Constitutional Law. Military Service. Inasmuch as Legislative Authority to Sustain Administrative Actions Which Raise Constitutional Questions May Not Be Implied by Federal Judiciary, Secretary of Navy Is without Statutory Authority to Issue Derogatory Discharge to Inactive Reservist under Circumstances Denying Constitutional Right to Confrontation

1961 ◽  
Vol 47 (7) ◽  
pp. 1252
2018 ◽  
pp. 17-21
Author(s):  
M.N. Rudman

The article reveals the content of the constitutional right to a healthy environment. Analysis of economic and international legal factors in the formation of the modern institution of the right to a healthy environment in the Constitution of the Russian Federation is supplemented with the characteristic of process of formation of this law in Soviet constitutional law. Characterized by a legal mechanism of realization of the right to a healthy environment in the modern legislation of the Russian Federation.


Public Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Stanton ◽  
Craig Prescott

Devolution is a recent addition to the UK constitutional law vocabulary. The concept refers to the decentralisation of power from central institutions in London to regional institutions exercising executive and legislative authority in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. This chapter explores the principle of devolution, both in terms of its historical development and its constitutional importance. It discusses recent issues and debates relevant to the role that it continues to play in the UK Constitution through the established institutions in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. All this is tied together in consideration of a problem scenario which encourages discussion of the powers of the devolved institutions and their relationship with centralised authority at Westminster.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-204
Author(s):  
Richard W. Garnett

A crucial, but often overlooked, dimension of the human and constitutional right to religious freedom is the autonomy of religious institutions, associations and societies with respect to matters of governance, doctrine, formation and membership. Although the Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed this autonomy in the context of American constitutional law, it is vulnerable, and even under threat, for a variety of reasons, including a general decline in the health of civil society and mediating associations and a crisis of confidence and authority caused by clerical sexual abuse and churches’ failure to respond to it.


2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul-Erik N Veel

Courts frequently engage in the weighing of competing values; perhaps most obviously, such balancing constitutes an integral aspect of proportionality analysis in many states’ constitutional law. However, such balancing raises a difficult theoretical question: What does it mean that one value “outweighs” another in any particular case? If the values at issue are incommensurable — as they often will be — such balancing may appear to break down. As Justice Scalia has stated, balancing in the presence of incommensurable values “is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.” It may appear that if a judge is asked in a particular case to decide, for example, whether a state interest is sufficiently strong to justify the limitation of a constitutional right, he will be forced to a) either abandon the notion of a genuine plurality of values, or b) make an arbitrary decision.This article argues that neither of these options need be accepted and that rational choice is indeed possible in the presence of incommensurable values. Specifically, it contends that the Nash bargaining solution provides a means, at least in certain circumstances, of rationally understanding and undertaking the weighing of distinct and mutually irreducible values which adjudication frequently requires. The Nash framework can both elucidate proportionality analysis by providing a social choice-based framework for understanding the structure of proportionality analysis and also justify proportionality analysis by demonstrating that the weighing of competing values is not necessarily mere judicial hand-waving.


2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-96
Author(s):  
Daniela Ježová

Abstract This article deals with the question of the obligation to refer a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice and when the national courts breach its obligation to refer. In case when the national court breach its obligation to refer the issue of violation of the constitutional right of individual arises. The article provides insight in terms of constitutional law on the fundamental right with connection to the violation of the obligation of national court to refer.


1989 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 510-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Franck

This essay questions whether it is as appropriate as it is common to speak of the federal judiciary as legitimately engaged in “statesmanship”— however that rather slippery concept may be denned or elucidated. Scholars of both the “interpretivist” and “noninterpretivist” schools in constitutional law appear to subscribe to the expectation that judges should be statesmen. Some point to Tocqueville for support of this notion. The argument here is that Tbcqueville is unreliable on this point, for he parts company not only with his contemporary, Joseph Story, but with the framers of the Constitution. The Federalist is examined for its thoughts on the meaning and location of statesmanship in the constitutional order, and it is argued that the essays on the judiciary reveal a conspicuous absence of any expectation that that branch should contain statesmen. Indeed, Publius advances an argument that Congress should act to restrain (through the threat of impeachment) judicial temptations to engage in any adventures that can be called statesmanship.


ICL Journal ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alec Walen

AbstractJustice Roberts′s dissent in Obergefell v Hodges - the case in which the US Supreme Court found a constitutional right for same sex couples to marry - rested on the premise the Court cannot invoke the right to marry as a basis for changing the definition of marriage. But his argument works only if the Court has no obligation to find a constitutional meaning for the term. I argue here that it has such an obligation. I argue further that an analogy with the concept of ‘person’ throws light on how that obligation should work. And finally, I argue that the most plausible constitutional definition would include same sex couples.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mirja Fauzul Hamdi

Keberadaan DPD yang diatur berdasarkan Undang-Undang No. 17/2014 masih dinilai diskriminatif dalam pelaksanaan kewenangan, khususnya bidang legislasi dibandingkan dengan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. Upaya pengujian undang-undang dilakukan oleh DPD ditujukan guna menjamin kemandirian lembaga sebagaimana amanah Undang-Undang Dasar Tahun 1945. Berdasarkan Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 79/PUU-XII/2014 merupakan suatu bentuk rekonstruksi hukum yang dijadikan sebagai dasar hukum bagi DPD dalam menjalan kewenangan bidang legislasi. Reconstruction of Regional Representative Council after the Decission of Constitutional Law No. 79/PUU-XII/2014 The existence of The Regional Representative Council that regulated by Law No. 17/2014 remain discriminative in exercising their authority, particulary in legislative function and compare to the House of representative.  The Regional Representative Council has conducted a legal review to ensure the independency of it institution as regulate by Constitution 1945. Based on the decission of the Constitutional Court No. 79/PUU-XII/2014 as the legal standing for DPD in exercising their legislative authority.


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