Constitutional Law. Freedom of the Press. National Labor Relations Act Held Not to Violate the First Amendment

1937 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 163

1912 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 153
Author(s):  
T. Schroeder ◽  
W. J. Chidley


Author(s):  
Wendell Bird

In the 1780s in America, the advocates of broad understandings of freedom of press and freedom of speech continued to argue, as “Junius Wilkes” did in 1782, that “[i]f a printer is liable to prosecution and restraint, for publishing pieces on public measures, conceived libellous, the liberty of the press is annihilated and ruined. . . . The danger is precisely the same to liberty, in punishing a person after the performance appears to the world, as in preventing its publication in the first instance. The doctrine of libels, is of pernicious consequence to the freedom of the press.” Many other essays in the 1780s showed the dominance of an expansive understanding of freedoms of press and speech, as did the declarations of rights of nine states. That was the context in which the First Amendment was adopted and ratified in 1789–1791. These conclusions about the prevalent and dominant understanding after the mid-1760s are flatly contrary to the narrow view of freedoms of press and speech stated by Blackstone and Mansfield, and restated by the neo-Blackstonians, who claim that the narrow understanding was not only predominant but exclusive through the ratification of the First Amendment and onward until 1798. This book’s conclusions are based on far more original source material than the neo-Blackstonians’ conclusions.



Author(s):  
Wendell Bird

The “father of the Bill of Rights,” James Madison, described the unqualified words protecting freedoms of speech and press as embodying a broad definition rather than a narrow definition of those liberties. Upon offering those provisions, he said that “freedom of the press and rights of conscience . . . are unguarded in the British constitution,” including the common law, and that “every government should be disarmed of powers which trench upon those particular rights.” In Madison’s draft and in the final First Amendment, each clause was worded to modify or to reject the English common law on point in order to provide for far greater protection of individual liberties; no clause was worded with the restrictions that the common law imposed. Was Madison right? Are freedoms of press and speech in the First Amendment broad or narrow protections?



Author(s):  
Sam Lebovic

According to the First Amendment of the US Constitution, Congress is barred from abridging the freedom of the press (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press”). In practice, the history of press freedom is far more complicated than this simple constitutional right suggests. Over time, the meaning of the First Amendment has changed greatly. The Supreme Court largely ignored the First Amendment until the 20th century, leaving the scope of press freedom to state courts and legislatures. Since World War I, jurisprudence has greatly expanded the types of publication protected from government interference. The press now has broad rights to publish criticism of public officials, salacious material, private information, national security secrets, and much else. To understand the shifting history of press freedom, however, it is important to understand not only the expansion of formal constitutional rights but also how those rights have been shaped by such factors as economic transformations in the newspaper industry, the evolution of professional standards in the press, and the broader political and cultural relations between politicians and the press.



1931 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 279
Author(s):  
Maurice S. Culp


1992 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Blanks Hindman

Legal theorists have been interpreting First Amendment rights and protections for years, and most scholars interested in these theoretical presentations have been pleased with liberal interpretations because these interpretations allegedly offer expansive protections for freedom of the press. The work of the four major theorists examined here, however, offers something else as well: an underlying assumption of press responsibility, which could, if adopted by the court system, result in restrictions on freedom of the press. For the press, much is given in the First Amendment, but, apparently, much is also expected.



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