Error and the Will

Philosophy ◽  
1963 ◽  
Vol 38 (144) ◽  
pp. 136-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Evans
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Will ◽  
Concepts Of Knowledge ◽  
Definition Of

Throughout the history of philosophy there has been a sustained interest in the concepts of knowledge, truth and meaning; interest in the concepts of error, falsity and nonsense, on the other hand, has been intermittent and spasmodic. Error, for example, has suffered at the expense of knowledge to such an extent that sometimes its very existence has been denied, or it has been explained away as being merely the absence of or privation of knowledge; many theories of truth are so constructed that no place can be found for falsity, and theories about what constitutes making sense pay, on the whole, little heed to what constitutes nonsense. In this paper I hope to do something to redress the balance so far as error is concerned. My remarks are prompted by the hope that, just as we may best understand health through the study of disease, so a consideration of error or failure may throw light on knowledge or success. It is clearly not very informative to say of error, falsity and nonsense that they are merely the absence of knowledge, truth and sense; indeed it is just as laconic as a proposed medical definition of disease as the absence of health.

scholarly journals Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Modern Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin de Boer
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
History Of ◽  
Methodological Principles ◽  
The One

This chapter examines Hegel’s lectures on the history of modern philosophy in view of the tension between, on the one hand, his ambition to grasp philosophy’s past in a truly philosophical way and, on the other hand, the necessity to account for the actual particularities of a wide range of philosophical systems. Hegel’s lectures are put in relief by comparing their methodological principles to those put forward by his Kantian predecessor Tennemann. After discussing Hegel’s conception of modern philosophy as a whole, the chapter turns to his reading of Locke, Leibniz, and, in particular, Kant. In this context, it also compares Hegel’s assessment of Kant’s achievements to that of Tennemann. The chapter concludes by considering Hegel’s account of the final moment of the history of philosophy.

scholarly journals Changing Interpretations of Plotinus: The 18th-Century Introduction of the Concept of a ‘System of Philosophy’

2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Catana
Keyword(s):  
19Th Century ◽  
18Th Century ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Modern Reader ◽  
15Th Century ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 19Th Century ◽  
Method Point

Abstract This article critically explores the history and nature of a hermeneutic assumption which frequently guided interpretations of Plotinus from the 18th century onwards, namely that Plotinus advanced a system of philosophy. It is argued that this assumption was introduced relatively late, in the 18th and 19th centuries, and that it was primarily made possible by Brucker’s methodology for the history of philosophy, dating from the 1740s, to which the concept of a ‘system of philosophy’ was essential. It is observed that the concept is absent from Ficino’s commentary from the 15th century, and that it remained absent in interpretations produced between the 15th and 18th centuries. It is also argued that the assumption of a ‘system of philosophy’ in Plotinus is historically incorrect—we do not find this concept in Plotinus’ writings, and his own statements about method point in other directions. Eduard Zeller (active in the second half of the 19th century) is typically regarded as the first to give a satisfying account of Plotinus’ philosophy as a whole. In this article, on the other hand, Zeller is seen as having finalised a tradition initiated in the 18th century. Very few Plotinus scholars have examined the interpretative development prior to Zeller. Schiavone (1952) and Bonetti (1971), for instance, have given little attention to Brucker’s introduction of the concept of a ‘system of philosophy’. The present analysis, then, has value for an understanding of Plotinus’ Enneads. It also explains why “pre-Bruckerian” interpretations of Plotinus appear alien to the modern reader; the analysis may even serve to make some sense of the hermeneutics employed by Renaissance Platonists and commentators, who are often eclipsed from the tradition of Platonism.

scholarly journals The Need for an Alternative Narrative to the History of Ideas or To Pay a Debt to Women: A Feminist Approach to Ricœur's Thought

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-20
Author(s):  
Fernanda Henriques
Keyword(s):  
Paul Ricoeur ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
History Of Ideas ◽  
The Other ◽  
Men I ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
History Of ◽  
Human Capacity ◽  
The One

This paper explores the thought of Paul Ricœur from a feminist point of view. My goal is to show that it is necessary to narrate differently the history of our culture – in particular, the history of philosophy – in order for wommen to attain a self-representation that is equal to that of men. I seek to show that Ricoeur’s philosophy – especially his approach to the topics of memory and history, on the one hand, and the human capacity for initiative, on the other hand– can support the idea that it is possible and legitimate to tell our history otherwise by envisioning a more accurate truth about ourselves. 

