Constitutional Law: Trial by Military Commission of Enemy Combatant after Cessation of Hostilities: Scope of Inquiry in Habeas Corpus Proceedings

1946 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 855
Author(s):  
L. B. Brody

Author(s):  
Amanda L. Tyler

The experience of World War II and the precedent of the Japanese American internment dramatically altered the political and legal landscape surrounding habeas corpus and suspension. This chapter discusses Congress’s enactment of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 along with its repeal in 1971. It further explores how in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, questions over the scope of executive authority to detain prisoners in wartime arose anew. Specifically, this chapter explores the Supreme Court’s sanctioning of the concept of the “citizen-enemy combatant” in its 2004 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and evaluates Hamdi against historical precedents. Finally, the chapter explores how Hamdi established the basis for an expansion of the reach of the Suspension Clause in other respects—specifically, to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.



2018 ◽  
pp. 88-97
Author(s):  
Eric M. Freedman

The notion of an independent judiciary that restrained the other branches was an infant with a questionable life expectancy when John Marshall stated in placatory dicta in Ex Parte Bollman (1807)—quite wrongly as a matter of both British history and American constitutional law— that the federal courts had no inherent authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus in the absence of legislation. The Suspension Clause, he claimed, was merely precatory, an injunction to Congress to pass such legislation. The highly political case involved Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartwout, alleged members of the Aaron Burr conspiracy, and pitted prominent federalists such as petitioners’ counsel Robert Goodloe Harper and Charles Lee against the administration of Thomas Jefferson. After reviewing the factual and political background, this chapter details the arguments of counsel in favor of inherent judicial authority to grant the writ and Marshall’s rejection of them. Judicial autonomy was under threat at the time and Marshall was trying to defend it But his words were a judicial sea mine that created a long-term danger: Congress could by simple inaction evade the bedrock prohibition against suspension of the writ.



2018 ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Eric M. Freedman

Viewing habeas corpus through a legal lens frequently misleads. The common law “rule” against controverting the return to writs of habeas corpus was commonly evaded through devices permitting judicial examination of the underlying facts and law. In many cases concluding “writ denied,” the prisoner in fact obtained “habeas corpus without the writ.” Failure to understand this explains why the Fourth Circuit performed so badly in rejecting the challenge of Yaser Hamdi to his detention as an enemy combatant. The Supreme Court very properly reversed that decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), resulting in the prisoner’s speedy release when the government was confronted with having to actually prove in court the claims it had made on paper.





1959 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-143
Author(s):  
E. C. S. Wade




Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document