Minority Control of Court Decisions in Ohio

1930 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 638-648
Author(s):  
W. Rolland Maddox
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Theodore Roosevelt ◽  
Constitutional Convention ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Minority Control

The experience of Ohio with the requirement of concurrence of an extraordinary majority of the Supreme Court to declare a statute invalid is an illuminating commentary on the desirability of such a restriction. Much has been spoken and written on both sides of the question. Those who have seen laws embodying worth-while reforms invalidated by the courts, many times by bare majority decisions, have campaigned for a curtailment of the judicial prerogative. Publicists have expatiated on the evils of the situation. Textbook writers have embodied the arguments in their discussions. Teachers, it is to be feared, have quite glibly enlarged upon the necessity of unseating our “judicial obligarchy.”The late President Theodore Roosevelt, addressing the Ohio constitutional convention in 1912, urged that body to propose an amendment providing for the recall of judicial decisions. He failed to convince the convention of the desirability of his remedy, but he succeeded in creating a feeling that something must be done; and an amendment to the judiciary article was adopted, reading as follows: “No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the Supreme Court without the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of the court of appeals declaring the law unconstitutional and void.” Since the Supreme Court is composed of a chief justice and six associate justices, the restriction amounts to a requirement of the concurrence of six justices in decisions of this kind.

A Curious Decision by Zambia’s Highest Court: Six Years Imprisonment for Civil Contempt?

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-138
Author(s):  
Christopher Phiri
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

Abstract On 23 November 2018, the Supreme Court of Zambia delivered a judgement which suggests that Zambian judges have virtually unbridled power to move on their own motion to punish for contempt of court anyone who criticises their judicial decisions. This article considers that judgement. It argues that whilst justice might well have been done in the case in question, it was certainly not seen to be done. Two main reasons are given for this argument. First, the judges appeared to have acted both as prosecutors and adjudicators in their own cause when it was neither urgent nor imperative to act immediately on their own motion. Second, the classification by the Court of the contempt in question as civil contempt rather than criminal contempt is alien to the common law world. The article culminates in a clarion call for the Zambian legislature to intervene and clarify the law of contempt of court to avert capricious and unbridled invocation of the judicial power to punish for contempt.

Under the Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 98 (7) ◽  
pp. 76-77
Author(s):  
Julie Underwood
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Circuit Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
K 12 ◽  
The U.S

How would the appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court (presuming he is confirmed by the U.S. Congress) affect the court’s dynamics, its ideological balance, and specifically its decisions on cases that bear upon K-12 education? Is he likely to be another Justice Antonin Scalia, will he be less conservative, or will he be more so? The author looks for clues in the opinions Gorsuch has written for the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals.

scholarly journals Implikasi Putusan Hakim Dalam Penetapan Sanksi Di Bawah Minimum Terhadap Tindak Pidana Narkotika

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-146
Author(s):  
Endy Ronaldi ◽  
Dahlan Ali ◽  
Mujibussalim Mujibussalim
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Research Method ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The One ◽  
Principle Of Legality

Tindak pidana narkotika merupakan kejahatan luar biasa sehingga menjadi prioritas pemerintah untuk diperangi. Penanggulangan tindak pidana narkotika diatur dalam Undang-Undang No. 35 Tahun 2009 tentang Narkotika. Salah satu pengaturan dalam undang-undang tersebut adalah pemberian sanksi di bawah minimum melalui putusan hakim. Sebagaimana kasus yang terjadi dalam Putusan Nomor 64/PID/2012/PN Sigli, Putusan No. 1/pid.sus/2016/PN Cag. (narkotika) dan Putusan No. 14/pid.sus/2016/PN Cag. Adapun permasalahan yang dikaji yaitu faktor penyebab hakim memutuskan sanksi di bawah minimum kepada pelaku narkotika dan implikasinya. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah metode yuridis normatif dengan mengkaji aspek normatif atas permasalahan yang dikaji. Pendekatan yang dilakukan adalah pendekatan kasuistik dengan menelaah putusan pengadilan. Putusan pengadilan dengan penetapan sanksi di bawah minimum disatu sisi bertentangan dengan asas legalitas dalam hukum pidana. Sehingga hal ini diakomodir dalam Surat Edaran Mahkamah Agung No. 3 tahun 2015. Narcotics crimes are extraordinary crimes so that become government priorities to be minimized. Tackling narcotics crime is regulated in Law No. 35 of 2009 concerning Narcotics. One of the regulations in the law is to impose sanctions below the minimum through a judge's decision. As the case with is the Decision Number 64/PID/2012/PN Sigli. The problems studied are the factors that cause the judge to decide the minimum sanctions for narcotics and their implications. The research method used is a normative juridical method by examining the normative aspects of the problem under study. The approach taken is a casuistic approach by examining court decisions. Court decisions with the determination of sanctions below the minimum on the one hand are contrary to the principle of legality in criminal law. So that accommodated in the Supreme Court Circular No. 3 of 2015.

