The problem of other minds and psychological notions

Wittgensteinian solution to the problem of other minds is usually associated with Wittgenstein?s position that psychological concepts do not describe but express mental states. In his book An Essay on Philosophical Psychology An Essay on Philosophical Psychology L. Kojen (2009) develops an interpretation of Wittgenstein according to which Wittgenstein himself was aware that all psychological concepts cannot be analyzed in terms of the expression of inner states. My goal in this paper is to examine whether the admission that psychological concepts have descriptive uses involves a return to mentalism and a reintroduction of skepticism regarding other minds. By relying on developmental psychology, I hope to show: a) that expression is the primary function of psychological concepts as it occurs first in child?s development, and b) that the descriptive uses appear later with language acquisitioion but do not lead to the skeptical problem of other minds.

Download Full-text

Other Minds

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy ◽

10.4324/9780415249126-v022-1 ◽

2018 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Alec Hyslop

Keyword(s):

Mental States ◽

Other Minds ◽

Conceptual Problem ◽

Standard View ◽

Epistemological Problem ◽

Analogical Inference ◽

Direct Knowledge ◽

Problem Of Other Minds ◽

The Many

It has traditionally been thought that the problem of other minds is epistemological: how is it that we know other people have thoughts, experiences and emotions? After all, we have no direct knowledge that this is so. We observe their behaviour and their bodies, not their thoughts, experiences and emotions. The task is seen as being to uncover the justification for our belief in other minds. It has also been thought that there is a conceptual problem: how can we manage to have any conception of mental states other than our own? It is noteworthy that there is as yet no standard view on either of these problems. One answer to the traditional (epistemological) problem has been the analogical inference to other minds, appealing to the many similarities existing between ourselves and others. This answer, though it is no longer in general favour among philosophers, still has its defenders. Probably the favoured solution is to view other minds as logically on a par with the unobservable, theoretical entities of science. That other people have experiences, like us, is seen as the best explanation of their behaviour.

Download Full-text

The Principle of Conservatism in Cognitive Ethology

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement ◽

10.1017/s1358246100007189 ◽

2001 ◽

Vol 49 ◽

pp. 225-238 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Elliott Sober

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mind ◽

Identity Theory ◽

Mental States ◽

Turing Test ◽

Other Minds ◽

Cognitive Ethology ◽

University Courses ◽

Problem Of Other Minds ◽

The Mind

Philosophy of mind is, and for a long while has been, 99% metaphysics and 1% epistemology. Attention is lavished on the question of the nature of mind, but questions concerning how we know about minds are discussed much less thoroughly. University courses in philosophy of mind routinely devote a lot of time to dualism, logical behaviourism, the mind/brain identity theory, and functionalism. But what gets said about the kinds of evidence that help one determine what mental states, if any, an individual occupies? Well, Skinner's puritanical disdain for postulating mental states gets raked over the coals, the problem of other minds gets solved by a perfunctory invocation of the principle of inference to the best explanation, and the Turing test gets discussed, mainly in order to emphasize that it can lead to mistaken answers.

Download Full-text

Developmental phenomenology: examples from social cognition

Continental Philosophy Review ◽

10.1007/s11007-020-09510-z ◽

2020 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Stefano Vincini ◽

Shaun Gallagher

Keyword(s):

Social Cognition ◽

Developmental Psychology ◽

Mental States ◽

Other Minds ◽

Phenomenological Psychology ◽

Developmental Science ◽

Contemporary Science ◽

Depth Analysis ◽

Psychological Models ◽

Innate Ability

Abstract We explore relationships between phenomenology and developmental psychology through an in-depth analysis of a particular problem in social cognition: the most fundamental access to other minds. In the first part of the paper, we examine how developmental science can benefit phenomenology. We explicate the connection between cognitive psychology and developmental phenomenology as a form of constructive phenomenological psychology. Nativism in contemporary science constitutes a strong impulse to conceive of the possibility of an innate ability to perceive others’ mental states, an idea which also has a transcendental implication. In the second part, we consider how phenomenology can contribute to developmental science. Phenomenology can go beyond the necessary evaluation and reinterpretation of experimental results. Some phenomenological notions and theories can be put forward on a par with alternative cognitive-psychological models and compete with them on grounds of empirical adequacy. For example, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of pairing can constitute a viable account of how infants access other minds. We outline a number of ways in which this account can be tested and can thus contribute to generating empirical knowledge.

Download Full-text

Intersubjectivity

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy ◽

10.4324/9780415249126-w054-1 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Shannon Spaulding

Keyword(s):

Social Cognition ◽

Mental States ◽

Human Interaction ◽

Collective Intentionality ◽

Mutual Understanding ◽

Other Minds ◽

Enactive Cognition ◽

Group Minds ◽

René Descartes ◽

Problem Of Other Minds

Intersubjectivity is the shared or mutual understanding among agents. Edmond Husserl first developed the concept of intersubjectivity as a critique of René Descartes’ problem of other minds. Husserl argued that the problem of other minds portrayed human interaction as inappropriately solipsistic. More recently, the concept of intersubjectivity has played a role in phenomenological accounts of social cognition, embodied and enactive cognition, debates about whether we can directly perceive others’ mental states, collective intentionality, and group minds.

Download Full-text

Reading One's Own Mind: Self-Awareness and Developmental Psychology

Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume ◽

10.1080/00455091.2004.10717609 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 30 ◽

pp. 297-339 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Shaun Nichols ◽

Stephen Stich

Keyword(s):

Twentieth Century ◽

Developmental Psychology ◽

Mental States ◽

Focus Of Attention ◽

Primary Concern ◽

Self Awareness ◽

Other Minds ◽

Major Focus ◽

Growing Body ◽

The Way

The idea that we have special access to our own mental states has a distinguished philosophical history. Philosophers as different as Descartes and Locke agreed that we know our own minds in a way that is quite different from the way in which we know other minds. In the latter half of the twentieth century, however, this idea carne under serious attack, first from philosophy (Sellars 1956) and more recently from developmental psychology. The attack from developmental psychology arises from the growing body of work on “mindreading,” the process of attributing mental states to people (and other organisms). During the last fifteen years, the processes underlying rnindreading have been a major focus of attention in cognitive and developmental psychology. Most of this work has been concerned with the processes underlying the attribution of mental states toother people.However, a number of psychologists and philosophers have also proposed accounts of the mechanisms underlying the attribution of mental states tooneself.This process ofreading one's own mindorbecoming self-awarewill be our primary concern in this paper.

Download Full-text