First Amendment Guerillas: Formative Years of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-142
Author(s):  
Floyd J. McKay
Author(s):  
Wendell Bird

In the 1780s in America, the advocates of broad understandings of freedom of press and freedom of speech continued to argue, as “Junius Wilkes” did in 1782, that “[i]f a printer is liable to prosecution and restraint, for publishing pieces on public measures, conceived libellous, the liberty of the press is annihilated and ruined. . . . The danger is precisely the same to liberty, in punishing a person after the performance appears to the world, as in preventing its publication in the first instance. The doctrine of libels, is of pernicious consequence to the freedom of the press.” Many other essays in the 1780s showed the dominance of an expansive understanding of freedoms of press and speech, as did the declarations of rights of nine states. That was the context in which the First Amendment was adopted and ratified in 1789–1791. These conclusions about the prevalent and dominant understanding after the mid-1760s are flatly contrary to the narrow view of freedoms of press and speech stated by Blackstone and Mansfield, and restated by the neo-Blackstonians, who claim that the narrow understanding was not only predominant but exclusive through the ratification of the First Amendment and onward until 1798. This book’s conclusions are based on far more original source material than the neo-Blackstonians’ conclusions.


Author(s):  
Wendell Bird

The “father of the Bill of Rights,” James Madison, described the unqualified words protecting freedoms of speech and press as embodying a broad definition rather than a narrow definition of those liberties. Upon offering those provisions, he said that “freedom of the press and rights of conscience . . . are unguarded in the British constitution,” including the common law, and that “every government should be disarmed of powers which trench upon those particular rights.” In Madison’s draft and in the final First Amendment, each clause was worded to modify or to reject the English common law on point in order to provide for far greater protection of individual liberties; no clause was worded with the restrictions that the common law imposed. Was Madison right? Are freedoms of press and speech in the First Amendment broad or narrow protections?


Author(s):  
Sam Lebovic

According to the First Amendment of the US Constitution, Congress is barred from abridging the freedom of the press (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press”). In practice, the history of press freedom is far more complicated than this simple constitutional right suggests. Over time, the meaning of the First Amendment has changed greatly. The Supreme Court largely ignored the First Amendment until the 20th century, leaving the scope of press freedom to state courts and legislatures. Since World War I, jurisprudence has greatly expanded the types of publication protected from government interference. The press now has broad rights to publish criticism of public officials, salacious material, private information, national security secrets, and much else. To understand the shifting history of press freedom, however, it is important to understand not only the expansion of formal constitutional rights but also how those rights have been shaped by such factors as economic transformations in the newspaper industry, the evolution of professional standards in the press, and the broader political and cultural relations between politicians and the press.


1992 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Blanks Hindman

Legal theorists have been interpreting First Amendment rights and protections for years, and most scholars interested in these theoretical presentations have been pleased with liberal interpretations because these interpretations allegedly offer expansive protections for freedom of the press. The work of the four major theorists examined here, however, offers something else as well: an underlying assumption of press responsibility, which could, if adopted by the court system, result in restrictions on freedom of the press. For the press, much is given in the First Amendment, but, apparently, much is also expected.


Communication ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dwight Teeter

Freedom of the press refers to the freedom to criticize government without suffering official interference or punishment, before or after publication. “Freedom of the press,” “freedom of speech,” and “freedom of expression” are terms often used together in the United States, with “the press” primarily connoting print and electronic media. This bibliography concentrates on freedom of the press as defined by some major American and English writers and in decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Because of the advent of electronic media and of the internet and of other “new media” or “social media” during the 20th and early 21st centuries, the term “freedom of the press” is used to cover mediated communication in general. The clearest indicator of press freedom is that opponents of government or of government leaders, laws, or policies can publish effective criticisms without suffering government retaliation in the form of fines, imprisonment, or even death. That definition does not include communications that may break laws of general applicability, such as the law of fraud, nor violation of a contract. It also does not cover extralegal controls such a communicator’s sense of the community’s range of permissible expression, or public pressures (including mob action) against the press in times of crisis. The legal definition of “freedom of the press” in the United States begins with the forty-five words of the First Amendment to the Constitution, adopted 15 December 1791: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or the free exercise thereof, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” The absolute words of prohibition against congressional statutes tampering with speech or press freedom were, however, overridden early in the nation’s history by Congress in 1798, just seven years after the adoption of the First Amendment. Congress then passed the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which, among other things, made it a crime to criticize the federal government or government leaders. These short-lived enactments, which fueled bitter partisan controversy in the new nation, are discussed in the Historical Context section. Freedom of the press is not static: it rises in times of peace and diminishes in times of war or national crisis, when most needed by society.


1992 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dwight L. Teeter

This essay looks at the question of whether an 18th-century protection for freedom of the press — the First Amendment — is sufficient for the challenges that the nation's press faces today. One disquieting conclusion is that many of the problems that faced newspapers in the era that spawned the First Amendment are still present. The study looks particularly at prior restraints and seditious libel and finds instances in which those abuses, long considered abandoned are alive and well—and potentially threatening.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document