scholarly journals Theories of the Will in the History of Philosophy

1899 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 319
Author(s):  
Archibald Alexander
2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Hofmeister Pich

Este é um estudo sobre o conceito de vontade na história da filosofia. O centro de interesse está na obra De libero arbitrio, de Agostinho. Tanto se procura descrever a suposta “descoberta” da vontade por Agostinho quanto analisar a coerência do conceito obtido. Trata-se do primeiro de dois estudos sobre a vontade e a liberdade em De libero arbitrio I. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Vontade. Liberum arbitrium. Liberdade. Razão. Desejo. Ação. Psicologia da ação moral. Assentimento. Juízo. Erro. Teodicéia. ABSTRACT – This is a study on the concept of will in the history of philosophy. Its main concern is a work of the young Augustine, namely De libero arbitrio. Aim of the investigation is both to describe the alleged “discovery” of the will through Augustine and to examine the coherence of such concept. This is the first of two studies on will and freedom according to Augustine in De libero arbitrio I. KEY WORDS – Will. Liberum arbitrium. Freedom. Reason. Action. Psychology of moral action. Assent. Judgement. Error. Theodicy.


Author(s):  
Andrey Aleksandrovich Yurasov

The subject of this research is the concept of free will. The modern philosophical discussions either do not explicate it, or interpret far from the traditional meaning that has been instilled into this term throughout the centuries, The goal of this article lies in the historical-philosophical reconstruction of the concept of free will. However, the interest towards achieving this goal is not limited to the sphere of history of philosophy. Understanding of the key term largely determines the fruitfulness of theoretical constructions aimed at solution of the problem of free will. The article expounds and substantiates the methodological principles the reconstruction concept of free is based upon. It is demonstrated that free will features two characteristics that can be designated as conformity and independence. Therefore, free will can be defined as the will that corresponds to the value system of an individual and is independent of external factors. Such definition summarizes the practice of utilization of this term in history of philosophy. However, since the late XIX century, and namely in the XX century, there has developed a strong tendency towards distortion of the traditional concept of free will, which implies exclusion of the characteristic of independence and defining free will through the concept of moral responsibility.


2006 ◽  
Vol 2006 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-84
Author(s):  
Jacek Filek

The history of philosophy is a history of the basic paradigms of philosophical thinking. These paradigms are marked out by the changing ways of experiencing being. Philosophy „declines“ being. Expressing this more grammatico, philosophy conjugates the infinitive „to be“. The first word of the first First Philosophy is „is“ - this is the „antiquity“ of philosophizing, the objective paradigm, the philosophy of objectivity, for which reason is the dominant human faculty and truth is the primary notion. The time of this paradigm is the past. The first word of the second First Philosophy is „I am“ - this is the „modernity“ of philosophizing, the subjective paradigm, the monological philosophy of subjectivity, for which the will is the dominant human faculty and freedom is the primary notion. The time of this paradigm is the future. The first word of the third First Philosophy is „you are“ - this is „the now“ of philosophizing, the dialogical paradigm, the philosophy of „the other“, for which feeling is the dominant faculty and responsibility is the primary notion. The basic notion of this new paradigm of thinking is responsibility, and its time is the present. These paradigms, however, are not in conflict with one another; rather, in showing the various aspects of being they help us to experience its fullness. The full experience of being can therefore be summarized in a triad of notions: truth - freedom - responsibility. However, what responsibility consists of remains to be determined.


Hypatia ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 127-150
Author(s):  
Antonia Soulez

Wittgenstein raises the notion of “conversion” in philosophy through his claims that philosophical understanding is a matter of the will rather than the intellect. Soulez examines this notion in Wittgenstein's philosophy through a series of reflections on the aims and methodology of his philosophical “grammar,” in relation to comparable models among Wittgenstein's contemporaries (Freud, fames) and from the history of philosophy (Saint Augustine, Descartes).


Philosophy ◽  
1963 ◽  
Vol 38 (144) ◽  
pp. 136-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Evans

Throughout the history of philosophy there has been a sustained interest in the concepts of knowledge, truth and meaning; interest in the concepts of error, falsity and nonsense, on the other hand, has been intermittent and spasmodic. Error, for example, has suffered at the expense of knowledge to such an extent that sometimes its very existence has been denied, or it has been explained away as being merely the absence of or privation of knowledge; many theories of truth are so constructed that no place can be found for falsity, and theories about what constitutes making sense pay, on the whole, little heed to what constitutes nonsense. In this paper I hope to do something to redress the balance so far as error is concerned. My remarks are prompted by the hope that, just as we may best understand health through the study of disease, so a consideration of error or failure may throw light on knowledge or success. It is clearly not very informative to say of error, falsity and nonsense that they are merely the absence of knowledge, truth and sense; indeed it is just as laconic as a proposed medical definition of disease as the absence of health.


1899 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 60
Author(s):  
James B. Peterson ◽  
Archibald Alexander

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