Gödel and Set Theory

2007 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Akihiro Kanamori
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
First Order ◽  
Kurt Gödel ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
The Universe ◽  
The Continuum

Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) with his work on the constructible universeLestablished the relative consistency of the Axiom of Choice (AC) and the Continuum Hypothesis (CH). More broadly, he ensured the ascendancy of first-order logic as the framework and a matter of method for set theory and secured the cumulative hierarchy view of the universe of sets. Gödel thereby transformed set theory and launched it with structured subject matter and specific methods of proof. In later years Gödel worked on a variety of set theoretic constructions and speculated about how problems might be settled with new axioms. We here chronicle this development from the point of view of the evolution of set theory as a field of mathematics. Much has been written, of course, about Gödel's work in set theory, from textbook expositions to the introductory notes to his collected papers. The present account presents an integrated view of the historical and mathematical development as supported by his recently published lectures and correspondence. Beyond the surface of things we delve deeper into the mathematics. What emerges are the roots and anticipations in work of Russell and Hilbert, and most prominently the sustained motif of truth as formalizable in the “next higher system”. We especially work at bringing out how transforming Gödel's work was for set theory. It is difficult now to see what conceptual and technical distance Gödel had to cover and how dramatic his re-orientation of set theory was.

Gödel, Kurt (1906–78)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Dawson
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Mathematical Platonism ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Fundamental Theorems ◽  
The Continuum

The greatest logician of the twentieth century, Gödel is renowned for his advocacy of mathematical Platonism and for three fundamental theorems in logic: the completeness of first-order logic; the incompleteness of formalized arithmetic; and the consistency of the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis with the axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory.

The constructible universe

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John P. Burgess
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Constructible Sets ◽  
Kurt Gödel ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
The Universe ◽  
The Continuum

the ‘universe’ of constructible sets was introduced by Kurt Gödel in order to prove the consistency of the axiom of choice (AC) and the continuum hypothesis (CH) with the basic (ZF) axioms of set theory. The hypothesis that all sets are constructible is the axiom of constructibility (V = L). Gödel showed that if ZF is consistent, then ZF + V = L is consistent, and that AC and CH are provable in ZF + V = L.

An addendum to “The work of Kurt Gödel”

1978 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 613-613 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen C. Kleene
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Axiom System ◽  
Von Neumann ◽  
Main Achievement ◽  
Constructible Sets ◽  
Kurt Gödel ◽  
The One ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
The Continuum

Gödel has called to my attention that p. 773 is misleading in regard to the discovery of the finite axiomatization and its place in his proof of the consistency of GCH. For the version in [1940], as he says on p. 1, “The system Σ of axioms for set theory which we adopt [a finite one] … is essentially due to P. Bernays …”. However, it is not at all necessary to use a finite axiom system. Gödel considers the more suggestive proof to be the one in [1939], which uses infinitely many axioms.His main achievement regarding the consistency of GCH, he says, really is that he first introduced the concept of constructible sets into set theory defining it as in [1939], proved that the axioms of set theory (including the axiom of choice) hold for it, and conjectured that the continuum hypothesis also will hold. He told these things to von Neumann during his stay at Princeton in 1935. The discovery of the proof of this conjecture On the basis of his definition is not too difficult. Gödel gave the proof (also for GCH) not until three years later because he had fallen ill in the meantime. This proof was using a submodel of the constructible sets in the lowest case countable, similar to the one commonly given today.

Martin's axiom and the continuum

1995 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 374-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haim Judah ◽  
Andrzej Rosłanowski
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Georg Cantor ◽  
Mathematical Research ◽  
Kurt Gödel ◽  
Uncountable Cardinal ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Infinite Set ◽  
The Continuum

Since Georg Cantor discovered set theory the main problem in this area of mathematical research has been to discover what is the size of the continuum. The continuum hypothesis (CH) says that every infinite set of reals either has the same cardinality as the set of all reals or has the cardinality of the set of natural numbers, namelyIn 1939 Kurt Gödel discovered the Constructible Universe and proved that CH holds in it. In the early sixties Paul Cohen proved that every universe of set theory can be extended to a bigger universe of set theory where CH fails. Moreover, given any reasonable cardinal κ, it is possible to build a model where the continuum size is κ. The new technique discovered by Cohen is called forcing and is being used successfully in other branches of mathematics (analysis, algebra, graph theory, etc.).In the light of these two stupendous works the experts (especially the platonists) were forced to conclude that from the point of view of the classical axiomatization of set theory (called ZFC) it is impossible to give any answer to the continuum size problem: everything is possible!In private communications Gödel suggested that the continuum size from a platonistic point of view should be ω2, the second uncountable cardinal. As this is not provable in ZFC, Gödel suggested that a new axiom should be added to ZFC to decide that the cardinality of the continuum is ω2.

Self-reference with negative types

1984 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 754-773 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. P. Hiller ◽  
J. Zimbarg
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
General Principle ◽  
Formal Language ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Free Variable ◽  
The One ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Self Reference ◽  
The Continuum

The universe of sets, V, is usually seen as an entity structured in successive levels, each level being made up of objects and collections of objects belonging to the previous levels. This process of obtaining sets and axioms for set theory can be seen in Scott [74] and Shoenfield [77].The approach we want to take differs from the previous one very strongly: the seeds from which we want to generate our universe of classes are to be the one-variable predicates (given by one-free-variable formulas) of the formal language we shall be using. In other words, any one-variable predicate of the language is to be represented as a class in our universe. In this sense, we view our theory as being about a self-referential language, a language whose predicates refer to objects which are predicates of the language itself.We want, in short, a system such that: (i) any predicate may be represented by an object to be studied by the theory itself; (ii) the axioms for the theory may be derived from the general principle that we are dealing with a language that aims at describing its own predicates; and (iii) the theory should be strong enough to derive ZFC and suggest answers to the existence of large cardinals and to the continuum hypothesis.An objection to such a project arises immediately: in view of the Russell-Zermelo paradox, how is it possible to have all predicates of the language as elements of the universe? This objection will be easy to deal with: we shall provide our language with a type structure to avoid paradox.

