of combatant equality. Two factors (partially) explain this effect: first, people implicitly presume that soldiers identify with the cause for which they fight, which influences moral judgments of their actions; second, people implicitly align themselves with the just side of a war, treating combatants on the just side as part of their ingroup, thus rendering more favorable moral judgments of them. Several other possible explanations were not supported.

Must Just Peace and Just War Be Mutually Exclusive?

Horizons ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-108
Keyword(s):  
Catholic Church ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Just Peace ◽  
The Catholic Church

In April 2016 Pax Christi International and the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace cosponsored the Nonviolence and Just Peace Conference at the Vatican. The conference issued an Appeal calling on the Catholic Church to make nonviolence and just peace central to its purpose, while also urging it to cease teaching or using just war theory. This roundtable consists of four perspectives from Catholic moral theologians who offer just-war responses to this Appeal.

Moral Responsibilities and the Conflicting Demands ofJus Post Bellum

2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Evans
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Conflict Situation ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Conflicting Demands ◽  
Moral Responsibilities ◽  
Just Peace ◽  
As If

Recently, strong arguments have been offered for the inclusion ofjus post bellumin just war theory. If this addition is indeed justified, it is plain that, due to the variety in types of post-conflict situation, the content ofjus post bellumwill necessarily vary. One instance when it looks as if it should become “extended” in its scope, ranging well beyond (for example) issues of “just peace terms,” is when occupation of a defeated enemy is necessary. In this situation, this article argues that an engagement byjus post bellumwith the morality of post-conflict reconstruction is unavoidable. However, the resulting extension ofjus post bellum's stipulations threatens to generate conflict with another tenet that it would surely wish to endorse with respect to “just occupation,” namely, that sovereignty or self-determination should be restored to the occupied people as soon as is reasonably possible. Hence, the action-guiding objective of the theory could become significantly problematized. The article concludes by considering whether this problem supports the claim that the addition ofjus post bellumto just war theory is actually more problematic than its supporters have realized.

When is a cause just?

2002 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 557-575 ◽  
Author(s):  
IAN HOLLIDAY
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
World Order ◽  
War On Terrorism ◽  
International Forum ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Just War Tradition ◽  
The Cold War

The September 11 terrorist strikes prompted renewed interest in a debate about just cause that has been increasingly open since the demise of the Cold War and the shift to a more multilateral and interventionist world order. This article contributes to that debate by looking first into the just war tradition to argue for a conceptual revision that equates just cause with jus ad bellum (just recourse to war). It then seeks to specify the component parts of just cause understood in this way, holding that demonstrable injustice should take the place formerly occupied by just cause in just war theory. Towards the end it uses three real-world cases to develop a mechanism for validating just cause claims. The argument is that a cause is just only when its proponents can convince an international forum of intractable injustice, responsible intervention, and an appropriate balance of contingent factors. The article closes by considering how the current war on terrorism might be assessed in such a forum.

Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott D. Sagan ◽  
Benjamin A. Valentino
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Survey Experiment ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Moral Equality ◽  
Women And Children ◽  
Just War Doctrine ◽  
Original Survey ◽  
Moral Equality Of Combatants

AbstractTraditional just war doctrine holds that political leaders are morally responsible for the decision to initiate war, while individual soldiers should be judged solely by their conduct in war. According to this view, soldiers fighting in an unjust war of aggression and soldiers on the opposing side seeking to defend their country are morally equal as long as each obeys the rules of combat. Revisionist scholars, however, maintain that soldiers who fight for an unjust cause bear at least some responsibility for advancing an immoral end, even if they otherwise fight ethically. This article examines the attitudes of the American public regarding the moral equality of combatants. Utilizing an original survey experiment, we find that the public's moral reasoning is generally more consistent with that of the revisionists than with traditional just war theory. Americans in our study judged soldiers who participate in unjust wars as less ethical than soldiers in just wars, even when their battlefield conduct is identical, and a large proportion supported harsh punishments for soldiers simply for participating in unjust wars. We also find, however, that much of the American public is willing to extend the moral license of just cause significantly further than revisionist scholars advocate: half of the Americans in our survey were willing to allow an unambiguous war crime—a massacre of innocent women and children—to go unpunished when the act was committed by soldiers fighting for a just cause. Our findings suggest that incorporation of revisionist principles into the laws of war would reinforce dangerous moral intuitions encouraging the killing of civilians.

Just War Theory and the Last of Last Resort

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eamon Aloyo
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Just War Tradition

The last resort criterion has a hallowed place in the just war theory tradition. Many leading just war theory scholars accept it as a jus ad bellum requirement and some powerful politicians reference it. While there are several versions of last resort, many take it to mean that peaceful options that have a reasonable chance of achieving a just cause must be exhausted before the use of force is permissible. Its justification is straightforward and commonsensical: war is terrible, inevitably results in the deaths of numerous innocents and destruction of their property, and thus should be avoided whenever possible. I argue that last resort should be dropped from the just war tradition because its inclusion in the just war tradition can result in a greater number of harms to innocents than if the precept did not exist. What should matter morally is the severity and numbers of harms inflicted on innocents, not whether those harms are inflicted violently or nonviolently. I suggest that in the context of achieving a just cause, the only actions that are permissible are those that are likely to inflict the fewest morally weighted harms and that meet the other just war theory precepts (excluding last resort). Three accounts of last resort do not permit this, whereas while a fourth does, it is redundant with an important account of the jus ad bellum proportionality precept. Thus violent policies may be preferable in some rare circumstances to nonviolent alternatives such as non-targeted sanctions and negotiations because nonviolent policies sometimes are more likely to foreseeably and avoidably result in far greater harms to innocents than violent options.

Debating Humanitarian Intervention

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Tesón ◽  
Bas van der Vossen
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Humanitarian Interventions ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Almost All

The book offers contrasting views of humanitarian intervention—a war aimed at ending tyranny or violence. Fernando Tesón argues that humanitarian interventions are sometimes permissible; Bas van der Vossen argues that as a rule they are not. The authors use the tools of modern analytic philosophy, in particular just war theory, to substantiate their claims. According to Tesón, a humanitarian intervention has the same just cause as a justified revolution: ending tyranny. He analyzes the different kinds of just cause and whether or not an intervener may pursue other justified causes. For Tesón, the permissibility of humanitarian intervention is almost exclusively determined by the rules of proportionality. Bas van der Vossen, by contrast, holds that military intervention is morally impermissible in almost all cases. Justified interventions, van der Vossen argues, must have high ex ante chance of success. Analyzing the history and prospects of intervention shows that they almost never do.

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