Should Have Known

This chapter argues that there are cases in which a subject, S, should have known that p, even though, given her state of evidence at the time, she was in no position to know it. In particular, S should have known that p when (i) another person has, or would have, legitimate expectations regarding S’s epistemic condition, (ii) the satisfaction of these expectations would require that S knows that p, and (iii) S fails to know that p. I argue that these three conditions are sometimes jointly satisfied. There are (at least) two main sources of legitimate expectations regarding another’s epistemic condition: participation in a legitimate social practice; and moral and epistemic expectations more generally. In developing my position on this score, I will have an opportunity (i) to contrast practice-generated entitlements to expect with epistemic reasons to believe; (ii) to compare the “should have known” phenomenon with the phenomenon of culpable ignorance; and finally (iii) to suggest the bearing of the “should have known” phenomenon to epistemology itself.

Culpability and Breach of Trust

This chapter sets out a framework for analyzing the relative culpability of the breach of trust represented by willfully insincere and/or epistemically negligent discourse. Given that blameworthiness is usually linked with intentionality, the chapter begins by arguing in favor of culpable ignorance. After illustrating why an analysis of the degree of culpability is necessary for the framework, it is argued that we can best establish degree of culpability by considering the gravity of the breach of trust involved. Nine contextually based trust-related dimensions are proposed (e.g. the vulnerability of the hearer, the institutional power of the speaker, and the perceived harm that might result from the untruthful discourse), and it is suggested that the ethical breach might be aggravated or attenuated accordingly. Finally the chapter considers further aggravating and mitigating circumstances that need to be taken into account when making a final ethical judgement of the discursive act of untruthfulness.

Iterated Reckless Ignorance as a Substitute for Knowledge

Previous chapters have been concerned mainly with willful ignorance—which, paradigmatically, is to violate the duty to reasonably inform oneself about a suspected inculpatory proposition with the intention of preserving one’s ignorance. But one also might fail to inform oneself about one’s suspicions with other mens rea: one might do so while reckless or negligent with respect to the fact that one will remain in ignorance. Such lesser breaches of one’s investigatory duties can be culpable too. However, the existing willful ignorance doctrine does not reach these lesser forms of culpable ignorance. That is a problem. This chapter argues not only that it would be good for courts to go beyond the existing willful ignorance doctrine, but that they are committed to doing so. The law allows willful ignorance to substitute for knowledge on the theory that acting with the former can be culpable to the same degree and in the same way as acting with the latter. Accordingly, the law is committed also to allowing certain forms of egregious nonwillful ignorance—most importantly, reckless ignorance—to substitute for knowledge, provided the conditions of equal culpability are met.

Culpable Ignorance and Mental Disorders

here.

Culpable ignorance in a collective setting

This paper explores types of organisational ignorance and ways in which organisational practices can affect the knowledge we have about the causes and effects of our actions. I will argue that because knowledge and information are not evenly distributed within an organisation, sometimes organisational design alone can create individual ignorance. I will also show that sometimes the act that creates conditions for culpable ignorance takes place at the collective level. This suggests that quality of will of an agent is not necessary to explain culpable ignorance in an organisational setting.

Overuse Injuries in Youth Sports: Legal and Social Responsibility

Youth sports-related injuries represent a major public health challenge, and overuse injuries, which result from repetitive microtrauma and insufficient rest, are a particular and growing concern. Overuse injuries are increasingly prevalent within youth sports, can lead to lifelong disabilities, and are almost entirely preventable. We explore the question of whether parents, who have been shown to significantly influence their children’s sports experiences and behaviors, can be held responsible for overuse injuries. We also discuss the role of other actors, including medical practitioners and coaches, and the duties that they may have to prevent such injuries to child athletes. We argue that, in many cases, contributions to overuse injuries are the result of non-culpable ignorance, and that a better way to help prevent overuse injuries may be to enact policies that educate parents, as well as schools, coaches, and organizations, about overuse injuries.

General Expectations II

This chapter develops an account of how our epistemic expectations of one another bear on epistemic assessment itself. It argues that a failure to live up to the epistemic responsibilities assigned to us in legitimate social practices puts one’s belief at risk of epistemic impropriety. Whether one’s belief is epistemically improper owing to a failure of epistemic responsibility depends on what would have been the case had one fulfilled all of one’s responsibilities. If the result would have been a belief that failed to satisfy what have previously been identified as the core criteria for knowledge, then one’s belief fails to be epistemically proper. In the course of bringing this out, the author addresses the literature on culpable ignorance, introduces the notion of epistemic strict liability, and distinguishes the risk of epistemic impropriety from epistemic impropriety itself. The result is an account of the conditions on normative defeat.