Political Theories of the Cupreme Court from 1789–1835

1908 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-244
Author(s):  
Charles G. Haines
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
National Government ◽  
Federal Constitution ◽  
Political Theories ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Authority ◽  
The Law

Prior to the time of the organization of the national government under the Constitution of 1787 the province of a court was very definitely determined. In accordance with the principles of ancient custom, a court was a tribunal established by law with the power to hear controversies between persons and to administer relief or punishment. It was the business of a court to interpret, pronounce and execute the law, to decide controversies and enforce rights. In the words of Lord Coke, “ a court is a place where justice is judicially ministered.”Such was the traditional position of a court when the Federal Constitution went into operation in 1789. A supreme court was provided for, to be organized by congress, in whose hands was placed the authority to create such inferior courts as might be necessary to carry out the judicial duties allotted to the federal government. The supreme court which was established by one of the first acts of the congress which met in 1789 very soon recognized and affirmed the limited and definite field for the exercise of judicial authority.

scholarly journals Examine The Constitutionality Of Regulations Under Laws That Are Not Contrary To The Law But Contrary To The Constitution

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-113
Author(s):  
Aditya Yuli Sulistyawan ◽  
I Putu Eka Cakra
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Authority ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Laws And Regulations

Kewenangan untuk memeriksa UU terhadap Konstitusi dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi dan pengujian hukum dan peraturan berdasarkan Undang-Undang tentang Hukum dilaksanakan oleh Mahkamah Agung sebagaimana diatur dalam Pasal 24 A paragraf 1 dan 24 C paragraf 1 Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945. Namun, dalam perumusan pasal a quo ternyata masih menyisakan masalah, yaitu belum mengatur mekanisme pengujian norma yang terkandung dalam undang-undang di bawah undang-undang jika ternyata tidak bertentangan dengan undang-undang tetapi bertentangan dengan konstitusi. Tulisan ini membahas pengujian norma-norma undang-undang melalui Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 tentang kewenangan peradilan di casu a quo pasal 24 A ayat 1 dan 24 C ayat 1 Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945. Kata kunci: otoritas, hukum, konstitusi. Abstract The authority to examine the Law against the Constitution is carried out by the Constitutional Court and the testing of the laws and regulations under the Law on the Law is carried out by the Supreme Court as regulated in article 24 A paragraph 1 and 24 C paragraph 1 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. However, in the formulation of the article a quo it turns out still leaves a problem, namely not yet regulating the norm testing mechanism contained in the legislation under the legislation if it turns out it is not contrary to the law but contrary to the constitution. This paper analyzes the testing of the norms of the legislation through the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Republic IX concerning judicial authority in casu a quo article 24 A paragraph 1 and 24 C paragraph 1 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Keyword: authority, law, the constitution.

PERSINGGUNGAN KEWENANGAN MENGADILI PENYALAHGUNAAN DISKRESI ANTARA PENGADILAN TUN DAN PENGADILAN TIPIKOR / INTERCEPTION OF JUSTICE AUTHORITY OF DISCRETION ABUSE BETWEEN ADMINISTRATION COURT AND CORRUPTION COURTS

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Budi Suhariyanto
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Criminal Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
State Finance ◽  
The Law ◽  
To Receive

Diskresi sebagai wewenang bebas, keberadaannya rentan akan disalahgunakan. Penyalahgunaan diskresi yang berimplikasi merugikan keuangan negara dapat dituntutkan pertanggungjawabannya secara hukum administrasi maupun hukum pidana. Mengingat selama ini peraturan perundang-undangan tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi tidak merumuskan secara rinci yang dimaksudkan unsur menyalahgunakan kewenangan maka para hakim menggunakan konsep penyalahgunaan wewenang dari hukum administrasi. Problema muncul saat diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014 dimana telah memicu persinggungan dalam hal kewenangan mengadili penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) antara Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dengan Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Pada perkembangannya, persinggungan kewenangan mengadili tersebut ditegaskan oleh Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 4 Tahun 2015 bahwa PTUN berwenang menerima, memeriksa, dan memutus permohonan penilaian ada atau tidak ada penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) dalam Keputusan dan/atau Tindakan Pejabat Pemerintahan sebelum adanya proses pidana. Sehubungan tidak dijelaskan tentang definisi dan batasan proses pidana yang dimaksud, maka timbul penafsiran yang berbeda. Perlu diadakan kesepakatan bersama dan dituangkan dalam regulasi tentang tapal batas persinggungan yang jelas tanpa meniadakan kewenangan pengujian penyalahgunaan wewenang diskresi pada Pengadilan TUN.Discretion as free authority is vulnerable to being misused. The abuse of discretion implicating the state finance may be prosecuted by both administrative and criminal law. In view of the fact that the law on corruption eradication does not formulate in detail the intended element of authority abuse, the judges use the concept of authority abuse from administrative law. Problems arise when the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 triggered an interception in terms of justice/ adjudicate authority on authority abuse (including discretion) between the Administrative Court and Corruption Court. In its development, the interception of justice authority is affirmed by Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2015 that the Administrative Court has the authority to receive, examine and decide upon the appeal there is or there is no misuse of authority in the Decision and / or Action of Government Officials prior to the criminal process. That is, shortly before the commencement of the criminal process then that's when the authority of PTUN decides to judge the misuse of authority over the case. In this context, Perma No. 4 of 2015 has imposed restrictions on the authority of the TUN Court in prosecuting the abuse of discretionary authority.

