The Supreme Court and the Constitution

1924 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 737-759
Author(s):  
Alan H. Monroe

Ever since the famous case of Marbury v. Madison in 1803, the United States Supreme Court has exercised the power of declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional and of refusing to enforce them as law. From the beginning, the exercise of this power has been the subject of great controversies as to both theory and practice. It has been assailed as subverting the true nature of our government. It has been stigmatized as the foundation of a judicial obligarchy. It has been attacked as a means for the nullification of the popular will as expressed in Congress. It will be the purpose of this paper, therefore, to inquire into the use of this power in relation to acts of Congress with especial regard to (1) the criticisms that have been made at various times throughout American history, and (2) the proposals that have been made to modify the exercise of this power.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (54) ◽  
pp. 499
Author(s):  
Edilton MEIRELES

RESUMONeste trabalho tratamos do direito de manifestação em piquetes e da responsabilidade que possa advir desses atos em face da jurisprudência da Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos da América. A partir da análise das principais decisões da Suprema Corte se pode concluir que, de modo geral, os participantes do piquete não respondem quando agem de forma não ilegal. Está sedimentado, no entanto, o entendimento de que o organizador do piquete responde pelos atos dos participantes. A pesquisa desenvolvida se justifica enquanto estudo comparativo e diante do pouco debate existente no Brasil a respeito do tema. Na pesquisa foi utilizado o método dedutivo, limitada à ciência dogmática do direito, com estudo de casos apreciados pelo judiciário. PALAVRAS-CHAVES: Responsabilidade; Piquete; Estados Unidos; Suprema Corte; Liberdade De Expressão. ABSTRACTIn this work we deal with the right of demonstration in pickets and the responsibility that may arise from these acts in the face of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States of America. From the analysis of the Supreme Court's main decisions it can be concluded that, in general, the picket participants do not respond when they act in a non-illegal way. It is settled, however, the understanding that the picket organizer responds by the acts of the participants. The research developed is justified as a comparative study and in view of the little debate that exists in Brazil regarding the subject. In the research was used the deductive method, limited to the dogmatic science of law, with study of cases appreciated by the judiciary.KEYWORDS: Responsibility; Picket; United States; Supreme Court; Freedom Of Expression.



1972 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 795-814 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas F. Lowenfeld

No recent issue has so divided lawyers and writers in the field of international law as the question whether courts of one nation should sit in judgment on the acts of other nations with respect to foreign held property—sometimes, always, or never. The United States Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cubav. Sabbatinosaid the answer was never—or at least hardly ever—thus upholding and reaffirming the “act of state doctrine”. The Congress in the Hickenlooper (or Sabbatino) Amendmentmade an effort to reverse that ruling, an effort that has proved largely unsuccessful. Now the State Department has taken its turn, arguing in a formal communication to the Supreme Court that when it perceives no objection to adjudication on foreign policy grounds, the courts should judge the validity of the foreign nation's acts under international law standards—at least as to counterclaims.



2019 ◽  
pp. 225-242
Author(s):  
Javier Escobar

Abstract: In Gamble v. United States, the defendant questioned the constitutionality of the dual sovereignty doctrine under the double jeopardy clause. In its judgment, delivered on 17 June, 2019, the United States Supreme Court upheld the application of the dual sovereignty doctrine, according to which different sovereigns may prosecute an individual without violating the double jeopardy clause if the individual's act infringed the laws of each sovereignty. This comment aims to address the reasoning of the Supreme Court and the rationale of the dual sovereignty doctrine, suggesting the convenience and necessity of a further study on its limits and the possible safeguards against potential abuses. 



1967 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 481-487
Author(s):  
Noah Weinstein ◽  
Corinne R. Goodman

For the first time in its 68-year history, the juvenile court has felt the impact of the United States Supreme Court. It would be impossible to predict the exact effect of the decisions, but unquestionably they will be of prime importance in their influ ence on juvenile court procedures.



1972 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-67
Author(s):  
Marc Schnall

This article summarizes the activity of the United States Supreme Court in formulating and applying definitions of what constitutes obscenity. For almost ninety years, American courts applied a test of obscenity established by a British court in 1868. In 1957, after lower courts in the United States had expanded the British definition, the Supreme Court, in Roth v. United States, defined as obscene such material which, "to the average person, apply ing contemporary community standards," appealed to prurient interests and lacked redeeming social value. Between 1957 and 1966, the Court added several dimensions to its definition of obscenity. The current test of obscenity was framed in 1966 in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, which reworded the Roth definition and included a third standard—namely, that the material must also be "patently offensive." This article examines not only the Supreme Court's actual definitions of obscenity but also the trends in these definitions and the Court's continual efforts to define and redefine obscenity.



1992 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Hodder-Williams

Six different notions of ‘political’ are commonly used in discussions of the US Supreme Court. All six are familiar, but the distinctions among them are seldom carefully drawn. The six are: (1) purely definitional, in the sense that the Supreme Court, as an appellate court of last resort inevitably authoritatively allocates values; (2) empirical, in the sense that litigants use the Court to try to achieve their political purposes; (3) influence seeking, in the sense that the justices have a natural desire to prevail in arguments within the court; (4) prudential, in the sense that the justices frequently consider the probable consequences of their decisions; (5) policy-oriented, in the – usually pejorative – sense that justices are said to use the Court and the law as a cover for pursuing their own policy and other goals; and (6) systemic, in the sense that the Court's decisions frequently, as a matter of fact, have consequences for other parts of the American political system. These six notions are considered in the context of recent abortion decisions.



1929 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry B. Hazard

With nationality problems continuing to occupy a prominent place in both international and municipal practice, expressions of opinion of our highest tribunal upon the subject are received with peculiar interest. This is particularly true where the rule announced is one which governs the validity of naturalization judgments. In a recent sweeping naturalization decision which upholds the government’s views at every point, the United States Supreme Court has again stressed the rule that when doubt exists concerning a grant of citizenship, the statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the United States and against the alien. On October 22, 1928, the court handed down its opinion in the case of Anna Marie Maney, Petitioner, v. The United States of America, in which it affirmed, on writ of certiorari, the judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The latter court had directed the cancellation of the applicant’s certificate of naturalization as having been “illegally procured” because of her failure to file, at the prescribed time and in the required manner, the certificate of her arrival in the United States.



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