From Havana to Miami: U.S. Cuba Policy as a Two-Level Game

1998 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
William M. LeoGrande

For thirty years, Cuba was a focal point of the Cold War. Before the demise of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s close ideological and military partnership with the communist superpower posed a challenge to U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Third World (see, e.g., Domínguez 1989). With the end of the Cold War, Cuba retrenched, ending its aid programs for foreign revolutionaries and regimes. Without the Soviet Union’s sponsorship, Cuba could no longer afford the luxury of a global foreign policy exporting revolution. Instead, its diplomats focused on reorienting Cuba’s international economic relations toward Latin America and Europe, building friendly relations with former adversaries.

Author(s):  
K. Demberel ◽  

The article deals with the issue of Mongolia's foreign policy during the Cold War. This period is divided into two parts. The first period, 1945-1960s, is a period of conflict between two systems: socialism and capitalism. In this first period of the Cold War Mongolia managed to establish diplomatic relations with socialist countries of Eastern Europe, as the “system allowed”. The second period, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, is the period of the conflict of the socialist system, the period of the Soviet-Chinese confrontation. During this period Mongolia's foreign policy changed dramatically and focused on the Soviet Union. This was due to the Soviet investment «boom» that began in 1960s and the entry of Soviet troops on the territory of Mongolia in 1967. The Soviet military intervention into Mongolia was one of the main reasons for cooling the Soviet-Chinese relations. And military withdrawal contributed to the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations until the mid-1980s and one of the conditions for improving relations with their neighbors. The internal systemic conflict had a serious impact on Mongolia's foreign policy over those years.


Author(s):  
Peter Rutland ◽  
Gregory Dubinsky

This chapter examines U.S. foreign policy in Russia. The end of the Cold War lifted the threat of nuclear annihilation and transformed the international security landscape. The United States interpreted the collapse of the Soviet Union as evidence that it had ‘won’ the Cold War, and that its values and interests would prevail in the future world order. The chapter first provides an overview of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 before discussing U.S.–Russian relations under Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, respectively. It then turns to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its enlargement, the Kosovo crisis, and the ‘Great Game’ in Eurasia. It also analyses the rise of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia and the deterioration of U.S.–Russian relations and concludes with an assessment of the cautious partnership between the two countries.


Author(s):  
Richard Saull

This chapter offers a theoretically informed overview of American foreign policy during the Cold War. It covers the main historical developments in U.S. policy: from the breakdown of the wartime alliance with the USSR and the emergence of the US–Soviet diplomatic hostility and geopolitical confrontation,to U.S. military interventions in the third world and the U.S. role in the ending of the Cold War. The chapter begins with a discussion of three main theoretical approaches to American foreign policy during the Cold War: realism, ideational approaches, and socio-economic approaches. It then considers the origins of the Cold War and containment of the Soviet Union, focusing on the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. It also examines the militarization of U.S. foreign policy with reference to the Korean War, Cold War in the third world, and the role of American foreign policy in the ending of the Cold War.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Marten Hanura

Russia or formerly known as the Soviet Union has a historically unique cooperation and diplomatic relations with Indonesia. This is because the relationship between Indonesia and Russia has a long history and experiencing ups and downs. The closeness of the two countries was influenced ideologically in the early days of Indonesian independence, and later the rise of the New Order regime influenced the dynamics of Indonesian foreign policy. During the New Order period, the Indonesian government began to freeze all forms of cooperative relations with the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War era began to change the map of international politics to affect the situation in Indonesia. In the Post-Reformation era, the normalization of relations between the two countries recovered and lasted until the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The purpose of this article is to find out how the changes in the implementation of the foreign policy of Indonesia-Russia during the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono with the previous era and what factors underlie Indonesia's foreign policy towards Russia. This research uses the descriptive-analytical method and using some theoretical concepts in the foreign policy-making process. The results of this study concluded that foreign policy between Indonesia and Russia increased significantly in the Post-Reformation era which no longer saw Russia as a threat as in the New Order era. The cooperation between Indonesia and Russia is implemented in various main areas, prominently is the cooperation in the field of military, social, economic and political.