Protection in Ascent, 1908–23

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy Woloch
Keyword(s):  
Women Workers ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Minimum Wage ◽  
District Of Columbia ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Children's Hospital ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Children’S Hospital ◽  
The Law ◽  
Made In

This chapter examines Muller's aftermath in legal history through the landmark case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923). In Oregon, an employer (Children's Hospital) sought an injunction against the DC Minimum Wage Board to restrain it from imposing the minimum wage of $16.50 per week for women workers in hotels, hospitals, restaurants, clubs, and apartment houses. The District of Columbia Supreme Court upheld the law in June 1920, as did the DC Court of Appeals in June 1921. However, at the second hearing in November 1922, the DC Court of Appeals upset the law. In 1923, when Adkins v. Children's Hospital reached the Supreme Court, defenders of the minimum wage faced a less receptive roster of justices than they had in 1917; recent appointments made in wartime and soon after had produced a more conservative court. As such, the Supreme Court failed to sustain the District of Columbia minimum wage law by a 5–3 decision.

scholarly journals Interpretative Discretion of Judiciary and the Well-Being of the Child

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Hanas
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Judicial Discretion ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
The Law ◽  
Common Criterion ◽  
Full Protection ◽  
Law Making

<p>The well-being of the child is a common criterion in many Polish normative regulations pertaining to different branches of law. It is both a tool for the law-making and the executive bodies, employed to direct the law-applying bodies towards ensuring full protection of the child. This article is focused on analysing interpretative judicial discretion with respect to the well-being of the child as manifested in the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court and in the judgements of the Supreme Administrative Court and Constitutional Tribunal. In the course of the research, the author undertakes to determine the essence of interpretative judicial discretion in cases predominantly focused on establishing the current and postulated situation of the child with a view to ensuring the most favourable ruling for the same.</p>

scholarly journals SENTENCING FOR THE OFFENSE OF FALSE TESTIMONY IN THE LIGHT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Probacja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 31-63
Author(s):  
Izabela Urbaniak-Mastalerz
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Current Case ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law

The study presents the problems of courts, in the case of sentencing for crimes of false testimony in the light of judicial decisions. The article is, therefore, a presentation of issued decisions of common courts and the Supreme Court in the scope of this off ense, indicating the changes made to the law. The author will attempt to resolve the problem of the circumstances in which a false testimony is sentenced for as an off ence, given the current case-law of the Supreme Court and common courts. The conclusions of the discussed principles of sentencing for this crime (based on available statistics), will be the starting point for the assessment.

GUILT AS A SUBJECTIVE SIDE OF LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY OF JUDGE

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaroslav Skromnyy ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Liability ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Legal Responsibility ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Judicial Practice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Subjective Aspect

The article reveals the main aspects of determining the guilt of a judge as a subjective aspect of imposing legal responsibility on him. It was established that the key aspects of determining the guilt of a judge as a subjective aspect of imposing legal responsibility on him are represented by the provisions of such legislative and regulatory documents as the Constitution of Ukraine, the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine «On the independence of the judiciary», the Law of Ukraine «On the implementation of decisions and the application of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights», Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine «On judicial practice in cases of crimes against human life and health», Law of Ukraine «On the judicial system and the status of judges». It was found that the evidence of the judge's guilt in relation to the offense committed by him today is one of the important issues of imposing a certain type of legal liability on him. It has been determined that judges often commit offenses due to the adoption of unfounded and often illegal court decisions. It has been proved that the guilt of judges for the offenses committed by them is manifested as a result of non-compliance or disregard for the norms of procedural legislation or labor discipline. It has been determined that in order to make a court decision, a judge is obliged to determine the norms of the law, a number of bylaws and study judicial practice in considering the relevant court case. It has been established that one of the elements of a judge's fault is an inner conviction. It has been established that the subject of the court case regarding the adoption by the judge of an unjustified and illegal court decision is not the corpus delicti, which is present in the actions of the judge, but the legality of that, or the investigator will refuse to initiate a criminal case against the judge for making an unjust decision. It was found that the practical methods of determining the guilt of a judge in committing an offense should be a comprehensive study of the materials of the case, which is open against the judge, and the analysis of data from the judge's dossier, in particular, data on the consideration of such cases by a judge and the adoption of appropriate court decisions on them. It has been proven that quite often the release of a judge from legal liability occurs in conditions when offenses committed by a judge are re-qualified as a miscarriage of justice.

