Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 557-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey A. Segal ◽  
Albert D. Cover
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Attitudinal Model

It is commonly assumed that Supreme Court justices' votes largely reflect their attitudes, values, or personal policy preferences. Nevertheless, this assumption has never been adequately tested with independent measures of the ideological values of justices, that is, measures not taken from their votes on the Court. Using content analytic techniques, we derive independent and reliable measures of the values of all Supreme Court justices from Earl Warren to Anthony Kennedy. These values correlate highly with the votes of the justices, providing strong support for the attitudinal model.

Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts

1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey A. Segal
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Positive Theory ◽  
Institutional Structures ◽  
Attitudinal Model

The hallmark of the new positive theories of the judiciary is that Supreme Court justices will frequently defer to the preferences of Congress when making decisions, particularly in statutory cases in which it is purportedly easy for Congress to reverse the Court. Alternatively, judicial attitudinalists argue that the institutional structures facing the Court allow the justices to vote their sincere policy preferences. This paper compares these sincere and sophisticated models of voting behavior by Supreme Court justices. Using a variety of tests on the votes of Supreme Court justices in statutory cases decided between 1947 and 1992, I find some evidence of sophisticated behavior, but most tests suggest otherwise. Moreover, direct comparisons between the two models unambiguously favor the attitudinal model. I conclude that the justices overwhelmingly engage in rationally sincere behavior.

Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court

2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL A. BAILEY ◽  
FORREST MALTZMAN
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Strict Interpretation ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Speech Clause

Judicial scholars often struggle to disentangle the effects of law and policy preferences on U.S. Supreme Court decision making. We employ a new approach to measuring the effect—if any—of the law on justices' decisions. We use positions taken on Supreme Court cases by members of Congress and presidents to identify policy components of voting. Doing so enables us to isolate the effects of three legal doctrines: adherence to precedent, judicial restraint, and a strict interpretation of the First Amendment's protection of speech clause. We find considerable evidence that legal factors play an important role in Supreme Court decision making. We also find that the effect of legal factors varies across justices.

U.S. Supreme Court Decision-Making and the Free Exercise Clause

1993 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 511-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph A. Ignagni
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Free Exercise ◽  
Free Exercise Clause ◽  
Attitudinal Model ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Free Exercise Of Religion ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Supreme Court, at various times, has changed the constitutional tests it claimed to use in order to settle free exercise of religion disputes. These changes in official doctrine and the manner in which many cases have been decided have left the Supreme Court open to much criticism from legal scholars. This study differs substantially from previous work in this area. It uses a fact-attitudinal model to analyze the cases from the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts. Its findings indicate that these decisions are, generally, explainable and predictable.

scholarly journals The Constraining Capacity of Legal Doctrine on the U.S. Supreme Court

2009 ◽  
Vol 103 (3) ◽  
pp. 474-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRANDON L. BARTELS
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Free Expression ◽  
Modeling Framework ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Strict Scrutiny ◽  
Legal Constraint ◽  
Attitudinal Model ◽  
Ideological Voting

Does law exhibit a significant constraint on Supreme Court justices' decisions? Although proponents of the attitudinal model argue that ideology predominantly influences justices' choices, “hybrid models” posit that law and ideology exhibit discrete and concurrent effects on justices' choices. I offer a new conceptualization of legal constraint examining how legal rules permit varying degrees of ideological discretion, which establishes how strongly ideological preferences will influence justices' votes. In examining the levels-of-scrutiny legal doctrine, I posit theoretical models highlighting the differential constraining capacities of the strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis rules. I use a multilevel modeling framework to test the hypotheses within the context of theGrayneddoctrine in free expression law. The results show that strict scrutiny, whichGraynedapplied to content-based regulations of expression, significantly constrains ideological voting, whereas intermediate scrutiny (applied to content-neutral regulations) and the low scrutiny categories each promote high levels of ideological voting.

Support Structures and Constitutional Change: Teles, Southworth, and the Conservative Legal Movement

2011 ◽  
Vol 36 (02) ◽  
pp. 516-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda Hollis‐Brusky
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Constitutional Change ◽  
Support Structures ◽  
The Federalist ◽  
Conservative Coalition ◽  
The Right

This essay reviews two recent works in political science on the American conservative legal movement: Steven M. Teles's The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law (2008) and Ann Southworth's Lawyers of the Right: Professionalizing the Conservative Coalition (2008). It examines these books in the context of a larger debate over the variables that best explain constitutional change in general and the recent “conservative counterrevolution” in Supreme Court jurisprudence in particular. It shows how these studies build on the scholarship of Charles Epp, who argued in The Rights Revolution (1998) that serious constitutional change requires not only the right cast of characters on the court, but also a strong “support structure” in the legal profession and civil society. Finally, it draws on the author's own research on the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy to illustrate some important avenues for further inquiry.

scholarly journals Supreme Court Decision Making: An Individual-Level Analysis of the Establishment Clause Cases During the Burger and Rehnquist Court Years

1994 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 21-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph A. Ignagni
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Establishment Clause ◽  
Rehnquist Court ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Burger Court ◽  
Attitudinal Model ◽  
State Relations

In the first Establishment Clause case decided by the Burger Court, the U.S. Supreme Court laid down a new constitutional test. With this addition, the Court now had in place the third prong of a three-part Establishment Clause test. However, this three-part test has not settled what is allowable in church-state relations for many scholars. In fact, it is often complained that constitutional law in this area is confused and conflicting. This study attempts to show that the votes of the justices are not as uncertain or unpredictable as previously has been claimed. It also endeavors to contribute to explaining Supreme Court decision making in general. A fact-attitudinal model is derived from judicial behavior theory, cognitive-cybernetic decision-making theory, and the writings of the justices themselves. The results suggest that the model has explanatory as well as predictive value during both the Burger and early Rehnquist Court years.

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