scholarly journals The current debate: (C+M) E and ultimate harm

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 87-96
Author(s):  
Vojin Rakic

Persson and Savulescu (2011b) is a largely successful defense of the position promoted in Persson and Savulescu (2008) against Fenton?s critique of this position in Fenton (2009). However, one of Fenton?s essential censures has remained without response: if moral enhancement (ME) is to occur at the genetic or biological level, as Persson and Savulescu suppose it can and ought to, it will not be possible without significant scientific progress, including cognitive enhancement (CE) by bio-medical means. I will offer a response here to this critique Fenton raised-a response Persson and Savulecu did not give. It will be based on the concept of ?integrated neuroenhancement?, abbreviated (C+M) E.

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-103
Author(s):  
Vojin Rakic

I will discuss four major perspectives on cognitive enhancement and morality: 1) cognitive enhancement is morally impermissible because humans are not supposed to alter what God has ordained or nature has shaped; 2) cognitive enhancement is our moral duty, because a cognitively upgraded human is a better human; 3) cognitive enhancement is morally permissible only if it is preceded by moral enhancement; 4) cognitive enhancement is morally permissible only if it is a means to moral enhancement. I shall argue that the first three perspectives are less cogent than the fourth. The fourth perspective integrates cognitive and moral enhancement into one whole. I will denote it by (C+M) E.


2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 104-110
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Dobrijevic

The idea of biotechnological enhancement of people for non-medical purposes is not unambiguous. A gap that may arise between the ?cognitive? and so-called ?moral? enhancement points precisely to this fact. This article shows that, contrary to the intentions of its supporters, the idea according to which moral enhancement has precedence over cognitive enhancement is essentially just a new form of undermining human freedom.


2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adriana Warmbier

In this article I discuss one of the most significant areas of bioethical interest, which is the problem of moral enhancement. Since I claim that the crucial issue in the current debate on human bioenhancement is the problem of agency, I bring out and examine the conditions of possibility of selfunderstanding, acting subjects attributing responsible authorship for their actions to themselves. I shall argue that the very idea of moral enhancement, properly understood, fails to justify the claims that enhancing the “biological” factor that plays a part in the process of making moral choices, whether through biomedical or genetic interventions, will actually increase the probability of having “morally better future motives”.


Universe ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (10) ◽  
pp. 212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Alonso-Serrano ◽  
Gil Jannes

The current debate about a possible change of paradigm from a single universe to a multiverse scenario could have deep implications on our view of cosmology and of science in general. These implications therefore deserve to be analyzed from a fundamental conceptual level. We briefly review the different multiverse ideas, both historically and within contemporary physics. We then discuss several positions within philosophy of science with regard to scientific progress, and apply these to the multiverse debate. Finally, we construct some key concepts for a physical multiverse scenario and discuss the challenges this scenario has to deal with in order to provide a solid, testable theory.


2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRIS GYNGELL ◽  
SIMON EASTEAL

Abstract:One debate in contemporary bioethics centers on whether the development of cognitive enhancement technologies (CETs) will hasten the need for moral enhancement. In this article we provide a new argument in favor of pursuing these enhancement technologies together. The widespread availability of CETs will likely increase population-level cognitive diversity. Different people will choose to enhance different aspects of their cognition, and some won’t enhance themselves at all. Although this has the potential to be beneficial for society, it could also result in harms as people become more different from one another. Aspects of our moral psychology make it difficult for people to cooperate and coordinate actions with those who are very different from themselves. These moral failings could be targeted by moral enhancement technologies, which may improve cooperation among individuals. Moral enhancement technologies will therefore help society maximize the benefits, and reduce the costs, associated with widespread access to cognitive enhancements.


2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 73-80
Author(s):  
Vojin Rakic

Eudaimonic agents have to become dominant in humanity if it is to seriously diminish the probability of its self-annihilation. In order for this to happen, humanity ought to be morally enhanced. It will be argued that moral and cognitive enhancement have to be combined in such a way that all cognitive bio-enhancement leads to moral enhancement.


2018 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
pp. 351-370
Author(s):  
Lewis Coyne

AbstractThis essay addresses two aspects of Persson and Savulescu's case for moral enhancement: 1) the precise technological nature of ultimate harm, particularly as it applies to the ecological crisis, and 2) what is at stake in the solution they propose. My claim is that Persson and Savulescu's treatment of both issues is inadequate: the ecological crisis is a more complex phenomenon than they suppose, and more is at stake in moral enhancement than they claim. To make my case I draw on the work of Hans Jonas, who presciently and insightfully dealt with related questions. Jonas’ philosophy unites bioethical, technological, and environmental concerns and so offers a useful contrast to Persson and Savulescu's proposal. If my analysis is correct then we have both practical and principled reasons to be sceptical about the prospect of moral bioenhancement, which I assume, for the sake of argument, to be feasible.1


2018 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
pp. 415-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian D. Earp

AbstractThe moral enhancement (or bioenhancement) debate seems stuck in a dilemma. On the one hand, the more radical proposals, while certainly novel and interesting, seem unlikely to be feasible in practice, or if technically feasible then most likely imprudent. But on the other hand, the more sensible proposals – sensible in the sense of being both practically achievable and more plausibly ethically justifiable – can be rather hard to distinguish from both traditional forms of moral enhancement, such as non-drug-mediated social or moral education, and non-moral forms of bioenhancement, such as smart-drug style cognitive enhancement. In this essay, I argue that bioethicists have paid insufficient attention to an alternative form of moral bioenhancement – or at least a likely candidate – that falls somewhere between these two extremes, namely the (appropriately qualified) use of certain psychedelic drugs.


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