Philosophie als Abwandlung des Seins

2006 ◽  
Vol 2006 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-84
Author(s):  
Jacek Filek
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
Philosophical Thinking ◽  
Basic Notion ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Past ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Will ◽  
First Philosophy

The history of philosophy is a history of the basic paradigms of philosophical thinking. These paradigms are marked out by the changing ways of experiencing being. Philosophy „declines“ being. Expressing this more grammatico, philosophy conjugates the infinitive „to be“. The first word of the first First Philosophy is „is“ - this is the „antiquity“ of philosophizing, the objective paradigm, the philosophy of objectivity, for which reason is the dominant human faculty and truth is the primary notion. The time of this paradigm is the past. The first word of the second First Philosophy is „I am“ - this is the „modernity“ of philosophizing, the subjective paradigm, the monological philosophy of subjectivity, for which the will is the dominant human faculty and freedom is the primary notion. The time of this paradigm is the future. The first word of the third First Philosophy is „you are“ - this is „the now“ of philosophizing, the dialogical paradigm, the philosophy of „the other“, for which feeling is the dominant faculty and responsibility is the primary notion. The basic notion of this new paradigm of thinking is responsibility, and its time is the present. These paradigms, however, are not in conflict with one another; rather, in showing the various aspects of being they help us to experience its fullness. The full experience of being can therefore be summarized in a triad of notions: truth - freedom - responsibility. However, what responsibility consists of remains to be determined.

On the Meaning of the Question “What Is Philosophy?”

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-202
Author(s):  
Teodor I. Oizerman ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Current Situation ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Digital Form ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One ◽  
Ideological Context

Theodor Oizerman’s article “On The Meaning of the Question‘What is Philosophy?’” was first published in the journal “Voprosy filosofii”, 1968, vol. 11. Since that the issue has become a bibliographical rarity and still does not exist in a digital form. Other versions of the article were rewritten in the form of book chapters and transformed in the context of the current situation. This proposed publication bases on one of the older versions, which, is, on the one hand, close to the original author’s intention, and on the other hand, lacks a certain dependence on the ideological context. The text, however, includes some critically important arguments appearing only in later editions. In general, the article is of central significance in terms of its place in the Metaphilosophy concept proposed by Oizerman, which later the following books have manifested: “The Problem Of The History Of Philosophy”(1969, 1983), “The Foundations For The Theory Of The Historico-Philosophical Process” (1983, in co-authorship with A.S. Bogomolov), “Philosophy As A History Of Philosophy” (1999), “Ambivalence Of Philosophy” (2011); “Metaphilosophy: Theory Of The Historico-Philosophical Process” (2009). A number of references due to the difficulty of reading the archived article text have been omitted or taken from new editions. The text has been prepared and edited by Ilya T. Kasavin.

Deception and Hope

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Pasnau
Keyword(s):  
Final Analysis ◽  
Good Evidence ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Situation ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
History Of

Despite the tendency toward optimism that runs throughout the history of philosophy, the possibility of a deceiving deity looms over many traditions, calling into question just how secure our epistemic situation really is. Yet there is a surprising constraint on our vulnerability to deception, even at the hands of God. On the other hand, God himself faces a surprising vulnerability to deception, which makes even his case far less ideal than has always been supposed. With that in mind, we have reason to suspect that we are subject to epistemic defeat, meaning that, in the final analysis, we have no good evidence for the truth of any proposition. If this is so, then we might take refuge in faith, or we might take refuge in hope. Hope, I argue, is the better option.

Philosophy in Italy

Philosophy ◽  
1928 ◽  
Vol 3 (10) ◽  
pp. 223-227
Author(s):  
Guido De Ruggiero
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Process Change ◽  
English Reader ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Absolute

Among the studies on the history of philosophy recently published in Italy, one that may be of some interest to the English reader is by DR. Abbagnano, a young pupil of Aliotta, and is devoted to the new English idealism.1 Truthfully speaking, the term ‘ new ’ is inappropriate, or partly so, because Abbagnano dedicates the greater part of his study to what we might call the ‘ old ’ idealism in England, represented by Stirling, the two Cairds, Wallace, Green, and Bradley. However, he does also pass in review the more recent doctrines, particularly those of J. H. Muirhead, G. H. Howison, D. G. Richtie, J. E. Creighton, J. B. Baillie, J. S. Mackenzie, H. Jones, W. E. Hocking, A. S. Pringle Pattison, and G. P. Adams. Abbagnano regards as a distinctive trait of English idealism inspired by Hegel as opposed to Hegel himself, this, that “for Hegel the absolute is essentially process, change and becoming; it is thought which differentiates itself and becomes articulate in a life of its own, in the threefold rhythm of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, in which each moment passes into the next. For Green, Bradley, and Royce, the absolute is on the other hand immutability, completeness, static perfection, in which each process and becoming is overcome and resolved.” At any rate, Abbagnano is equally unsympathetic towards Hegel and towards his followers, against whom he opposes, not without scholastic ingenuity, his own irrationalistic views, set out in another book whose contents are sufficiently expressed in the title.1

scholarly journals El sentido de la historia de la filosofía para la filosofía hermenéutica

