The Swing Ratio and Game Theory

1972 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 551-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sankoff ◽  
Koula Mellos
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Major Part ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Hard Core ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Effect Factors ◽  
Asymptotically Optimal ◽  
Ratio Effect ◽  
Total Vote

We propose a simple game-theory model of single-member plurality electoral systems, two parties with unequal resources being the players. Strategies consist of allocations of resources among the n contests, and a party's payoff is the number of contests to which it has assigned more resources than the other party. Mixed strategies exist which are asymptotically optimal as n increases. Identifying a party's proportion of total resources with its total vote proportion, we predict that the swing ratio, or marginal seat proportion per vote proportion, is 2. This compares to empirical findings which range between 2 and 4, and to the hitherto unexplained cube law, which predicts 3. We suggest that the strategic problem modeled by this game accounts for the major part of the swing ratio effect. Factors which vary from system to system, such as proportion of hard-core support attached to parties, may amplify this effect.

scholarly journals Entry, Competition, and Regulation in Cognitive Radio Scenarios: A Simple Game Theory Model

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis Guijarro ◽  
Vicent Pla ◽  
Jose R. Vidal ◽  
Jorge Martinez-Bauset
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cognitive Radio ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Spectrum Management ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Innovative Technology ◽  
Primary Operator ◽  
Radio Technology ◽  
Cognitive Radio Technology

Spectrum management based on private commons is argued to be a realistic scenario for cognitive radio deployment within the current mobile market structure. A scenario is proposed where a secondary entrant operator leases spectrum from a primary incumbent operator. The secondary operator innovates incorporating cognitive radio technology, and it competes in quality of service and price against the primary operator in order to provide service to users. We aim to assess which benefit users get from the entry of secondary operators in the market. A game theory-based model for analyzing both the competition between operators and the subscription decision by users is proposed. We conclude that an entrant operator adopting an innovative technology is better off entering the market, and that a regulatory authority should intervene first allowing the entrant operator to enter the market and then setting a maximum amount of spectrum leased. This regulatory intervention is justified in terms of users utility and social welfare.

Game theory model for a virtual water strategy: Scenarios under rational and semirational game play

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuan Zhi ◽  
Paul B. Hamilton ◽  
Guoyong Wu ◽  
Ni Hong ◽  
Yuanyuan Sun ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Virtual Water ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Game Play ◽  
Virtual Water Strategy ◽  
Water Strategy

MONTE CARLO METHODS IN FUZZY GAME THEORY

2007 ◽  
Vol 03 (02) ◽  
pp. 259-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
AREEG ABDALLA ◽  
JAMES BUCKLEY
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Monte Carlo ◽  
Monte Carlo Method ◽  
Monte Carlo Methods ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Minimax Theorem ◽  
Approximate Solutions ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Fuzzy Game ◽  
Zero Sum

In this paper, we consider a two-person zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs and fuzzy mixed strategies for both players. We define the fuzzy value of the game for both players [Formula: see text] and also define an optimal fuzzy mixed strategy for both players. We then employ our fuzzy Monte Carlo method to produce approximate solutions, to an example fuzzy game, for the fuzzy values [Formula: see text] for Player I and [Formula: see text] for Player II; and also approximate solutions for the optimal fuzzy mixed strategies for both players. We then look at [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] to see if there is a Minimax theorem [Formula: see text] for this fuzzy game.

scholarly journals Strategy Analysis of Promoting Pollution Control of SMEs

2021 ◽  
Vol 237 ◽  
pp. 01025
Author(s):  
Yanying Zhang ◽  
Gui Jiang ◽  
Ziwei Yu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Strategy Analysis ◽  
Pollution Problem ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
The Government ◽  
Two Sides

The pollution problem of SMEs is an important problem to be solved in the process of China’s economic development. Based on the game theory, this paper takes the government and SMEs as the two sides of the game, constructing the game theory model of pollution control of SMEs, putting forward the strategies to promote the pollution control of SMEs according to the analysis results of the model.

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