O ENSINO RELIGIOSO EM QUESTÃO

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (21) ◽  
pp. 459
Author(s):  
Mauro Rocha Baptista
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Religious Education ◽  
Common Core ◽  
Historical Perspective ◽  
National Curriculum ◽  
The Other ◽  
Federal Constitution ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common

Neste artigo analisamos a relação do Ensino Religioso com a sua evolução ao longo do contexto recente do Brasil para compreender a posição do Supremo Tribunal Federal ao considerar a possibilidade do Ensino Religioso confessional. Inicialmente apresentaremos a perspectiva legislativa criada com a constituição de 1988 e seus desdobramentos nas indicações curriculares. Neste contexto é frisado a intenção de incluir o Ensino Religioso na Base Nacional Curricular Comum, o que acabou não acontecendo. A tendência manifesta nas duas primeiras versões da BNCC era de um Ensino Religioso não-confessional. Uma tendência que demarcava a função do Ensino Religioso em debater a religião, mas que não permitia o direcionamento por uma vertente religioso qualquer. Esta posição se mostrava uma evolução da primeira perspectiva histórica mais associada à catequese confessional. Assim como também ultrapassava a interpretação posterior de um ecumenismo interconfessional, que mantinha a superioridade do cristianismo ante as demais religiões. Sendo assim, neste artigo, adotaremos o argumento de que a decisão do STF, de seis votos contra cinco, acaba retrocedendo ante o que nos parecia um caminho muito mais frutífero.Palavras-chave: Ensino Religioso. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Confessional. Interconfessional. Não-confessional.Abstract: On this article, we analyze the relation between Religious education and its evolution along the currently Brazilian context in order to understand the position of the Supreme Court in considering the possibility of a confessional Religious education. Firstly, we are going to present the legislative perspective created with the 1988 Federal Constitution and its impacts in the curricular lines. On this context it was highlighted the intention to include the Religious Education on the Common Core National Curriculum (CCNC), which did not really happened. The tendency manifested in the first two versions of the CCNC was of a non-confessional Religious Education. A tendency that delineated the function of the Religious Education as debating religion, but not giving direction on any religious side. This position was an evolution of the first historical perspective more associated to the confessional catechesis. It also went beyond the former interpretation of an inter-confessional ecumenism, which kept the superiority of the Christianity over the other religions. As such, in this paper we adopt the argument that the decision of the Supreme Court, of six votes against five, is a reversal of what seemed to be a much more productive path on the Religious Education.Keywords: Religious Education. Brazilian Supreme Court. Confessional. Inter-confessional. Non- confessional.Enviado: 23-01-2018 - Aprovado e publicado: 12-2018

STUDI KASUS PENETAPAN KEMBALI TARIF DAN/ATAU NILAI PABEAN (SPKTNP) OLEH DIREKTUR JENDERAL BEA DAN CUKAI: TINJAUAN PUTUSAN PENINJAUAN KEMBALI MAHKAMAH AGUNG RI

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Akhmad Firdiansyah ◽  
Wachid Hasyim ◽  
Yonathan Agung Pahlevi
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Analysis ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Director General ◽  
Import Duty ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law

