Polynomial rings and weak second-order logic

1985 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 953-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Bauval
Keyword(s):  
Zero Divisor ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Polynomial Rings ◽  
Commutative Field ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Order Language ◽  
Second Order Logic

This article is a rewriting of my Ph.D. Thesis, supervised by Professor G. Sabbagh, and incorporates a suggestion from Professor B. Poizat. My main result can be crudely summarized (but see below for detailed statements) by the equality: first-order theory of F[Xi]i∈I = weak second-order theory of F.§I.1. Conventions. The letter F will always denote a commutative field, and I a nonempty set. A field or a ring (A; +, ·) will often be written A for short. We shall use symbols which are definable in all our models, and in the structure of natural numbers (N; +, ·):— the constant 0, defined by the formula Z(x): ∀y (x + y = y);— the constant 1, defined by the formula U(x): ∀y (x · y = y);— the operation ∹ x − y = z ↔ x = y + z;— the relation of division: x ∣ y ↔ ∃ z(x · z = y).A domain is a commutative ring with unity and without any zero divisor.By “… → …” we mean “… is definable in …, uniformly in any model M of L”.All our constructions will be uniform, unless otherwise mentioned.§I.2. Weak second-order models and languages. First of all, we have to define the models Pf(M), Sf(M), Sf′(M) and HF(M) associated to a model M = {A; ℐ) of a first-order language L [CK, pp. 18–20]. Let L1 be the extension of L obtained by adjunction of a second list of variables (denoted by capital letters), and of a membership symbol ∈. Pf(M) is the model (A, Pf(A); ℐ, ∈) of L1, (where Pf(A) is the set of finite subsets of A. Let L2 be the extension of L obtained by adjunction of a second list of variables, a membership symbol ∈, and a concatenation symbol ◠.

scholarly journals Second Order Logic or Set Theory?

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jouko Väänänen
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Standard Models ◽  
The Right ◽  
Second Order Logic ◽  
Proper Context

AbstractWe try to answer the question which is the “right” foundation of mathematics, second order logic or set theory. Since the former is usually thought of as a formal language and the latter as a first order theory, we have to rephrase the question. We formulate what we call the second order view and a competing set theory view, and then discuss the merits of both views. On the surface these two views seem to be in manifest conflict with each other. However, our conclusion is that it is very difficult to see any real difference between the two. We analyze a phenomenonwe call internal categoricity which extends the familiar categoricity results of second order logic to Henkin models and show that set theory enjoys the same kind of internal categoricity. Thus the existence of non-standard models, which is usually taken as a property of first order set theory, and categoricity, which is usually taken as a property of second order axiomatizations, can coherently coexist when put into their proper context. We also take a fresh look at complete second order axiomatizations and give a hierarchy result for second order characterizable structures. Finally we consider the problem of existence in mathematics from both points of view and find that second order logic depends on what we call large domain assumptions, which come quite close to the meaning of the axioms of set theory.

Categoricity and the natural numbers

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Natural Numbers ◽  
Categorical Theory ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Standard Models ◽  
Skolem Theorem ◽  
Infinite Model ◽  
Second Order Logic

This chapter focuses on modelists who want to pin down the isomorphism type of the natural numbers. This aim immediately runs into two technical barriers: the Compactness Theorem and the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem (the latter is proven in the appendix to this chapter). These results show that no first-order theory with an infinite model can be categorical; all such theories have non-standard models. Other logics, such as second-order logic with its full semantics, are not so expressively limited. Indeed, Dedekind's Categoricity Theorem tells us that all full models of the Peano axioms are isomorphic. However, it is a subtle philosophical question, whether one is entitled to invoke the full semantics for second-order logic — there are at least four distinct attitudes which one can adopt to these categoricity result — but moderate modelists are unable to invoke the full semantics, or indeed any other logic with a categorical theory of arithmetic.

