Subjectivism and Degrees of Well-Being

In previous work, I have argued that subjectivists about well-being must turn from a preference-satisfaction to a desire-satisfaction theory of well-being in order to avoid the conceptual problem of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. In a recent paper, Van der Deijl and Brouwer agree, but object that no version of the desire-satisfaction theory can provide a plausible account of how an individual's degree of well-being depends on the satisfaction or frustration of their various desires, at least in cases involving the gain or loss of desires. So subjectivists can avoid the conceptual problem of interpersonal comparisons only by adopting a substantively implausible view. In this reply, I defend subjectivism by arguing that the totalist desire-satisfaction theory avoids Van der Deijl and Brouwer's objections, and briefly suggest that it may also be able to handle the problem of adaptive desires. I conclude that subjectivists should endorse the totalist desire-satisfaction theory.

“Are psychological attributes quantitative?” is not an empirical question: Conceptual confusions in the measurement debate

Critics of psychological measurement have accused quantitative psychologists of ignoring the empirical hypothesis that psychological phenomena are quantitative (Michell), or have claimed that it is impossible in principle to find out whether psychological phenomena are actually quantitative (Trendler). By drawing on Bennett and Hacker (2003), I argue that both criticisms do not go far enough because they sidestep the fundamental conceptual problem of the measurement debate: It is impossible to give concrete formulations of the question “Are psychological attributes quantitative?” without transgressing the boundaries of meaningful language. Conceptual confusions and questionable philosophical assumptions have contributed to the misguided idea that the quantity of psychological phenomena must or can be demonstrated empirically. First, the measurement debate is characterized by misleading examples and ambiguous terminology. Second, the idea of psychological measurement is inherently Cartesian. In summary, psychological measurement is even more problematic than Michell and Trendler have argued.

The Breathing Body, Whistling Flute, and Sonic Divine: Oneness and Distinction in Bengal Vaishnavism’s Devotional Aesthetics

This paper studies complex narratives connecting the Hindu deity Krishna, his melodious flute, and the porous, sonic human body in the popular devotional sect, Bengal Vaishnavism. From the devotee–lover responding to Krishna’s flute call outside, envying the flute’s privileged position on Krishna’s lips, to becoming the deity’s flute through yogic breath–sound fusions—texts abound with nuanced relations of equivalence and differentiation among the devotee–flute–god. Based primarily on readings of Hindu religious texts, and fieldwork in Bengal among makers/players of the bamboo flute, the paper analyses theological constructions correlating body–flute–divinity. Lying at the confluence of yogic, tantric, and devotional thought, the striking conceptual problem about the flute in Bengal Vaishnavism is: are the body, flute and divinity distinct or the same? I argue that the flute’s descriptions in both classical Sanskrit texts and popular oral lore and performances draw together ostensibly opposed religious paradigms of Yoga (oneness with divinity) and passionate devotion/bhakti (difference): its fine, airy feeling fusing with the body’s inner breathing self, and sweet melody producing a subservient temperament towards the lover–god outside. Flute sounds embody the peculiar dialectic of difference-and-identity among devotee–flute–god, much like the flute–lip-lock itself, bringing to affective life the Bengal Vaishnava philosophical foundation of achintya-bhed-abhed (inconceivability between principles of separation and indistinction).

Zionism, Pan-Asianism, and the Postcolonial Predicament in the Interwar Writings of Eugen Hoeflich

In the early 1920s, the Viennese writer and journalist Eugen Hoeflich promoted a unique vision of Zionism that aligned Jewish nationalism with a set of anticolonial ideologies collectively known as Pan-Asianism. This article explores the poetic and political strategies Hoeflich employed in order to affiliate Zionism with the Pan-Asian idea in general, and the Indian anticolonial struggle in particular. I read Hoeflich's turn to Pan-Asianism as an attempt to work through a conceptual problem that theorist Partha Chatterjee calls the “postcolonial predicament.” That is, how might the Jews assert their collective identity without reproducing the Eurocentric discourses that presuppose their inferiority? Hoeflich's vision of Indian-Jewish solidarity constitutes an imaginative effort to de-Europeanize Jewish nationalism and disentangle Zionism from British imperial designs. On a broader level, this study sheds light on the transnational solidarities that informed central European Zionists in the interwar era, and points to the discursive continuities that linked Jewish nationalists in Europe to anticolonial thinkers in Asia.

Tindak Pidana Aborsi Akibat Perkosaan

Abortion is an abortion wherein in an abortion in the body there is a fetus but it is not perfectly shaped. According to the Criminal Code the abortion is prohibited for any reason, but the Health Law provides exceptions if medical indications. The problem is how is the regulation of the crime of abortion? And what are the criminal sanctions against perpetrators of criminal acts of abortion due to rape? The type of research used is normative legal research, with a legal and conceptual problem approach. Legal material comes from primary and secondary legal materials; the technique of collecting legal materials is by reviewing the laws and regulations governing abortion. Analysis of descriptive legal material analysis and adjusting to legal arguments. The regulation of abortion in the Criminal Code is regulated in article 346 of the Criminal Code, 347 of the Criminal Code, 348 of the Criminal Code and 349 of the Criminal Code. While the regulation of abortion in the Health Law is regulated in Articles 75, 76, 77 and Article 194 of Law No. 36 of 2009 concerning Health. Sanctions for abortion offenders can be subject to articles in the Criminal Code, namely Article 346 subject to a maximum sentence of four years in prison. Where as in article 347-349 the Criminal Code can be imprisoned for a maximum of fifteen years. In the Health Law, the maximum criminal threat is 10 years and a maximum fine of Rp. 1,000,000,000.00 (one billion rupiah). Conclusion, if the abortion is done not because of medical indications, then the act of abortion can be claimed as a crime.

Limn

This chapter centers on Limn, a scholarly magazine that focuses on tensions arising at the intersection of politics, expertise, and collective life. It describes Limn as an experiment in scholarly publishing in the interpretive human sciences that aims to make possible new kinds of communication and collective work. It also mentions Martin Høyem, who custom designed Limn with a range of imagery and graphic material related to the contributions, including a featured graphic that links diverse contributions in a common conceptual problem-space. The chapter discusses Limn as a vehicle for exploring new forms of collaboration in the interpretive human sciences. It recounts the changing field of American anthropology during the 1990s and 2000s in which discipline encouraged individualized work and valorized virtuosic interpretation and writing, with little space for collaborative inquiry.

The problem of the concept of the living machine according to Samuel Alexander’s emergentism

The concept of a living being as a kind of living machine is widespread and well-known. If it is only a metaphor, it does not mean much; however, if other- wise, there is a severe conceptual problem since the living part of the concept always indicates the notorious notion of vitalism. The question is how can living machines be really different from lifeless machines without the concept of vitalism? According to Samuel Alexander, the problem arises from the traditional usage of the concept of mechanical which is confused both with the concept of something is determinated and with the concept of material; furthermore, the latter concept is defined against the Cartesian concept of mind and not on its own. Alexander’s point is that the difference between lifeless machines and living beings lies not in a vital substance or a non-mechanical principle but in an emergent mechanical quality called life which simple machines lack.