Extended ultrapowers and the Vopěnka-Hrbáček theorem without choice

1991 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 592-607 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell Spector

AbstractWe generalize the ultrapower in a way suitable for choiceless set theory. Given an ultrafilter, forcing is used to construct an extended ultrapower of the universe, designed so that the fundamental theorem of ultrapowers holds even in the absence of the axiom of choice. If, in addition, we assume DC, then an extended ultrapower of the universe by a countably complete ultrafilter must be well-founded. As an application, we prove the Vopěnka-Hrbáček theorem from ZF + DC only (the proof of Vopěnka and Hrbáček used the full axiom of choice): if there exists a strongly compact cardinal, then the universe is not constructible from a set. The same method shows that, in L[2ω], there cannot exist a θ-compact cardinal less than θ (where θ is the least cardinal onto which the continuum cannot be mapped); a similar result can be proven for other models of the form L[A]. The result for L[2ω] is of particular interest in connection with the axiom of determinacy. The extended ultrapower construction of this paper is an improved version of the author's earlier pseudo-ultrapower method, making use of forcing rather than the omitting types theorem.

Author(s):  
John P. Burgess

the ‘universe’ of constructible sets was introduced by Kurt Gödel in order to prove the consistency of the axiom of choice (AC) and the continuum hypothesis (CH) with the basic (ZF) axioms of set theory. The hypothesis that all sets are constructible is the axiom of constructibility (V = L). Gödel showed that if ZF is consistent, then ZF + V = L is consistent, and that AC and CH are provable in ZF + V = L.


1988 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 1208-1219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell Spector

AbstractA new method is presented for constructing models of set theory, using a technique of forming pseudo-ultrapowers. In the presence of the axiom of choice, the traditional ultrapower construction has proven to be extremely powerful in set theory and model theory; if the axiom of choice is not assumed, the fundamental theorem of ultrapowers may fail, causing the ultrapower to lose almost all of its utility. The pseudo-ultrapower is designed so that the fundamental theorem holds even if choice fails; this is arranged by means of an application of the omitting types theorem. The general theory of pseudo-ultrapowers is developed. Following that, we study supercompactness in the absence of choice, and we analyze pseudo-ultrapowers of models of the axiom of determinateness and various infinite exponent partition relations. Relationships between pseudo-ultrapowers and forcing are also discussed.


2011 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Ferreirós

AbstractSet theory deals with the most fundamental existence questions in mathematics-questions which affect other areas of mathematics, from the real numbers to structures of all kinds, but which are posed as dealing with the existence of sets. Especially noteworthy are principles establishing the existence of some infinite sets, the so-called “arbitrary sets.” This paper is devoted to an analysis of the motivating goal of studying arbitrary sets, usually referred to under the labels ofquasi-combinatorialismorcombinatorial maximality. After explaining what is meant by definability and by “arbitrariness,” a first historical part discusses the strong motives why set theory was conceived as a theory of arbitrary sets, emphasizing connections with analysis and particularly with the continuum of real numbers. Judged from this perspective, the axiom of choice stands out as a most central and natural set-theoretic principle (in the sense of quasi-combinatorialism). A second part starts by considering the potential mismatch between the formal systems of mathematics and their motivating conceptions, and proceeds to offer an elementary discussion of how far the Zermelo–Fraenkel system goes in laying out principles that capture the idea of “arbitrary sets”. We argue that the theory is rather poor in this respect.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel G Da Silva

Abstract The method of morphisms is a well-known application of Dialectica categories to set theory (more precisely, to the theory of cardinal invariants of the continuum). In a previous work, Valeria de Paiva and the author have asked how much of the Axiom of Choice is needed in order to carry out the referred applications of such method. In this paper, we show that, when considered in their full generality, those applications of Dialectica categories give rise to equivalents (within $\textbf{ZF}$) of either the Axiom of Choice ($\textbf{AC}$) or Partition Principle ($\textbf{PP}$)—which is a consequence of $\textbf{AC}$ whose precise status of its relationship with$\textbf{AC}$ itself is an open problem for more than a hundred years.


1981 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 822-842 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard Becker

Since the discovery of forcing in the early sixties, it has been clear that many natural and interesting mathematical questions are not decidable from the classical axioms of set theory, ZFC. Therefore some mathematicians have been studying the consequences of stronger set theoretic assumptions. Two new types of axioms that have been the subject of much research are large cardinal axioms and axioms asserting the determinacy of definable games. The two appear at first glance to be unrelated; one of the most surprising discoveries of recent research is that this is not the case.In this paper we will be assuming the axiom of determinacy (AD) plus the axiom of dependent choice (DC). AD is false, since it contradicts the axiom of choice. However every set in L[R] is ordinal definable from a real. Our axiom that definable games are determined implies that every game in L[R] is determined (in V), and since a strategy is a real, it is determined in L[R]. That is, L[R] ⊨ AD. The axiom of choice implies L[R] ⊨ DC. So by embedding ourselves in L[R], we can assume AD + DC and begin proving theorems. These theorems true in L[R] imply corresponding theorems in V, by e.g. changing “every set” to “every set in L[R]”. For more information on AD as an axiom, and on some of the points touched on here, the reader should consult [14], particularly §§7D and 8I. In this paper L[R] will no longer even be mentioned. We just assume AD for the rest of the paper.