Models with second order properties in successors of singulars

1989 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-137
Author(s):  
Rami Grossberg
Keyword(s):  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Complete Theory ◽  
Singular Cardinal ◽  
Strongly Compact Cardinal ◽  
Compact Cardinal ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory

AbstractLet L(Q) be first order logic with Keisler's quantifier, in the λ+ interpretation (= the satisfaction is defined as follows: M ⊨ (Qx)φ(x) means there are λ+ many elements in M satisfying the formula φ(x)).Theorem 1. Let λ be a singular cardinal; assume □λ and GCH. If T is a complete theory in L(Q) of cardinality at most λ, and p is an L(Q) 1-type so that T strongly omits p( = p has no support, to be defined in §1), then T has a model of cardinality λ+ in the λ+ interpretation which omits p.Theorem 2. Let λ be a singular cardinal, and let T be a complete first order theory of cardinality λ at most. Assume □λ and GCH. If Γ is a smallness notion then T has a model of cardinality λ+ such that a formula φ(x) is realized by λ+ elements of M iff φ(x) is not Γ-small. The theorem is proved also when λ is regular assuming λ = λ<λ. It is new when λ is singular or when ∣T∣ = λ is regular.Theorem 3. Let λ be singular. If Con(ZFC + GCH + ∃κ) [κ is a strongly compact cardinal]), then the following is consistent: ZFC + GCH + the conclusions of all above theorems are false.

scholarly journals A MODEL-THEORETIC CHARACTERIZATION OF MONADIC SECOND ORDER LOGIC ON INFINITE WORDS

2017 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
SILVIO GHILARDI ◽  
SAMUEL J. VAN GOOL
Keyword(s):  
Temporal Logic ◽  
Linear Temporal Logic ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Natural Numbers ◽  
Infinite Words ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Second Order Logic ◽  
Monadic Second Order Logic

AbstractMonadic second order logic and linear temporal logic are two logical formalisms that can be used to describe classes of infinite words, i.e., first-order models based on the natural numbers with order, successor, and finitely many unary predicate symbols.Monadic second order logic over infinite words (S1S) can alternatively be described as a first-order logic interpreted in${\cal P}\left( \omega \right)$, the power set Boolean algebra of the natural numbers, equipped with modal operators for ‘initial’, ‘next’, and ‘future’ states. We prove that the first-order theory of this structure is the model companion of a class of algebras corresponding to a version of linear temporal logic (LTL) without until.The proof makes crucial use of two classical, nontrivial results from the literature, namely the completeness of LTL with respect to the natural numbers, and the correspondence between S1S-formulas and Büchi automata.

Categoricity and the sets

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Status ◽  
Second Order Logic ◽  
Philosophy Of Set Theory ◽  
Order Set

In this chapter, the focus shifts from numbers to sets. Again, no first-order set theory can hope to get anywhere near categoricity, but Zermelo famously proved the quasi-categoricity of second-order set theory. As in the previous chapter, we must ask who is entitled to invoke full second-order logic. That question is as subtle as before, and raises the same problem for moderate modelists. However, the quasi-categorical nature of Zermelo's Theorem gives rise to some specific questions concerning the aims of axiomatic set theories. Given the status of Zermelo's Theorem in the philosophy of set theory, we include a stand-alone proof of this theorem. We also prove a similar quasi-categoricity for Scott-Potter set theory, a theory which axiomatises the idea of an arbitrary stage of the iterative hierarchy.

Second-order logic, philosophical issues in

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stewart Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Practice ◽  
Expressive Power ◽  
Deductive System ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Mathematical Structures ◽  
First Order ◽  
Correct Reasoning ◽  
Second Order Logic