Letter Games: a metamathematical taster

2016 ◽  
Vol 100 (549) ◽  
pp. 442-449
Author(s):  
A. C. Paseau
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Incompleteness Theorem ◽  
Mathematical Study ◽  
Mathematical System ◽  
Kurt Gödel ◽  
Standard Set ◽  
The Continuum ◽  
Simplified Form

Metamathematics is the mathematical study of mathematics itself. Two of its most famous theorems were proved by Kurt Gödel in 1931. In a simplified form, Gödel's first incompleteness theorem states that no reasonable mathematical system can prove all the truths of mathematics. Gödel's second incompleteness theorem (also simplified) in turn states that no reasonable mathematical system can prove its own consistency. Another famous undecidability theorem is that the Continuum Hypothesis is neither provable nor refutable in standard set theory. Many of us logicians were first attracted to the field as students because we had heard something of these results. All research mathematicians know something of them too, and have at least a rough sense of why ‘we can't prove everything we want to prove’.

Power-like models of set theory

2001 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 1766-1782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Enayat
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Mahlo Cardinal ◽  
Uncountable Cardinal ◽  
Consistent Extension ◽  
Elementary Submodel ◽  
Finite Language ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Models Of Set Theory ◽  
The Continuum

Abstract.A model = (M. E, …) of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF is said to be 0-like. where E interprets ∈ and θ is an uncountable cardinal, if ∣M∣ = θ but ∣{b ∈ M: bEa}∣ < 0 for each a ∈ M, An immediate corollary of the classical theorem of Keisler and Morley on elementary end extensions of models of set theory is that every consistent extension of ZF has an ℵ1-like model. Coupled with Chang's two cardinal theorem this implies that if θ is a regular cardinal 0 such that 2<0 = 0 then every consistent extension of ZF also has a 0+-like model. In particular, in the presence of the continuum hypothesis every consistent extension of ZF has an ℵ2-like model. Here we prove:Theorem A. If 0 has the tree property then the following are equivalent for any completion T of ZFC:(i) T has a 0-like model.(ii) Ф ⊆ T. where Ф is the recursive set of axioms {∃κ (κ is n-Mahlo and “Vκis a Σn-elementary submodel of the universe”): n ∈ ω}.(iii) T has a λ-like model for every uncountable cardinal λ.Theorem B. The following are equiconsistent over ZFC:(i) “There exists an ω-Mahlo cardinal”.(ii) “For every finite language , all ℵ2-like models of ZFC() satisfy the schemeФ().

HODL(ℝ) is a Core Model Below Θ

1995 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Steel
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Transitive Closure ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
Definable Sets ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Do So

In this paper we shall answer some questions in the set theory of L(ℝ), the universe of all sets constructible from the reals. In order to do so, we shall assume ADL(ℝ), the hypothesis that all 2-person games of perfect information on ω whose payoff set is in L(ℝ) are determined. This is by now standard practice. ZFC itself decides few questions in the set theory of L(ℝ), and for reasons we cannot discuss here, ZFC + ADL(ℝ) yields the most interesting “completion” of the ZFC-theory of L(ℝ).ADL(ℝ) implies that L(ℝ) satisfies “every wellordered set of reals is countable”, so that the axiom of choice fails in L(ℝ). Nevertheless, there is a natural inner model of L(ℝ), namely HODL(ℝ), which satisfies ZFC. (HOD is the class of all hereditarily ordinal definable sets, that is, the class of all sets x such that every member of the transitive closure of x is definable over the universe from ordinal parameters (i.e., “OD”). The superscript “L(ℝ)” indicates, here and below, that the notion in question is to be interpreted in L(R).) HODL(ℝ) is reasonably close to the full L(ℝ), in ways we shall make precise in § 1. The most important of the questions we shall answer concern HODL(ℝ): what is its first order theory, and in particular, does it satisfy GCH?These questions first drew attention in the 70's and early 80's. (See [4, p. 223]; also [12, p. 573] for variants involving finer notions of definability.)

Internal categoricity and the sets

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Important Work ◽  
The Universe ◽  
The Continuum

As the previous chapter discussed the internalist perspective on the categoricity of arithmetic, this chapter presents the internalist perspective on sets. In particular, we show both how to internalise Scott-Potter set theory its quasi-categoricity theorem, and how to internalise Zermelo’s Quasi-Categoricity Theorem. As in the case of arithmetic, this gives a non-semantic way to draw the boundary between algebraic and univocal theories. A particularly compelling case of the quasi-univocity of set theory revolves around the continuum hypothesis. Furthermore, by additionally postulating that the size of the pure sets is the same as the size of the universe, these famous quasi-categoricity results can actually be turned into internal categoricity results simpliciter, so that one has full univocity instead of mere quasi-univocity. In the appendices we prove these results, and we discuss how they relate to important work by McGee and Martin.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document