scholarly journals Plantinga on warrant and acceptability of Christian Belief

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-117
Author(s):  
Stevan Rakonjac

Alvin Plantinga wants to answer the following question: Is Christian belief intellectualy or rationaly acceptable? We will present the answer John Locke gives, based on his evidentialism, to the aforementioned question, as well as Plantinga?s critique of Locke?s evidentialist approach. Plantinga thinks that the question ?Is Christian belief intellectualy or rationaly acceptable?? is best understood as meaning ?Is Christian belief warranted??. We will analyze Plantinga?s argument for the claim that Christian belief probably has warrant if it is true, which implies that we first have to show that Christian belief (probably) is false in order to show that it (probably) has no warrant. But than that means that we have to show that Christian belief is false in order to show that it is unacceptable, making it very hard, if not impossible, to show that Christian belief is unacceptable. We will then present one objection to Plantinga?s argument, ?the Great Pumpkin Objection?. Relying on Linda Zagzebski?s analysis, we will claim that the Great Pupmpkin objection shows that Plantinga?s notion of ?warrant? does not adequately capture the meaning of the relevant notion of ?intellectual or rational acceptability? of beliefs, and that, hence, his conclusion about warrant of Christian belief are not necessary relevant for the claims about intellectual or rational acceptability of Christian belief. We will also analyze a solution given by Kyle Scott. He thinks that if we have, in addition to Plantinga?s argument showing that Christian belief is warranted if true, favouring evidence in support of Christian belief, which he thinks we obviously have, than Christian belief is acceptable. We will point out that Scott does not elaborate what makes adequate favouring evidence in support of some belief, and we will calim that adequate understanding of favouring evidence will, in some respects, be very similar to Locke?s evidentialism. If so, than Scott proposal will reintroduce some elements of Locke?s evidentialism, and the question of whether there is favouring evidence in support of Christian belief will not have an obvious and easy answer.

2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD SWINBURNE

Alvin PlantingaWarranted Christian Belief(New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2000).In the two previous volumes of his trilogy on ‘warrant’, Alvin Plantinga developed his general theory of warrant, defined as that characteristic enough of which terms a true belief into knowledge. A belief B has warrant if and only if: (1) it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly, (2) in a cognitive environment sufficiently similar to that for which the faculties were designed, (3) according to a design plan aimed at the production of true beliefs, when (4) there is a high statistical probability of such beliefs being true.Thus my belief that there is a table in front of me has warrant if in the first place, in producing it, my cognitive faculties were functioning properly, the way they were meant to function. Plantinga holds that just as our heart or liver may function properly or not, so may our cognitive faculties. And he also holds that if God made us, our faculties function properly if they function in the way God designed them to function; whereas if evolution (uncaused by God) made us, then our faculties function properly if they function in the way that (in some sense) evolution designed them to function.


2012 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Agnaldo Cuoco Portugal

o artigo pretende mostrar que a crítica que Alvin Plantinga faz contra o bayesianismo como descrição do que está envolvido na noção de racionalidade não se aplica a toda forma de bayesianismo. A abordagem de Swinburne, baseada em uma teoria lógica da probabilidade, é um exemplo de bayesianismo não atingido pela crítica de Plantinga. Além disso, o artigo defende que, em uma abordagem bayesiana, desaparece o problema da probabilidade decrescente, apontado por Plantinga em Warranted Christian Belief (2000). Assim, mesmo que não seja uma descrição suficiente da noção de racionalidade, o bayesianismo ajuda a entender importantes elementos presentes no raciocínio indutivo, especialmente os relativos aos argumentos cumulativos.


Philo ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-118
Author(s):  
Tyler Wunder ◽  

Methodus ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-47
Author(s):  
Oliver R. Scholz

According to a widely accepted conception, philosophy is essentially a second-order discipline raising second-order questions about the procedures and products of first-order reasonings (concepts; principles; theories etc.). While this conception has considerable prima facie plausibility and, carefully put, contains a grain of truth, it also invites serious misunderstandings that may be detrimental to an adequate understanding and public image of philosophy. To work out the grain of truth while avoiding the misunderstandings, I begin by asking: What is philosophical understanding? In answering this question, understanding in philosophy is compared and contrasted with everyday understanding, on the one hand, and scientific understanding, on the other hand. While philosophy itself is a scientific practice in a wide sense, in contrast to normal understanding within a special scientific discipline (physics; chemistry; biology; psychology; etc.) philosophical understanding is characterized by a particular critical attitude and particular principles of rational acceptability.


1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-292
Author(s):  
Robert C. Solomon

Is belief in God rational? Over a century ago, Hegel (following Kant) and Søren Kierkegaard established one set of parameters for discussing that question, but in a language that appears opaque to many philosophers today. Very recently, Alvin Plantinga, James Ross, and George Mavrodes have been debating similar issues in a modern analytic idiom. In this essay, I want to use this modern philosophical language in an attempt to clarify certain issues surrounding the relevant notion of “rationality” and related notions essential to the natural theologian, and in so doing attempt to make presentable the dispute between Hegel and Kierkegaard.For our purposes here, I take “rationality” to be predicated of an epistemological concept of belief, even if, as I believe, any such notion would have to be a special case and a logical derivative of a more general notion of “rationality” as primarily practical.


Theology ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 119 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-62
Author(s):  
Keith Ward

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