What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary? Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action

1994 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark I. Lichbach

Peasant upheavals are studied from the perspective offered by the selective incentives solution to Olson's collective action problem. This article presents much evidence from three different forms of peasant struggles—everyday forms of peasant resistance, unorganized rural movements, and organized peasant rebellions—that demonstrates the widespread existence of selective incentives. Questions about the causes and consequences of selective incentives are then examined. First, what are the conditions under which peasant struggles emphasize material selective incentives rather than nonmaterial altruistic appeals? The level of selective incentives in any peasant upheaval is a function of demand and supply considerations. Peasants demand selective incentives. The suppliers include one or more dissident peasant organizations, the authorities, and the allies of both. A political struggle ensues as the suppliers compete and attempt to monopolize the market. Second, what are the conditions under which the pursuit of material self-interest hurts rather than helps the peasantry's collective cause? Selective incentives supplemented by ideology can be effective; selective incentives alone are counterproductive.These questions and answers lead to the conclusion that the selective incentives solution reveals much more about peasant upheavals than simply that peasants will often be concerned with their own material self-interest. It is therefore important to study the following three aspects of peasant collective action: the dilemma peasants face, or how peasant resistance is in the interest of all peasants but in the self-interest of none; the paradox peasants face, or that rational peasants do solve their dilemma (for example, with selective incentives) and participate in collective action; and the irony peasants face, or that self-interest is both at the root of their dilemma and at the foundation of a solution to their paradox.

2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 498-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
SUSAN DORR GOOLD

“Collective action” usually brings to mind images of picket signs held by laborers striking for better wages and benefits. Collective action, however, need not be limited to the withholding of labor. Nor need it involve only the working or middle classes, as airline pilots have recently demonstrated. Finally, collective action need not have as its only purpose the self-interest of the group. Collective action does, however, always involve a joining together of individuals united by common goals or interests in order to consolidate power for the purpose of negotiating with another group or entity. Examples of collective action obviously include striking, other withholding labor actions, and slowdowns, but can also include many other activities. “Paper strikes,” for example, have been threatened or used by house officer organizations in the past. In a paper strike, patient care continues but without documentation, and thus, the institution suffers from absent or delayed financial remuneration.


1997 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-360
Author(s):  
Frans van Zetten

Is guidance by social norms compatible with rationality? Jon Elster has argued inThe Cement of Societythat there is a fundamental contrast between rationality and conformity to social norms. The context of study is the problem of collective action, with special emphasis on collective wage bargaining. In such negotiations, the appeal to social norms rather than to self-interest can block agreement. Suppose one union is committed to the norm of equal pay for equal work; another one appeals to the norm of equal pay for everybody, regardless of the type of work. ‘In the presence of competing norms that favor different groups, the self-righteousness conferred by belief in a norm can lead to a bargaining impasse.'In confrontations between individuals, codes of honor can produce similar problems. It is in no one's interest to face a colleague over the barrel of a gun because one has made a nasty remark about his latest book, but if the code demands that one fight it out, the challenge must be accepted.


2016 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 373-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Meadowcroft ◽  
Elizabeth A Morrow

How do dissident, far-right groups overcome the collective action problem inherent to political organisation in order to recruit sufficient activists willing to bear the costs of participation and not free-ride on the participation of others? An original ethnographic study of the UK anti-Islamic street protest organisation, the English Defence League, shows that it solved the collective action problem by supplying selective incentives to members in the form of the club goods of access to violence, increased self-worth and group solidarity. These benefits were offset against the costs of stigma, time, money and unwanted police attention that also accompanied English Defence League membership. The personal benefits the English Defence League provided to its members enabled it to supply what Mancur Olson has termed the first unit of collective action, but limited its ability to supply the additional units required to build a broader, more mainstream movement.


Hypatia ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 120-125
Author(s):  
Margaret A. McLaren

Author(s):  
Justin Buchler

This chapter presents a unified model of legislative elections, parties, and roll call voting, built around a party leadership election. First, a legislative caucus selects a party leader who campaigns based on a platform of a disciplinary system. Once elected, that leader runs the legislative session, in which roll call votes occur. Then elections occur, and incumbents face re-election with the positions they incrementally adopted. When the caucus is ideologically homogeneous, electorally diverse, and policy motivated, members will elect a leader who solves the collective action problem of sincere voting with “preference-preserving influence.” That leader will threaten to punish legislators who bow to electoral pressure to vote as centrists. Consequently, legislators vote sincerely as extremists and get slightly lower vote shares, but they offset that lost utility with policy gains that they couldn’t have gotten without party influence. Party leaders will rarely pressure legislators to vote insincerely.


Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Silva

The economy has been brutal to American workers. The chance to provide a better life for one’s children—the promise at the heart of the American Dream—is slipping away. In the face of soaring economic inequality and mounting despair, we might expect struggling Americans to rise up together and demand their fair share of opportunity. And yet, the groups who stand to gain the most from collective mobilization appear the least motivated to act in their own self-interest. This book examines why disadvantaged people disable themselves politically. Drawing on in-depth interviews with over one hundred black, white, and Puerto Rican residents in a declining coal town in Pennsylvania, We’re Still Here demonstrates that many working-class people are fiercely critical of growing inequality and of the politicians who have failed to protect them from poverty, exploitation, and social exclusion. However, the institutions that historically mediated between personal suffering and collective political struggle have not only become weak, but have become sites of betrayal. In response, working-class people turn inward, cultivating individualized strategies for triumphing over pain. Convinced that democratic processes are rigged in favor of the wealthy, they search for meaning in internet conspiracy theories or the self-help industry—solitary strategies that turn them inward, or turn them against each other. But as visions of a broken America unite people across gender, race, and age, they also give voice to upended hierarchies, creative re-imaginings of economic justice, and yearnings to be part of a collective whole.


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