scholarly journals Modeling dynamic cooperative advertising in a decentralized channel

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-566
Author(s):  
Peter Ezimadu ◽  
Chukwuma Nwozo

This work deals with cooperative advertising in a manufacturer-retailer supply channel using differential game theory. It considers the manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader and the retailer as the follower. It incorporates the manufacturer?s advertising effort into Sethi?s sales-advertising dynamics, and considers its effect on the retail advertising effort, the awareness share, the players? payoffs, and the channel payoff. These are achieved by considering two channel structures: a situation where retail advertising is subsidized, and a situation where it is not. In both situations, it obtains the Stackelberg equilibrium, which characterizes the effects of the manufacturer?s advertising effort, including the relationships between the manufacturer?s advertising effort and the retailer?s advertising effort. The work shows that the direct involvement of the manufacturer in advertising is worthwhile.

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-176
Author(s):  
Peter Ezimadu

This work considers cooperative advertising decisions in a manufacturer-distributor-retailer supply chain, where the manufacturer is taken as the Stackelberg leader, using differential game theory. The distributor and retailer are the first and the second followers, respectively. We introduce the distributor into the traditional manufacturer-retailer channel through his direct involvement in advertising as being incorporated into the non-stochastic Sethi's sales-advertising dynamics. This is used to model the awareness share dynamics in which the distributor and the retailer directly engage in advertising, while the manufacturer bypasses the distributor to subsidise only the retail advertising effort. We consider a subsidised and unsubsidised channel structures, where each structure results in a system of three nonlinear equations, which cannot be solved analytically, but only numerically. However, we show that the unique solution to each of the systems exists, provided certain conditions are satisfied. The distributor and the retailer's advertising strategies are developed for both when subsidy is provided and when it is not provided. We also obtain the manufacturer's subsidy rate and the market awareness share for both when retail advertising is subsidised and when it is not subsidised. We observe that with the provision of subsidy, the distributor reduces his advertising effort. However, the resulting increase in the retail advertising effort is larger than the reduction in the distributor's advertising commitment, thus making the channel advertising effort larger with subsidy. It further shows that to avoid being shortchanged, each player should adopt only his optimal strategy or strategies as the case may be.


Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhihui Wu ◽  
Lichao Feng ◽  
Dongyan Chen

In this paper, via the differential game method, the problems of the pricing and advertising decision are investigated by considering the effect of number of the platform users on demand. In addition, a novel contract is developed to coordinate the supply chain. Firstly, the optimal strategies of the pricing and advertising are given in the decentralized and centralized scenarios by applying the differential game theory. Also, the comparison analysis concerning on the optimal strategies is proposed in two decision scenarios. It is shown that the centralized scenario could lead to the higher advertising effort of each member and a lower retail price. Next, we construct the state-dependent contract with hope to coordinate the supply chain and then improve the performance of the supply chain. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the impacts of the price-elasticity index of demand and the effectiveness of the number of retailer’s platform users onto the feasible region of the corresponding contract.


2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 260-264
Author(s):  
Feng Tian ◽  
Ji Feng Zou ◽  
Tong Zhang

In this paper, a method of the UAV path planing in the complex environment by using artificial potential field and differential game theory is introduced. This article studies the pursuit evasion game of the dynamic path planing for the UAV. The fly zone of either the pursuer or the evader is divided into two categories, namely the obstacle areas and the obstacle-free areas. So we can use the artificial potential field in the obstacle areas,and we use differential game theory in the obstacle-free areas for the UAV. This method can apply to pursuit-evasion game in the complex environment for the UAV path planing.Not only the UAV can avoid obstacles but also they can find the best capture path.Finally,the simulation results verify its correctness and validity .


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Qilong Sun ◽  
Minghui Shen ◽  
Xiaolong Gu ◽  
Kang Hou ◽  
Naiming Qi

The active defense scenario in which the attacker evades from the defender and pursues the target is investigated. In this scenario, the target evades from the attacker, and the defender intercepts the attacker by using the optimal strategies. The evasion and the pursuit boundaries are investigated for the attacker when the three players use the one-to-one optimal guidance laws, which are derived based on differential game theory. It is difficult for the attacker to accomplish the task by using the one-to-one optimal guidance law; thus, a new guidance law is derived. Unlike other papers, in this paper, the accelerations of the target and the defender are unknown to the attacker. The new strategy is derived by linearizing the model along the initial line of sight, and it is obtained based on the open-loop solution form as the closed-loop problem is hard to solve. The results of the guidance performance for the derived guidance law are presented by numerical simulations, and it shows that the attacker can evade the defender and intercept the target successfully by using the proposed strategy.


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