Constitutional Law in 1953–1954

1955 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-106
Author(s):  
David Fellman
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
General Counsel ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
Solicitor General ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Law Degree

The membership of the Supreme Court remained unchanged during the 1953 Term. Chief Justice Vinson died on September 8, shortly before the opening of the Term. Governor Earl Warren of California was given a recess appointment by President Eisenhower on October 2, and was sworn in as the fourteenth Chief Justice on October 5. The Senate Judiciary Committee moved slowly, however, and the appointment did not reach the Senate until March 1, 1954, when it was confirmed by a voice vote without opposition.A week after the 1954 Term got under way Justice Robert H Jackson died, of a heart attack, on October 9, 1954, at the age of 62. For a man who had no law degree, Justice Jackson had done very well in the law. After a brilliant career as a lawyer in Jamestown, New York, he entered the government service in 1934 as General Counsel to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. He was appointed Solicitor-General in 1938, Attorney-General in 1940, and was elevated to the Supreme Court by President Roosevelt in June, 1941. He served as chief American prosecutor at the Nürnberg trial of top Nazi war criminals. Though appointed with the reputation of being a liberal New Dealer, Justice Jackson was actually close to the very center of the Court in many cases where the Justices were sharply divided. He was one of the most gifted opinion-writers on the Court, with a flair for felicitous phrasing and well-turned epigrams. To take the place of Justice Jackson, President Eisenhower nominated, on November 8, 1954, Judge John Marshall Harlan, whom he had appointed the previous March to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Judge Harlan, once a successful New York lawyer, is the grandson of the Justice Harlan who served with such distinction from 1877 to 1911.

scholarly journals The dispute about law in urgent administrative cases at the appeal of the bodies of revenue and fees

2019 ◽  
pp. 85-90
Author(s):  
O.V Skochylias-Pavliv ◽  
N.V. Lesko
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Legal Definition ◽  
Judicial Practice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Judicial Procedure ◽  
Administrative Proceedings

The article deals with current issues related to the procedure of consideration and resolution of urgent administrative cases at the appeal of the bodies of revenue and fees. The peculiarities of the specified category of cases which are manifested in the urgency; subject composition; notification of the participants of the case on the date, time and place of the case; filing of the claim; calculation of procedural terms; announcement and service of court decisions; appeal and cassation appeal; the court fee are analyzed. It is noted that the statements of the case are a statement of claim, reaction a statement of claim, a response to a reaction, a protest, a third party’s explanation of the statement claim, or reaction a statement of claim. The form of the appeal of tax authorities to the administrative court is a claim. Obviously, that is why in these categories of cases there are often misunderstandings regarding the payment of court fees as evidenced by a large number of decisions on leaving without motion the claim of bodies of revenue and fees on the ground of failure to submit to the court a document on payment of court fees. Central to the article is the consideration of the issue of understanding of the dispute about law as one of the grounds for refusing to open proceedings at the appeal of the bodies of revenue and fees. The only form of administrative proceedings is the consideration of the case on the statement of claim. As is well known, a lawsuit involves conflict between the parties. The mutual rights and obligations of the parties to prove their claims and objections constitute the substance of the dispute. However, the peculiarities of disputes at the request of the bodies of revenue and fees due to the fact that they don’t have a dispute about the law. It is noted that there is no legal definition of the term «dispute about the law», which significantly complicates the consideration and resolution of this category of cases. The interpretation of this concept exists only in judicial practice, in particular in resolutions of the Supreme Court but they are also contradictory. That’s why we consider it necessary to supplement article 283 Code of Administrative Proceedings of Ukraine a note defining the concept of «dispute about the law», which should be understood as a claim of the taxpayer to the tax authority regardless of the subject of the claim which may be submitted to administrative or judicial procedure. Keywords: a dispute about law, administrative proceedings, administrative case, revenue, and fees, claim.

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