scholarly journals Relational incentives in Chinese family firms

2011 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 511-524
Author(s):  
Jiancai Pi

This paper mainly discusses the choice of managerial compensation contracts in Chinese family firms. Relation or guanxi in Chinese language is an important factor that should be considered because it can bring the shirking cost to the relation-based manager and the caring cost to the owner under Chinese-style differential mode of association (?chaxu geju?). Our theoretical analysis shows that under some conditions it is optimal for the owner to choose the efficiency wage contract, and that under other conditions it is optimal for the owner to choose the share-based incentive contract.

Author(s):  
Wen Helena Li ◽  
Jin‐hui Luo ◽  
Marco De Sisto ◽  
Timothy Bartram

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-37
Author(s):  
Zhenduo Zhu ◽  
Yuanfei Kang

ABSTRACT Motivated by the research gap on intergenerational succession dynamics of family firms, this study examines the effects of initiating intergenerational succession on firms' innovation activities. We propose that initiation of intra-family succession can result in founder–successor co-governance that represents a strategic transition to the succession and incorporates the two conflicting yet complementary directions of change and continuity. Grounded in the theory of altruism, we suggest that co-governance will positively affect firms' innovation activities and that this positive link is contingent on the idiosyncratic intra-family relationships of kinship type, age difference, and gender difference between the founder and the successor. Furthermore, we posit that co-governance will lead to a flow of resources to low risk, rather than more inventive but higher risk, innovations. Based on the unbalanced panel data of 4,694 firm-year observations in our sample from listed Chinese family firms during the 2006–2015 period, empirical analysis supports our hypotheses and confirms that when examining family firms' innovation, there is a need to take the heterogeneity of the intra-family governance structure more fully into consideration.


2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 327-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivo D. Tafkov

ABSTRACT: This study investigates the conditions under which providing relative performance information to employees has a positive effect on performance when compensation is not tied to peer performance. Specifically, I investigate, via an experiment, the effect of relative performance information (present or absent) on performance under two compensation contracts (flat-wage or individual performance-based). Given the presence of relative performance information, I examine the effect of the type of relative performance information (private or public) on performance. Using theory from psychology, I predict and find that relative performance information positively affects performance under the two compensation contracts and that this positive effect is greater under an individual performance-based contract than under a flat-wage contract. I also predict and find that, although both public and private relative performance information have a positive effect on performance, the effect is greater when relative performance information is public. Data Availability: Data are available from the author on request.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (17) ◽  
pp. 7068
Author(s):  
Xiaolin Li ◽  
Weian Li ◽  
Yaowei Zhang

This paper firstly introduces green governance into the empirical research of family firms. Due to the fact that family firms have their own particularity in the principal agent and also have a strong desire to preserve social emotional wealth, this paper deeply studies the driving influence of family control on the green governance of family firms, and analyzes the moderating effect based on the political connection of executives. Taking the 2015–2017 Chinese family-listed firms that released social responsibility reports as the research sample, we find that family control contributes to the improvement of corporate green governance in family firms. However, the political connection of the actual controller weakens the effect of family control on the green governance of family firms. In addition, this research is also carried out under different situations, such as at the regional level and individual level. The research helps family firms give full play to their own advantages, guide the green governance practice of family firms, and improve the level of green governance.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiongyu Huang ◽  
Minying Cheng ◽  
Wenjing Li ◽  
Minghai Wei

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document