1987 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 374-387 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. E. Forster

We shall be concerned here with weak axiomatic systems of set theory with a universal set. The language in which they are expressed is that of set theory—two primitive predicates, = and ϵ, and no function symbols (though some function symbols will be introduced by definitional abbreviation). All the theories will have stratified axioms only, and they will all have Ext (extensionality: (∀x)(∀y)(x = y· ↔ ·(∀z)(z ϵ x ↔ z ϵ y))). In fact, in addition to extensionality, they have only axioms saying that the universe is closed under certain set-theoretic operations, viz. all of the formand these will always include singleton, i.e., ι′x exists if x does (the iota notation for singleton, due to Russell and Whitehead, is used here to avoid confusion with {x: Φ}, set abstraction), and also x ∪ y, x ∩ y and − x (the complement of x). The system with these axioms is called NF2 in the literature (see [F]). The other axioms we consider will be those giving ⋃x, ⋂x, {y: y ⊆x} and {y: x ⊆ y}. We will frequently have occasion to bear in mind that 〈 V, ⊆ 〉 is a Boolean algebra in any theory extending NF2. There is no use of the axiom of choice at any point in this paper. Since the systems with which we will be concerned exhibit this feature of having, in addition to extensionality, only axioms stating that V is closed under certain operations, we will be very interested in terms of the theories in question. A T-term, for T such a theory, is a thing (with no free variables) built up from V or ∧ by means of the T-operations, which are of course the operations that the axioms of T say the universe is closed under.


Author(s):  
John P. Burgess

The method of forcing was introduced by Paul J. Cohen in order to prove the independence of the axiom of choice (AC) from the basic (ZF) axioms of set theory, and of the continuum hypothesis (CH) from the accepted axioms (ZFC = ZF + AC) of set theory (see set theory, axiom of choice, continuum hypothesis). Given a model M of ZF and a certain P∈M, it produces a ‘generic’ G⊆P and a model N of ZF with M⊆N and G∈N. By suitably choosing P, N can be ‘forced’ to be or not be a model of various hypotheses, which are thus shown to be consistent with or independent of the axioms. This method of proving undecidability has been very widely applied. The method has also motivated the proposal of new so-called forcing axioms to decide what is otherwise undecidable, the most important being that called Martin’s axiom (MA).


2007 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Akihiro Kanamori

Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) with his work on the constructible universeLestablished the relative consistency of the Axiom of Choice (AC) and the Continuum Hypothesis (CH). More broadly, he ensured the ascendancy of first-order logic as the framework and a matter of method for set theory and secured the cumulative hierarchy view of the universe of sets. Gödel thereby transformed set theory and launched it with structured subject matter and specific methods of proof. In later years Gödel worked on a variety of set theoretic constructions and speculated about how problems might be settled with new axioms. We here chronicle this development from the point of view of the evolution of set theory as a field of mathematics. Much has been written, of course, about Gödel's work in set theory, from textbook expositions to the introductory notes to his collected papers. The present account presents an integrated view of the historical and mathematical development as supported by his recently published lectures and correspondence. Beyond the surface of things we delve deeper into the mathematics. What emerges are the roots and anticipations in work of Russell and Hilbert, and most prominently the sustained motif of truth as formalizable in the “next higher system”. We especially work at bringing out how transforming Gödel's work was for set theory. It is difficult now to see what conceptual and technical distance Gödel had to cover and how dramatic his re-orientation of set theory was.


Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss

This is a mainly technical chapter concerning the causal embodiment of the Axiom of Choice from set theory. The Axiom of Choice powered a construction of an infinite fair lottery in Chapter 4 and a die-rolling strategy in Chapter 5. For those applications to work, there has to be a causally implementable (though perhaps not compatible with our laws of nature) way to implement the Axiom of Choice—and, for our purposes, it is ideal if that involves infinite causal histories, so the causal finitist can reject it. Such a construction is offered. Moreover, other paradoxes involving the Axiom of Choice are given, including two Dutch Book paradoxes connected with the Banach–Tarski paradox. Again, all this is argued to provide evidence for causal finitism.


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