1970 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Carmen López
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Hermeneutic Philosophy ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Language Analysis ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Dialectical Tension ◽  
History Of

RESUMENFrente a las concepciones reduccionistas de la historia de la filosofía, la filosofía hermenéutica respeta la tensión dialéctica entre la filosofía y su historia. De ahí que, en este artículo, analicemos algunas aplicaciones de la hermenéutica de Gadamer y de Ricoeur para la compresión de la historia de la filosofía y de la interpretación de textos. Ambos pensamientos subrayan la relación esencial, constante entre la filosofía y su historia; ahora bien, la hermenéutica de Gadamer tiene como objeto prioritario la apropiación de la tradición a la que pertenece el intérprete, mientras que la de Ricoeur completa esta tarea con una hermenéutica de la sospecha. De ahí que Ricoeur no se limite a la relación de la filosofía con su historia e intente completarla con el psicoanálisis, el análisis del lenguaje o la crítica de las ideología. A pesar de que algunos filósofos se han propuesto deconstruir los conceptos claves de la filosofía hermenéutica, nosotros consideramos que ella nos ofrece un paradigma adecuado para la historia de la filosofía, cuyo objeto es interpretar la tradición dotándola de sentido y creando nuevos significados válidos para el presente.PALABRAS CLAVESHISTORIA – FILOSOFIA – HERMENEUTICAABSTRACTAs contrasted with the reductionist ideas in the history of philosophy, hermeneutic philosphy respects the dialectical tension between philosophy and its history. This is the reason why in this article we analyse some applications of Gadamer’s and Ricoeur’s hermeneutics in order to understand the history of philosphy and the interpetation of texts. Both ideas empahise the essential, constant relation between philosophy and its history. Now then, the prior aim of Gadamer’s hermeneutics is the appropiation of the tradition the interpreter belongs to; on the other hand, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics compeltes this task with a suspicion hermeneutics. From this, we deduce that Ricoeur doesn’t limit himself to the realtion of philosophy with its history and he tries to complete it with psycoanalysis, language analysis and the critique of ideologies. In spite of the fact that some philosophers have tried to deconstruct the key concepts of hermeneutic philosophy, we consider that it offers us a relevant paradigm for the history of philosophy, whose aim is to interpret tradition, endowing it with sense and creating new useful meanings for the present.KEYWORDSHISTORY – PHILOSOPHY – HERMENEUTICS  

Phenomenology and Ontology in the Later Heidegger

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Keiling
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One

Heidegger’s later philosophy is marked by two conflicting claims about phenomenology. On the one hand, phenomenology and philosophy generally is tasked with “responding to the claim of what is to be thought” in a novel and unprecedented manner. On the other hand, Heidegger recognizes that there have been earlier attempts at thus doing justice to phenomena; in the ontological commitments of earlier thinkers, Heidegger finds accounts of the “things themselves,” each of which has different implications for what phenomenology should concern itself with. Phenomenology, as Heidegger conceives it, should thus both incorporate the history of philosophy and exceed it, yet it is unclear how these ideas can be reconciled. This chapter calls this problem the “dilemma of the historicity of phenomenology” and identifies different versions of it in Heidegger’s works after 1935/6.

Pippin on Hegel

1989 ◽  
Vol 10 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Robert Stern
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Cambridge University ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
History Of ◽  
Absolute Knowledge

Ever since Plato coined the metaphor, it has been tempting to treat the history of philosophy as a series of battles between Gods and Giants, as a ‘clash of argument’ between idealists and materialists, rationalists and naturalists, and idealists and realists. Many commentators, provoked by Hegel's combative remarks, have been led to see the Kant-Hegel relation in this way; and yet it has not always been easy to determine either what the issue between these two antagonists really is, or indeed which of them is the Giant and which the God. Robert Pippin, in his new book, Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. xii + 327, hb £30.00, pb £10.95) casts new light on the nature of the struggle, and makes clear what was at stake: a non-rationalist, non-metaphysical answer to the sceptic, and with it absolute knowledge. Pippin's densely written but engrossing book provides the focus of discussion for this issue of the Bulletin. The contributions by H.S. Harris and Terry Pinkard offer critical comments on Pippin's approach to Hegel, and they are followed with a response by Pippin himself. These pieces were originally presented as a meeting of the Western APA, and assume an acquaintance with Pippin's argument, which I will try to outline in what follows. Like many recent commentators, Pippin begins by insisting that we take seriously Hegel's claim to have ‘completed’ Kant, and so rejects any metaphysical, rationalist readng of Hegel. On the other hand, Pippin wants to understand Hegel's claim to have found a form of idealism that answers Kant's transcendental scepticism regarding the ‘thing-in-itself’, without collapsing back into rationalism.

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