EURATOM: A Study in Coalition Politics

1963 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 597-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. L. Nieburg

The two industrial nuclear-power blocs in Western Europe, EURATOM (European Atomic Community—the Common Market) and ENEA (European Nuclear Energy Agency, organized under the auspices of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation), represent a significant political cleavage in Europe. Both supranational groups are consortiums for the generation of industrial nuclear power, including fuel production, reprocessing, and isotope separation. EURATOM represents the Continental Six under French-West German leadership; ENEA, a more loosely organized bloc under British sponsorship.

1983 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margarete K. Luddemann

The pivotal role energy plays in national economics not only converts the access to sources of supply into a vivid issue of foreign policy concern, but also causes an understandable preoccupation with investment capabilities and self-sufficiency. A report prepared by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1974 predicted a bright future for nuclear energy in the i developing countries and encouraged use of this form of energy after numerous field studies.A nation that commits itself to nuclear energy by purchasing nuclear power-generating technology but not fuel cycle facilities incurs the risk of becoming dependent upon the supplier country because a quick switch to alternative sources of supply is difficult in cases of curtailment of fuel.


1982 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Simpson

The 1980 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference will chiefly be remembered for the inability of the delegates to agree on a final document. There were several visible reasons for this, some related to the immediate political concerns of the participants, some linked to the nature of the treaty itself. The statements of the participating states indicated that they held differing conceptions of the purposes of the treaty, and possessed very diverse views on the action that should be taken to achieve them. Four sets of assertions dominated the discussions: that the nuclear states had not fulfilled their obligation to negotiate measures of nuclear disarmament as specified in Article VI of the treaty; that the advanced industrial states had not fulfilled their obligations to assist and encourage the global development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy contained in both Articles IV and V of the treaty; that the attempts by the United States government to discharge its obligations under the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act by threatening to terminate fuel supply contracts to both treaty parties and non-parties, unless they accepted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their nuclear installations, was inequitable and improper (the same accusation was also directed at Canada); and that the major danger of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and Africa originated in the threats posed to the states in these regions by the regimes in Israel and South Africa. One issue on which there did appear to be agreement, however, was that the safeguards regime foreshadowed by Article III of the treaty had functioned satisfactorily, in that no Feaches of it had been reported to the Review Conference by the IAEA. Yet the differing interpretations of the balance of rights and obligations contained in the treaty masks a much deeper set of issues: what precisely is the problem of nuclear proliferation, to what extent is the predominant diplomatic rhetoric of nuclear non-proliferation discussions unrepresentative of the real concerns and interests of the participants, what was and is the relationship between nuclear weapons and nuclear power, and does the NPT itself address (or was it ever intended to address) the problem of nuclear proliferation in the form in which it seems likely to be encountered in the 1980s?


1994 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Melissen

The spread of nuclear weapons outside the Western world has become the most important nuclear issue since the end of the Cold War. By contrast, the debate about Europe's nuclear strategy has subsided. Nuclear collaboration in Western Europe now seems an unlikely prospect and so too does proliferation, despite instability in the former Soviet Union, and occasional speculation about Germany's nuclear appetite. A very different atmosphere prevailed during the Cold War, when the need for a European nuclear force was endlessly debated, without any prospect of this political demand being fulfilled, and, in the late 1950s and 1960s, several European countries appeared to be at the threshold of obtaining nuclear power.


Nature ◽  
1958 ◽  
Vol 182 (4642) ◽  
pp. 1069-1070 ◽  

Author(s):  
Sören Holmberg ◽  
Per Hedberg

Sweden started its nuclear programme in the early 1950s. Initially it was generally welcomed as modernization and even supported by environmentalists. The issue became more contested in the 1970s, when protests began and the Centre Party turned anti-nuclear. In the 1980s, the phasing out of nuclear energy until 2010 was decided as a consequence of a referendum. In 2010, however, the parliament decided to allow building a new generation of nuclear power plants. After the Fukushima disaster a new phase of nuclear energy confinement began in 2014 as a consequence of a Red-Green coalition coming to power. Over the years most Swedish parties have reversed their positions on the nuclear power issue. Policy reversals were triggered by party competition and government replacement and reflected changes in public opinion as well as coalition politics.


1970 ◽  
Vol 1 (9) ◽  
pp. 6-7
Author(s):  
Einar Saeland

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