Justice and Rationality: Some Objections to the Central Argument in Rawls's Theory

1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 615-629 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Fishkin

The argument is made that Rawls's proposed principles of justice would not rationally be chosen in his proposed version of the “original position.” First of all, Rawls's own account of the information available in the original position provides no basis for the conclusions about “primary goods” which he believes would imply his proposed principles. Second, even if those conclusions about primary goods were to be accepted, they would not imply the proposed principles (the “general” and the “special” conceptions of justice) because the claims which Rawls cites in support of “maximin” actually imply a different conception. Lastly, an alternative version of the original position is suggested which would avoid these difficulties and which would, in addition, successfully support a maximin conception of justice. This is not meant, however, as a conclusive argument for maximin, but only as an indication that the objections advanced here do not apply to “social contract theory” as such, but only to the particular version of it which Rawls has proposed.

Author(s):  
Albert Weale

Social contract theory can be understood as a form of constructivism. Constructivism is the view that the content of morality can be defined by a procedure, the results of which define principles of actions. Constructivism can be understood as directed both to the normative question of what principles are justifiable and to the meta-ethical question as to the logical status of such principles. In respect of the latter, constructivism holds to a procedure-dependent conception of practical reason rather than a truth-directed view. In the case of social contract theory, the procedure is made up of three elements: an original position; the reasoning of the contracting parties; and the contents of the agreement that those contracting parties conclude with one another. Some contract theorists can be thought of as aspiring to a form of ethical reductionism, involving the defining of moral notions in non-moral terms by means of the constructed procedure, but this is not true of all. In this connection, there is a dispute as to whether rationality is to be defined in terms of self-interest. Constructivism is offered as an alternative to intuitionism, in which it is assumed that principles are in some sense self-evident.


Author(s):  
Megan Blomfield

This chapter draws on Charles Beitz’s account of natural resource justice to defend a method of justification that can be used to develop the Common Ownership view. This method employs an original position device, familiar from contemporary social contract theory, and the resulting view is therefore termed ‘Contractualist Common Ownership’. This understanding of Common Ownership is motivated by arguing that it is an apt interpretation of Equal Original Claims. Two key objections to this approach are anticipated and addressed. Contractualist Common Ownership is then used to reconsider and reject the principle of equal division. It is argued that instead, the parties would first secure agreement on a basic needs principle. However, it is also argued that this sufficientarian principle would not be accepted in isolation; parties would seek agreement on further principles of justice for the assignment of rights to natural resources, beyond what is required for basic needs.


2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 285-287

Hun Chung of Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University reviews “Modern Social Contract Theory” by Albert Weale. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores major work in social contract theory from 1950 to the present, focusing on the problems of defining principles of justice and demonstrating the grounds of moral obligation.”


Author(s):  
Albert Weale

This book provides an exposition and evaluation of major work in social contract theory from 1950 to present. It locates the central themes of that theory in the intellectual legacy of utilitarianism, particularly the problems of defining principles of justice and of showing the grounds of moral obligation. Subsequently, it demonstrates how theorists responded in a novel way to the dilemmas articulated in utilitarianism, developing in their different approaches a constructivist method in ethics—a method that aimed to vindicate a liberal, democratic, and just political order. A distinctive feature of the book is its comparative approach. Each theory is placed in its particular intellectual context. Special attention is paid to the contrasting theories of rationality adopted by the different authors, whether that be utility theory or a deliberative conception of rationality, with the intention of assessing how far the principles advanced can be justified by reference to the hypothetical choices of rational contracting agents. The book also looks at some principal objections to the enterprise of contract theory, and offers its own programme for the future of that theory taking the form of the empirical method.


1988 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman

Gauthier's title is potentially misleading. The phrase “morals by agreement” suggests a social contract theory of morality according to which basic moral principles arise out of an actual or hypothetical agreement. John Rawls defends a hypothetical agreement version, arguing that the basic principles of justice are those that would be agreed to in an initial position of fair equality. I myself defend an actual agreement version, arguing that the moral principles that apply to a person derive from implicit conventions the person has accepted in dealing with other people. Gauthier's view is different from either of these sorts of contract theory. Instead, he holds that certain basic principles of impartiality are prior to actual agreements.


Res Publica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Voigt

AbstractStates of emergency are declared frequently in all parts of the world. Their declaration routinely implies a suspension of basic constitutional rights. In the last half century, it has become the norm for constitutions to contain an explicit ‘emergency constitution’, i.e., the constitutionally safeguarded rules of operation for a state of emergency. In this paper, I ask whether inclusion of an emergency constitution can be legitimized by drawing on social contract theory. I argue that there are important arguments, both against and in favor of constitutionalized emergency provisions, and that social contract theory—as applied by economists—can be of some help when deciding whether to have, or not to have an emergency constitution. This paper introduces a novel argument for justifying emergency constitutions. It argues that they can serve as a commitment mechanism protecting both citizens and politicians from overreacting to rare but significant threats.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Paul Seabright ◽  
Jonathan Stieglitz ◽  
Karine Van der Straeten

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 134-146
Author(s):  
Andi Chandra Jaya

The focus of this study is to answer the subject matter of how the concept of the nation-state according to Abdullah Munsyi in the constellation of Malay Islamic political ideology in the 19th century AD and how is the relevance of the concept of the current Indonesian nation state ? The study used the conscience morale theory of Ernest Renan and the social contract theory initiated by J. J. Roussae. This research is included in the library research category and uses historical approaches and political philosophy. The primary data in this study are Abdullah Musnyi's Hikayat Abdullah book published by Yayasan Karyawan, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2007 and secondary data, in the form of books, journal articles, papers, and others related to research problems. the findings of the research are: 1). In accordance with the theory of conscience morale Ernest Renan and the social contract theory initiated by J. J. Roussae, Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir Munsyi was the originator of nationalism. Through his most important work, Hikayat Abdullah, he put forward the formulation of Malay identity in the formulation of the nation which was understood as a Malay tribe or race who had the right to be involved in determining the Malay political format not as a community under a political system that was authoritarian. 2). His closeness with the British colonial side, thus forming the liberal thinking he obtained from Raffles and his friends. He not only dismantled the manipulation of royal ideology, but at the same time put forward a new view of the existence of a humanist individual. 3). The understanding of nationality has egalitarian values ​​that are very relevant to the current Indonesian context, especially the values ​​of equality (egalitarianism) in the midst of the emergence of conflicts in various conflicts today. Likewise the concept of nation-state is closely related to nationalism and good governance where good governance is based on the absolute existence of transparency, open participation, and accountability in all state activities at every level of state management, so that a clean government is formed. Keywords: Abdullah Munsyi, Nation-State, and Malay Political ideology


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