Author(s):  
Laurence R. Jurdem

As the American public became increasingly disenchanted over the nation’s ongoing presence in Southeast Asia, the Nixon administration initiated a diplomatic strategy toward the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Nixon, who early in his political career had been a passionate anticommunist, began to consider ways in which he might bring China into the international community. The president believed that this strategy had the potential to decrease the Cold War tensions that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. The foreign policy strategy that Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, developed came to be known as détente. The initiatives that composed Nixon’s policy were based on Kissinger’s realist view of international affairs. That perspective embraced the idea of accepting the world as it was rather than trying to change it. By deemphasizing the importance of the conflict between international communism and democracy, pundits on the Right believed Nixon was not only withdrawing America from its global responsibilities, but in doing so was giving the communist world free reign to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy.


Author(s):  
Tobias Rupprecht

This chapter complicates conventional understandings of Latin America’s Cold War by looking at the travels of tercermundista intellectuals and activists to all parts of the USSR. Visits of intellectuals from the global South to the Cold War Soviet Union have hardly been studied. Accounts of the history of Cold War Latin America have put the Soviet Union, as a political and intellectual point of reference, aside too readily. The early Cold War was a time of enhanced, and rather successful, Soviet attempts to present their country in a positive light towards the emerging Third World. Those Latin Americans who developed a sense of belonging with the Third World in the 1960s, this chapter demonstrates, were still susceptible to the lures of certain characteristics of the Soviet state and suggested their implementation in their home countries. The reason for the positive perception came, on the one hand, as a result of very lavishly funded and well conducted programmes for Third World visitors in the Soviet Union.


Author(s):  
Nikita Evgen'evich Belukhin

The object of this research is the foreign policy of Denmark in the 1980s. The subject of this research on the one hand is the ideological foundations of Denmark's foreign policy during this period, which were strongly affected by the ideas of European social democracy, and on the other hand – the influence of the Danish Parliament (Folketing) upon the formation of Denmark’s official position on the issues of European security discussed within the framework of NATO. Denmark’s refutation of neutrality after the World War II and its entry into NATO in many ways determined the foreign policy position of Denmark throughout the Cold War as a small European state that perceived the Soviet Union as a threat to national security. At the same time, the desire of Denmark of maintain maximum flexibility and avoid making far-reaching commitments within the framework of NATO, led to the fact that Denmark was often perceived as an unreliable and inconvenient ally. The period from 1982 to 1988 indicates the Atlantic dissidence of Denmark and simultaneous improvement of relations with the Soviet Union), when Denmark’s representatives in the NATO sessions, being obliged to take into account the position of the parliamentary majority in the Folketing, were forced to make reservations to the final documents of the sessions, expressing disagreement or criticism of implemented measures. Among the Russian scholars dealing with the history of Denmark, this period has not yet received wide coverage. This article is an attempt to describe and explain the causes and consequences of the period of the “policy of reservations” for Denmark’s foreign policy in the context of the end of Cold War and in the conditions of transition towards the post-bipolar system of international relations.


Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter focuses on the United States’s predominance and the search for order in the post-Cold War period. George H. W. Bush, who came to power in January 1989, concentrated on world affairs and had a series of foreign successes before the end of 1991. Bush’s cautious, pragmatic, orderly approach carried both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand he escaped any major disasters abroad and avoided antagonizing the Soviet Union or rekindling the Cold War. On the other hand, he seemed to be undynamic and at the mercy of events — he failed to provide a sense of overall direction to US foreign policy once the Cold War ended. The chapter first considers US foreign policy in the 1990s before discussing the Gulf War of 1990–1991, US–Soviet relations in the 1990s, US policy towards the ‘rogue states’ during the time of Bill Clinton, and ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Somalia and Haiti.


Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter focuses on the predominance of the US and the search for order in the post-Cold War period. George H. W. Bush, who came to power in January 1989, concentrated on world affairs and had a series of foreign successes before the end of 1991. Bush’s cautious, pragmatic, approach carried both advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, he escaped any major disasters abroad and avoided antagonizing the Soviet Union or rekindling the Cold War. On the other, he seemed to be undynamic and at the mercy of events—he failed to provide a sense of overall direction to US foreign policy once the Cold War ended. The chapter first considers US foreign policy in the 1990s, before discussing the Gulf War of 1990–1, US–Soviet relations in the 1990s, US policy towards the ‘rogue states’ during the time of Bill Clinton, and ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Somalia and Haiti.


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