ABSTRACT In accordance with the mandate of Article 23A of the 1945 Constitution, all tax stipulations must be based on the law. To carry out the mandate in accordance with Article 17 of the Customs Law Number 17 of 2006, the Director General of Customs and Excise is given the attributive authority to issue reassignment letter on Customs Tariff and / or Value for the calculation of import duty within two years starting from the date of customs notification carried out through a mechanism of audit or re-research. To examine the application of these legal norms, there are currently Supreme Court (MA) Judgment (PK) decisions that accept PK applications from PK applicants and question the legality of issuing SPKTNP by the Director General of BC. This study uses explosive qualitative analysis to analyze the issuance of SPKTNP by the Director General of BC. The results of this study indicate that the Supreme Court is of the view that the issuance of SPKTNP by the Director General of BC is a legal defect, while DGCE considers the issuance of SPKTNP by the Director General of BC according to the provisions.Key words: official decision, reassignment letter, DCGE  ABSTRAKSesuai amanah Pasal 23A Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 Segala penetapan pajak harus berdasar undang-undang. Untuk menjalankan amanah tersebut sesuai Pasal 17 Undang-Undang Kepabeanan Nomor 17 Tahun 2006 Direktur Jenderal Bea dan Cukai (Dirjen BC) diberikan kewenangan atributif untuk menerbitkan Surat Penetapan Kembali Tarif dan/atau Nilai Pabean (SPKTNP) guna penghitungan bea masuk dalam jangka waktu dua tahun terhitung sejak tanggal pemberitahuan pabean yang dilakukan melalui mekanisme audit atau penelitian ulang. Untuk meneliti penerapan norma hukum tersebut dewasa ini terdapat putusan Peninjauan Kembali (PK) Mahkamah Agung (MA) yang menerima permohonan PK dari pemohon PK dan mempermasalahkan legalitas penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC. Penelitian ini mengunakan analisis kualitatif eksplotarif untuk menganalisis penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa MA berpandangan penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC adalah cacat hukum, sedangkan DJBC beranggapan penerbitan SPKTNP oleh Dirjen BC telah sesuai ketentuan.Kata Kunci: penetapan pejabat, SPKTNP, Direktur Jenderal Bea dan Cukai.

Private International Law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
V.C. Govindaraj
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Private International Law ◽  
Conflict Of Laws ◽  
Application Of Law ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Corrective Measures ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law

In deciding cases of private international law or conflict of laws, as it is widely known, judges of the Supreme Court in India generally consult the works of renowned English jurists like Dicey and Cheshire. This volume argues that our country should have its own system of resolving inter-territorial issues with cross-border implications. The author critically analyses cases covering areas such as the law of obligations, the law of persons, the law of property, foreign judgments, and foreign arbitral awards. The author provides his perspectives on the application of law in each case. The idea is to find out where the judges went wrong in deciding cases of private international law, so that corrective measures can be taken in future to resolve disputes involving complex, extra-territorial issues.

Transforming the Law on Psychiatric Lesions

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-271
Author(s):  
Emile Zitzke
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Expert Witnesses ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Psychological Harm ◽  
The Law ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Law Of Delict ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Made In

In this article, I trace the development in the law of delict of recognising general damages claims on account of psychiatric lesions with the aim of making suggestions on how to transform it. Using the tragic case of Michael Komape as a springboard for the discussion, I argue that even though the Supreme Court of Appeal has recently brought clarity on the law on psychiatric lesions, more transformative work still needs to be done. More specifically, this article contends that the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity might require us to rethink the high evidentiary threshold that courts have set for proving the element of harm in cases related to psychiatric lesions. I argue that this can be done in at least three ways: First, by very cautiously bringing about a development that would involve protecting victims of psychological harm whose expert witnesses are shown to be inadequate despite all other facts indicating the existence of a psychiatric lesion. Secondly, by lowering the requirement of “recognised psychiatric lesion” to “grievous mental injury”, in line with similar arguments made in England. Thirdly, and most controversially, by acknowledging that perhaps the time has come for our law to recognise claims for so-called “grief in the air”.

EXPRESSIVE MEANING, RACE, AND THE LAW:

Legal Theory ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-99
Author(s):  
Andrew Altman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Reasoning ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Expressive Meaning ◽  
The Law

Recently, legal and social thinkers have turned to the idea that actions possess a nonlinguistic meaning, called “expressive meaning.” In this article I examine the idea of expressive meaning and its role in legal reasoning. My focus is on a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases involving constitutional challenges to election districts drawn on the basis of race. The Supreme Court used the idea of expressive meaning in striking down the districts. After explicating the idea of expressive meaning, I explain and criticize the Court’s reasoning. I distinguish the approach of Justices Thomas and Scalia, who hold that all uses of race in districting do constitutional harm, from that of Justice O’Connor, who distinguishes uses of race that do constitutional harm from those that do not. I contend that Justice O’Connor is right to make the distinction but she draws the line using a questionable standard. A more defensible standard would be more accommodating to the districts that the Court invalidated.

A Note on the Law and Economics of Stolen Valor

2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-119
Author(s):  
Dennis L. Weisman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Military Service ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Wage Premium ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Jel Classifications

The issue of stolen valor concerns the act of trading on false claims of being awarded valorous military service medals. The Supreme Court overturned the 2005 Stolen Valor Act, largely on First Amendment grounds, ruling that even false speech deserves some protection. Misrepresentation that devalues the reputation of medals for valor may not violate the revised statute despite reducing the expected wage premium associated with being awarded the medal for valor and discouraging investment in military effort. Hence, the law and economics of stolen valor are in some conflict. JEL Classifications: D82, H1, K23

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