Typically, a formal language has variables that range over a collection of objects, or domain of discourse. A language is ‘second-order’ if it has, in addition, variables that range over sets, functions, properties or relations on the domain of discourse. A language is third-order if it has variables ranging over sets of sets, or functions on relations, and so on. A language is higher-order if it is at least second-order. Second-order languages enjoy a greater expressive power than first-order languages. For example, a set S of sentences is said to be categorical if any two models satisfying S are isomorphic, that is, have the same structure. There are second-order, categorical characterizations of important mathematical structures, including the natural numbers, the real numbers and Euclidean space. It is a consequence of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorems that there is no first-order categorical characterization of any infinite structure. There are also a number of central mathematical notions, such as finitude, countability, minimal closure and well-foundedness, which can be characterized with formulas of second-order languages, but cannot be characterized in first-order languages. Some philosophers argue that second-order logic is not logic. Properties and relations are too obscure for rigorous foundational study, while sets and functions are in the purview of mathematics, not logic; logic should not have an ontology of its own. Other writers disqualify second-order logic because its consequence relation is not effective – there is no recursively enumerable, sound and complete deductive system for second-order logic. The deeper issues underlying the dispute concern the goals and purposes of logical theory. If a logic is to be a calculus, an effective canon of inference, then second-order logic is beyond the pale. If, on the other hand, one aims to codify a standard to which correct reasoning must adhere, and to characterize the descriptive and communicative abilities of informal mathematical practice, then perhaps there is room for second-order logic.

Infinitary logic and admissible sets

1969 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Barwise
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Generalized Quantifiers ◽  
Infinitary Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Admissible Sets ◽  
Classical Language ◽  
Second Order Logic ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus

In recent years much effort has gone into the study of languages which strengthen the classical first-order predicate calculus in various ways. This effort has been motivated by the desire to find a language which is(I) strong enough to express interesting properties not expressible by the classical language, but(II) still simple enough to yield interesting general results. Languages investigated include second-order logic, weak second-order logic, ω-logic, languages with generalized quantifiers, and infinitary logic.

scholarly journals First order quantifiers in monadic second order logic

2004 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Jerome Keisler ◽  
Wafik Boulos Lotfallah
Keyword(s):  
Expressive Power ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Existential Quantifier ◽  
Reachability Problem ◽  
Open Problems ◽  
First Order ◽  
Second Order Logic ◽  
Monadic Second Order Logic ◽  
Quantifier Alternation

AbstractThis paper studies the expressive power that an extra first order quantifier adds to a fragment of monadic second order logic, extending the toolkit of Janin and Marcinkowski [JM01].We introduce an operation existsn (S) on properties S that says “there are n components having S”. We use this operation to show that under natural strictness conditions, adding a first order quantifier word u to the beginning of a prefix class V increases the expressive power monotonically in u. As a corollary, if the first order quantifiers are not already absorbed in V, then both the quantifier alternation hierarchy and the existential quantifier hierarchy in the positive first order closure of V are strict.We generalize and simplify methods from Marcinkowski [Mar99] to uncover limitations of the expressive power of an additional first order quantifier, and show that for a wide class of properties S, S cannot belong to the positive first order closure of a monadic prefix class W unless it already belongs to W.We introduce another operation alt(S) on properties which has the same relationship with the Circuit Value Problem as reach(S) (defined in [JM01]) has with the Directed Reachability Problem. We use alt(S) to show that Πn ⊈ FO(Σn), Σn ⊈ FO(∆n). and ∆n+1 ⊈ FOB(Σn), solving some open problems raised in [Mat98].

Completeness in the theory of properties, relations, and propositions

1983 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 415-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Bealer
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Present Approach ◽  
Intensional Logic ◽  
Comprehensive Treatment ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Technical Details ◽  
Logical Data

Higher-order theories of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs) are known to be essentially incomplete relative to their standard notions of validity. There is, however, a first-order theory of PRPs that results when standard first-order logic is supplemented with an operation of intensional abstraction. It turns out that this first-order theory of PRPs is provably complete with respect to its standard notions of validity. The construction involves the development of a new algebraic semantic method. Unlike most other methods used in contemporary intensional logic, this method does not appeal to possible worlds as a heuristic; the heuristic used is that of PRPs taken as primitive entities. This is important, for even though the possible-worlds approach is useful in treating modal logic, it seems to be of little help in treating the logic for psychological matters. The present approach, by contrast, appears to make a step in the direction of a satisfactory treatment of both modal and intentional logic. For, by taking PRPs as primitive entities, we remain free to tailor the statement of their identity conditions so that it agrees with the logical data—modal, psychological, etc. In this way, the present approach suggests a strategy for developing a comprehensive treatment of intensional logic.In [1] and [2] I explore this prospect philosophically. The purpose of the present paper is to lay out the technical details of the approach and to present the completeness results.

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