The United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East

1978 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 99 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. M. Smolansky
Author(s):  
Olivia L. Sohns

Moral, political, and strategic factors have contributed to the emergence and durability of the U.S.-Israel alliance. It took decades for American support for Israel to evolve from “a moral stance” to treating Israel as a “strategic asset” to adopting a policy of “strategic cooperation.” The United States supported Israel’s creation in 1948 not only because of the lobbying efforts of American Jews but also due to humanitarian considerations stemming from the Holocaust. Beginning in the 1950s, Israel sought to portray itself as an ally of the United States on grounds that America and Israel were fellow liberal democracies and shared a common Judeo-Christian cultural heritage. By the mid-1960s, Israel was considered a strategic proxy of American power in the Middle East in the Cold War, while the Soviet Union armed the radical Arab nationalist states and endorsed a Palestinian “people’s wars of national liberation” against Israel. Over the subsequent decades, Israel repeatedly sought to demonstrate that it was allied with the United States in opposing instability in the region that might threaten U.S. interests. Israel also sought to portray itself as a liberal democracy despite its continued occupation of territories that it conquered in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the rise of regional instability and radicalism in the Middle East following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the Arab Spring of 2011, Israel’s expertise in the realms of counterterrorism and homeland security provided a further basis for U.S.-Israel military-strategic cooperation. Although American and Israeli interests are not identical, and there have been disagreements between the two countries regarding the best means to secure comprehensive Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian peace, the foundations of the relationship are strong enough to overcome crises that would imperil a less robust alliance.


Author(s):  
Peter Sluglett

This chapter examines how the Cold War affected the states of the Middle East. More specifically, it considers the evidence of which factors drove regional developments and how it has been contested by both international relations and regional scholars. After providing an overview of the immediate origins of the Cold War, the chapter discusses the role played by oil during the Cold War. It then analyses early manifestations of the rivalry between the Soviets and the United States in Greece, Turkey, and Iran at the beginning of the Cold War, and uses Iraq as a case study of the changing nature of the relations between a Middle Eastern state and both superpowers from the 1940s until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Finally, it evaluates the overall impact of the Cold War on the Middle East as a whole.


2020 ◽  
pp. 181-205
Author(s):  
Francine R. Frankel

The US policy of collective security against the Soviet Union led to the pursuit of the Middle East Defense Organization, which was undermined by Nehru’s success in persuading Egypt to follow his example of remaining nonaligned. Nehru failed, however, to prevent the 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Pakistan, which tilted the balance of power in the subcontinent away from India—although Mountbatten weighed in to provide advanced British aircraft and averted an incipient deal between New Delhi and Moscow. Subsequently, Nehru was confirmed in his belief that the United States was determined to build up Pakistan and build- down India.


Author(s):  
Anand Toprani

During the first half of the twentieth century, a lack of oil constrained Britain and Germany from exerting their economic and military power independently. Having fought World War I with oil imported from the United States, Britain was determined to avoid relying upon another great power for its energy needs ever again. Even before the war had ended, Whitehall began implementing a strategy of developing alternative sources of oil under British control. Britain’s key supplier would be the Middle East—already a region of vital importance to the British Empire, but one whose oil potential was still unproven. There turned out to be plenty of oil in the Middle East, but Italian hostility after 1935 threatened British transit through the Mediterranean. As war loomed in 1939, Britain’s quest for independence from the United States was a failure. Germany was in an even worse position than Britain. The Third Reich went to war dependent on petroleum synthesized from coal, meager domestic crude oil production, and overland imports—primarily from Romania. German leaders were confident, however, that they had sufficient oil to fight a series of short, localized campaigns that would deliver to them the mastery of Europe. Their plan derailed following Germany’s swift victory over France, when Britain refused to make peace. This left Germany responsible for satisfying Europe’s oil requirements while cut off from world markets. A looming energy crisis in Axis Europe, an absence of strategic alternatives, and ideological imperatives all compelled Germany to invade the Soviet Union in 1941—a decision that ultimately sealed its fate.


2020 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-162
Author(s):  
Galen Jackson

Standard explanations for the demise of U.S.-Soviet détente during the 1970s emphasize the Soviet Union's inability to put aside its communist ideology for the sake of a more cooperative relationship with the United States. Soviet resistance to reaching a stable accommodation during this period, many analysts maintain, was especially evident in the Middle East, where Moscow is said to have embraced the “radical Arab program” vis-à-vis Israel. Such accounts do not fare well, however, in light of the historical evidence. Instead, that evidence indicates that the Soviet Union was eager to cooperate with the United States to achieve an Arab-Israeli agreement. The Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford administrations, however, were not interested in working with the Soviets in the Middle East, and instead sought to expel them from the region. These findings have important implications for scholarly debates about whether great power rivals can cooperate on issues where their strategic interests are overlapping, as well as for contemporary debates over U.S. policy toward countries such as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.


1961 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Scalapino ◽  
Chong-Sik Lee

In the summer of 1921, the Communist world was preparing for the first major conference of Far Eastern peoples. This conference was originally scheduled for Irkutsk in the late summer or early fall of that year. It was intended as a sequel to the Baku Conference of September 1920, which had been attended mainly by delegates from the Middle East. But it was also planned as the Soviet answer to the Washington Conference, as is well known. Competition between the Soviet Union and the United States for the support of the Asian people can be dated from this time, although initially Moscow was much more aware of this fact than Washington.


Author(s):  
Melvyn P. Leffler

This chapter takes a look at U.S. war planning during the Cold War. Looking through Joint Chiefs of Staff records, the chapter shows that U.S. war planning, although crude, began in the early months of 1946. If war erupted, for whatever reasons, the war plans called for the United States to strike the Soviet Union (USSR). Expecting Soviet armies to overrun most of Europe very quickly, planners assumed that the United States would launch its attack primarily from bases in the United Kingdom and the British-controlled Cairo-Suez base in the Middle East. To protect the latter, it would be essential to slow down Soviet armies marching southward to conquer the Middle East. The United States needed the Turkish army to thwart Soviet military advances and required Turkish airfields to insure the success of the strategic offensive against targets inside the USSR.


2019 ◽  
pp. 175-181
Author(s):  
David P. Fields

American diplomatic historian Lloyd Gardner once suggested that the constant problem facing Koreans in their twentieth-century relations with the United States was that “Korea was always about someplace else.” In an insightful essay, historian James Matray elaborated on this idea, showing how presidents from Lyndon B. Johnson to George W. Bush made policy decisions affecting the Korean Peninsula that were actually focused on US relations with the Soviet Union, the Middle East, or American domestic politics....


Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter examines the onset of the so-called stagflation and the problems that beset détente during the period 1973–1976. In the aftermath of Israel’s victories in the Six Day War, a situation of ‘no peace, no war’ prevailed in the Middle East. Attempts in 1970 and 1971 by the United Nations and the United States to make progress on a peace settlement proved futile. The chapter first considers the Middle East war of October 1973, which sparked a confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union, before discussing the impact of stagflation, especially on the Bretton Woods system. It then explores political problems in Europe and how European détente reached a high point in the Helsinki conference of 1975. It concludes with an analysis of détente and crises in less developed countries such as Chile, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Angola.


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