Frederic B. Fitch. A simplification of basic logic. The journal of symbolic logic, vol. 18 (1953), pp. 317–325. - Frederic B. Fitch. A definition of negation in extended basic logic. The journal of symbolic logic, vol. 19 (1954), pp. 29–36. See Errata, ibid., p. vi.

1955 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-81
Author(s):  
Burton Dreben

1984 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic B. Fitch

In [3] a definition of negation was presented for the system K′ of extended basic logic [1], but it has since been shown by Peter Päppinghaus (personal communication) that this definition fails to give rise to the law of double negation as I claimed it did. The purpose of this note is to revise this defective definition in such a way that it clearly does give rise to the law of double negation, as well as to the other negation rules of K′.Although Päppinghaus's original letter to me was dated September 19, 1972, the matter has remained unresolved all this time. Only recently have I seen that there is a simple way to correct the definition. I am of course very grateful to Päppinghaus for pointing out my error in claiming to be able to derive the rule of double negation from the original form of the definition.The corrected definition will, as before, use fixed-point operators to give the effect of the required kind of transfinite induction, but this time a double transfinite induction will be used, somewhat like the double transfinite induction used in [5] to define simultaneously the theorems and antitheorems of system CΓ.





1957 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 343-344
Author(s):  
Frederic B. Fitch

Greater economy can be effected in the primitive rules for the system K of basic logic by defining the existence operator ‘E’ in terms of two-place abstraction and the disjunction operator ‘V’. This amounts to defining ‘E’ in terms of ‘ε’, ‘έ’, ‘o, ‘ό’, ‘W’ and ‘V’, since the first five of these six operators are used for defining two-place abstraction.We assume that the class Y of atomic U-expressions has only a single member ‘σ’. Similar methods can be used if Y had some other finite number of members, or even an infinite number of members provided that they are ordered into a sequence by a recursive relation represented in K. In order to define ‘E’ we begin by defining an operator ‘D’ such thatHere ‘a’ may be thought of as an existence operator that provides existence quantification over some finite class of entities denoted by a class A of U-expressions. In other words, suppose that ‘a’ is such that ‘ab’ is in K if and only if, for some ‘e’ in A, ‘be’ is in K. Then ‘Dab’ is in K if and only if, for some ‘e and ‘f’ in A, ‘be’ or ‘b(ef)’ is in K; and ‘a’, ‘Da’, ‘D(Da)’, and so on, can be regarded as existence operators that provide for existence quantification over successively wider and wider finite classes. In particular, if ‘a’ is ‘εσ’, then A would be the class Y having ‘σ’ as its only member, and we can define the unrestricted existence operator ‘E’ in such a way that ‘Eb’ is in K if and only if some one of ‘εσb’, ‘D(εσ)b’, ‘D(D(εσ))b’, and so on, is in K.



1986 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 321-321
Author(s):  
I.J. Good
Keyword(s):  


1936 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alonzo Church

In a recent paper the author has proposed a definition of the commonly used term “effectively calculable” and has shown on the basis of this definition that the general case of the Entscheidungsproblem is unsolvable in any system of symbolic logic which is adequate to a certain portion of arithmetic and is ω-consistent. The purpose of the present note is to outline an extension of this result to the engere Funktionenkalkul of Hilbert and Ackermann.In the author's cited paper it is pointed out that there can be associated recursively with every well-formed formula a recursive enumeration of the formulas into which it is convertible. This means the existence of a recursively defined function a of two positive integers such that, if y is the Gödel representation of a well-formed formula Y then a(x, y) is the Gödel representation of the xth formula in the enumeration of the formulas into which Y is convertible.Consider the system L of symbolic logic which arises from the engere Funktionenkalkül by adding to it: as additional undefined symbols, a symbol 1 for the number 1 (regarded as an individual), a symbol = for the propositional function = (equality of individuals), a symbol s for the arithmetic function x+1, a symbol a for the arithmetic function a described in the preceding paragraph, and symbols b1, b2, …, bk for the auxiliary arithmetic functions which are employed in the recursive definition of a; and as additional axioms, the recursion equations for the functions a, b1, b2, …, bk (expressed with free individual variables, the class of individuals being taken as identical with the class of positive integers), and two axioms of equality, x = x, and x = y →[F(x)→F(y)].



Author(s):  
Priscila L. Farias

Charles Peirce ends the above tentative definition of the grounds for abduction by stating that “the effort should therefore be to make each hypothesis, which is practically no more than a question, as near an even bet as possible” (CP 1.121). The reason why I am quoting this passage of the Collected Papers is that I assume it can justify why should I (with no solid background in symbolic logic or mathematics) dare coming up with a debate on Paul Bourgine’s article “Models of abduction.” Taking the following rendition of an abductive inference as a guide: The surprising fact, C, is observed; But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189) I therefore decided to consider Paul’s article as a “surprising fact,” and to try my best in devising relevant questions about it. I believe should thank my deductive capacities for enabling me to extract hopefully clear and reliable consequences from those questions, but I will only be able to evaluate the pertinence of my efforts after a moment o f induction I expect to share with you, dear reader.



2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. e94
Author(s):  
Vladimir O. Lobovikov

The paper is dvoted to interdisciplinary research at the intersection of symbolic logic, mathematical ethics, and philosophical theology. By comparing definitions of relevant functions, a surprising analogy is discovered between the well-known Philo’s precise definition of implication in logic (classical one) and Augustine’s precise definition of God’s morally good reaction to human actions. The moral-value-table-representation of Augustinian doctrine is compared with moral-value-table-representations of Pelagius’ and Leo Tolstoy’s views of adequate moral-response-actions.



2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 49-55
Author(s):  
Ludomir Newelski

Does formal logic make sense?This text is a commentary on the book Logika i argumentacja. Praktyczny kurs krytycznego myślenia Logic and Argumentation. A Practical Course In Critical Thinking by Professor Andrzej Kisielewicz. Prof. Kisielewicz argues there, among other things, that formal symbolic logic is inadequate to explain practical rational reasoning. This commentary defends formal logic in this respect. In particular, Prof. Kisielewicz proposes in his book a definition of practical logical inference. According to him, a conclusion follows from a given set of premises if there is no situation, where the premises hold, while the conclusion fails. In this commentary it is pointed out that this is a well-known notion of semantic inference in formal logic. It is also well-known that semantic and syntactic inference in logic are equivalent, i.e. equally strong.



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