A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions of Judicial Role Variations

1966 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 677-680 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodore L. Becker

Contrary to some belief, there are some, and possibly many, conditions under which survey research techniques can be put to use in the study of judicial decision-making. The present note reports on the successful use of such a technique in the collection and analysis of data drawn directly from the judicial bench of the State of Hawaii. In this case the plan to utilize survey techniques arose out of consideration of a problem that has plagued students of judicial decision-making from the beginning, i.e., the problem of getting direct information about those judicial attitudes and orientations which might reasonably be expected to function as determinants of judicial decisions.In an earlier study of the impact of judicial role orientation upon judicial decision-making, I tried to handle the problem of taking independent measures of actual judicial attitudes and orientations which could then be related to judicial decisions. My approach at the time was to use accessible and measurable law students as stand-ins for actual judges. In contrast to this approach most of the political “judicial behavioralists,” while collecting data on actual functioning judges, do not attempt to solve the problem in any way. For these scholars continue to reason tautologically from information contained mainly in judicial votes and secondarily in judicial opinions, leaving us with such essential conclusions, in effect, as: “conservative” decisions are made by “conservative” judges, etc. Who is to say which is the worst procedure: the “judicial behavioralists,” which collects irrelevant data from relevant persons; or my own, which collects relevant data from irrelevant persons?Despite advice to the contrary, I decided to try my hand at direct surveys of a judiciary, i.e., the one closest at hand.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hubert Smekal ◽  
Jaroslav Benák ◽  
Monika Hanych ◽  
Ladislav Vyhnánek ◽  
Štěpán Janků

The book studies other than purely legal factors that influence the Czech Constitutional Court judges in their decision-making. The publication is inspired by foreign models of judicial decision-making and discusses their applicability in the Czech environment. More specifically, it focuses, for example, on the influence of the judge’s personality, collegiality, strategic decision-making or the impact of public opinion and the media. The book is based mainly on interviews with current constitutional judges.


Author(s):  
Steven D. Schaaf

Under what conditions will authoritarian courts issue decisions that constrain state actors? This study breaks new ground in authoritarianism research by explaining when authoritarian states are—and are not—held accountable to legal norms. I leverage evidence from interviews with Jordanian and Palestinian legal actors, original data on judicial decisions, and two years of fieldwork shadowing judges as they conducted business in the courthouse. I find that courts in Jordan and Palestine are hardly regime pawns, as judges routinely prioritize their own interests above those of regime elites. My results also demonstrate that lawsuits revealing instances of intra-state disunity are particularly good vehicles for expanding judicial authority over state activity and, further, that appellate courts are uniquely less capable of constraining state actors.


Author(s):  
Michael A. Bailey ◽  
Forrest Maltzman

Building on the theoretical model of Chapter 3, this chapter seeks to assess whether “law” affects judicial decisions independently of policy preferences. Numerous legal doctrines may shape judicial decision-making, including stare decisis, originalism, plain meaning, the promotion of democratic participation, and doctrines with regard to specific elements of the Constitution such as the Bill of Rights or the commerce clause. The chapter concentrates on three legal doctrines (stare decisis, strict interpretation of the Constitution, and judicial restraint) that are both prominent and clearly more likely to play a role in structuring decision-making on some cases than on others. These doctrines are not necessarily canons of jurisprudence that are universally shared; they are principles that are widely acknowledged in the legal world as appropriately influencing constitutional interpretation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-264
Author(s):  
Christoph K. Winter

AbstractThis Article analyzes the value of behavioral economics for EU judicial decision-making. The first part introduces the foundations of behavioral economics by focusing on cognitive illusions, prospect theory, and the underlying distinction between different processes of thought. The second part examines the influence of selected biases and heuristics, namely the anchoring effect, availability bias, zero-risk bias, and hindsight bias on diverse legal issues in EU law including, among others, the scope of the fundamental freedoms, the proportionality test as well as the roles of the Advocate General and Reporting Judge. The Article outlines how behavioral economic findings can be taken into account to improve judicial decision-making. Accordingly, the adaptation of judicial training concerning cognitive illusions, the establishment of a de minimis rule regarding the scope of the fundamental freedoms, and the use of economic models when determining the impact of certain measures on fundamental freedoms is suggested. Finally, an “unbiased jury” concentrating exclusively on specific factual issues such as causal connections within the proportionality test is necessary, if the hindsight bias is to be avoided. While it is of great importance to take behavioral economic findings into account, judicial decision-making is unlikely to become flawless based on natural intelligence. Despite bearing fundamental risks, artificial intelligence may provide means to achieve greater fairness, consistency, and legal certainty in the future.


2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Ryan J. Rebe

<p>This article examines the causal connection between attorney contributions and judicial decisions in elective states.  The results show that contributions are a significant predictor of appellant success in state supreme courts when judges receive contributions from the attorneys for the appellant.  However, this relationship is contingent on the competitiveness of the judicial seat.  The analysis shows that judges who received a low percentage of the vote in the previous election are more likely to vote with contributors than judges who received a high percentage.  This evidence bolsters the argument that contributions directly affect decision making when judges feel electoral pressure.  The results also support the proposition that elected judges are more likely to vote with donors in states with nonpartisan ballots.  While the contribution amounts are higher in partisan states, the judges in the nonpartisan sample are more closely aligned with their contributors when it comes to decision making. </p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafał Mańko

AbstractThe present paper puts forward a first outline of a possible agonistic theory of adjudication, conceived of as an extension of Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic theory of democracy onto the domain of the juridical, and specifically, judicial decision-making. Mouffe’s concept of the political as the dimension of inherent and unalienable conflicts (antagonisms) which, nonetheless, need to be tamed for a pluralist democracy to function, creates an excellent vantage point for a critical theory of adjudication. The paper argues for perceiving all judicial decisions as having a double nature—juridical and political. Cloaked in legal form, judgments nonetheless decide on individual instances of on-going collective conflicts, opposing workers to employers, consumers to traders, tenants to landlords, moral progressives to traditionalists, minorities to majorities and so forth. Judges, when handing down judgments, enjoy a ‘relative sovereignty’, being always already inscribed into the institutional imperatives of the juridical, on one hand, and ideological influences, on the other, but at the same time called upon to decide in the terrain of the undecidable and contingent (after all, law does not ‘apply itself’ on its own). Indeed the determinacy of legal decisions is only relative: in many cases judges can, by performing a sufficient amount of legal interpretive work, reach a conclusion which will be different from the prima facie interpretation. The collective conflicts of a various nature (economic, ideological, socio-political), once they are juridified, become the object of judicial decisions which, in light of Mouffe’s theory, can be seen as temporary hegemonic fixations. The goal of critical legal scholarship is to destabilise such hegemonies in the name of justice. This can be done not only through an external critique of the law, but also through an internal one. The methodological approach advanced in the latter part of the paper emphasises the need for a critique of judicial decisions based on the consideration of all possible alternative decisions a court could have reached, and their evaluation in the light of conflicting interests and ideologies.


Author(s):  
Cristine Griffo ◽  
João Paulo A. Almeida ◽  
Giancarlo Guizzardi

In this paper, we expose the legal theories underlying two important classes of Legal Core Ontologies and show how these ontologies inherit both limitations and benefits (such as explanatory power) of their underlying theories. We do that with the help of a real case study in which we have normative omission and collision of principles. We use this case study to conduct an ontological analysis of the support for judicial decision-making in LKIF-Core (representing Kelsen’s Pure Theory of the Law) and UFO-L (representing Robert Alexy’s Theory of Constitutional Rights). We show that UFO-L is able to articulate the semantics of the content of judicial decisions by making explicit the individual’s legal positions that are raised in argumentation along a legal process. The same cannot be said of LKIF-Core that is based on the Kelsenian stance and focuses on the representation of general norms (norm types) and subsumption of facts to these norms.


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