On the Implications of the Non-Selfish Motivations for Moral Action in the Mozi: Focusing on the Self-Interest Thesis and the Implementation of a Utilitarian Ethic

2020 ◽  
Vol 129 ◽  
pp. 31-60
Author(s):  
Myeong-seok Kim
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Utilitarian Ethic

The Wisdom of the Egoist: The Moral and Political Implications of Valuing the Self

1997 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Hampton
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Political Implications ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Traditional Understanding ◽  
Moral Philosophers

There is a traditional understanding of what morality is, an under-standing that most contemporary moral philosophers take for granted. This understanding is not itself a theory, but rather an account of the phenomenon of morality, to which these philosophers have thought any theory of the phenomenon must conform if it is to be considered successful as either an explanation or a justification of our moral life. According to this account, there are three prominent features that, together, characterize the moral:First, moral action and moral regard are taken to be other-regarding. While some philosophers have identified a certain kind of self-respect as part of morality, in general morality has been thought to involve duties to others, requiring that they be treated with respect. Self-interest is generally taken to be outside the province of the moral.

Levels and types of breaking the maxims: A neo-Gricean account of humor

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila L. Nemesi
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
The Self ◽  
Social Psychological ◽  
Cooperative Principle ◽  
Pragmatic Theory ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Constant Tension

AbstractOn the basis of examples drawn from seven classic Hungarian film comedies, I argue in this article that the place of humor within the Gricean–Leechian model needs to be revisited and extended towards social psychological pragmatics to account for a wider range of humorous material. Scrutinizing the relevant controversial details of Grice’s conceptual framework, my concern is to find a practical way of fitting the various forms of humor into an adequate (and not an idealistic) pragmatic theory. I propose to differentiate between two levels and five types of breaking the maxims, introducing the Self-interest Principle (SiP) supposed to be in constant tension with, and as rational as, Grice’s Cooperative Principle. Politeness and self-presentational phenomena are subsumed under the operation of the SiP which embraces and coordinates the speaker’s own personal and interpersonal purposes.

Sex Differences in Reward Allocation

1988 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 981-982
Author(s):  
Kerry C. Martin ◽  
Jay Hewitt
Keyword(s):  
Sex Differences ◽  
Work Groups ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
High Productivity ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Reward Allocation

Men and women were presented descriptions of two dyadic work groups. In both groups, one member of the dyad did approximately two-thirds of the work. For one of the groups, subjects were asked to imagine that they were the worker of high productivity while for the other group subjects were asked to imagine that they were impartial observers. Subjects were asked to divide the rewards among the two workers for both groups. Men and women did not differ in allocation of reward when acting as impartial observers. When subjects imagined themselves as the worker of high productivity, men gave themselves a greater share of the reward than did women. It was concluded that the results were consistent with the self-interest explanation of sex differences in allocation of reward.

Reasonable Self-Interest

1997 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-85
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Hill
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Rational Requirement ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Interest Model ◽  
Moral Requirements

Philosophers have debated for millennia about whether moral requirements are always rational to follow. The background for these debates is often what I shall call “the self-interest model.” The guiding assumption here is that the basic demand of reason, to each person, is that one must, above all, advance one's self-interest. Alternatively, debate may be framed by a related, but significantly different, assumption: the idea that the basic rational requirement is to develop and pursue a set of personal ends in an informed, efficient, and coherent way, whether one's choice of ends is based on self-interested desires or not. For brevity I refer to this as “the coherence-and-efficiency model.” Advocates of both models tend to think that, while it is sufficiently clear in principle what the rational thing to do is, what remains in doubt is whether it is always rational to be moral. They typically assume that morality is concerned, entirely or primarily, with our relations to others, especially with obligations that appear to require some sacrifice or compromise with the pursuit of self-interest.

scholarly journals Belief in altruistic motives predicts prosocial actions and inferences

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan W. Carlson ◽  
jamil zaki
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Lay Theories ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Altruistic Motivation ◽  
Social Correlates ◽  
Prosocial Motives ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Trait Empathy

Are humans ever truly altruistic? Or are all actions, however noble, ultimately motivated by self-interest? Scientists and philosophers have long grappled with this question, but few have considered laypeople’s beliefs about the nature of prosocial motives. Here we examine these beliefs and their social correlates. In line with prior work, we find that people tend to believe humans can be, and frequently are, altruistically motivated. Moreover, people who more strongly believe in altruistic motivation act more prosocially themselves—for instance, sacrificing relatively high levels of money and time to help others—a relationship that holds even when controlling for trait empathy. People who believe in altruism also judge other prosocial agents to be more genuinely kind, especially when agents’ motives are ambiguous. Together, this work suggests that believing in altruism predicts the extent to which people both see altruism and act altruistically, possibly reflecting the self-fulfilling nature of such lay theories.

scholarly journals Foruroligende etik i Heinrich von Kleists »Michael Kohlhaas«

2009 ◽  
Vol 36 (106) ◽  
pp. 70-95
Author(s):  
Maria Jørgsen
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Central Place ◽  
The Self ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
The Sublime ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Louis Xvi ◽  
Kant's Ethics

Disquieting Ethics in »Michael Kohlhaas« by Heinrich von Kleist:This article argues that the concept of evil takes a central place in the exploration of the Kantian ethics in Heinrich von Kleist’s novella »Michael Kohlhaas«.Maria Jørgensen argues that not only is the famous duty to which Kohlhaas finds himself obliged conceived in accordance with Kant’s ethics of duty, but also the description of Kohlhaas’ subjectivity in general is constructed by means of Kantian terms. Kleist’s text makes use of concepts such as duty, freedom, pathology, universality and the sublime in order to construct Kohlhaas as an inherently decentered subject. Furthermore Jørgensen argues that the emptying of the concept of the Good in Kantian ethics surfaces in Kleist’s novella as a hitherto unnoticed tendency to a certain tautologisation in Kohlhaas’ qualitative judgments.In the final section of the article the evil act in »Michael Kohlhaas« as an act of freedom, »Aktus der Freiheit«, is investigated with a departure in the Kantian concept of diabolical evil in Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. If Kohlhaas’ first attempt to act ethically is contaminated by the self-interest which sticks to his initial duty to secure redress for the wrongs done to him and his fellow citizens by the Junker von Tronka, his last act of refusing to negotiate with the Elector of Saxony functions as a purely ethical act in Kantian terms. Kohlhaas’ act can be seen as an ethical act as it neglects the subject’s pathology, which according to Kant can only be done by an act of reason. Furthermore the act is in keeping with the criteria which Kant, according to Alenka Zupančič, delivers in the famous footnote on the execution of Louis XVI in Metaphysik der Sitten: The act is characterized by being purely formal, it arises from a maxim, and it is first of all an act of freedom. This article thus argues that »Michael Kohlhaas« evidently contains a fulfilled ethical act in Kantian terms, but that this act must be found in quite another place than previously assumed.

scholarly journals Ketidaktaatan Sipil dan Pilihan Golput

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 156-184
Author(s):  
Togardo Siburian
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Social Ethics ◽  
Civil Disobedience ◽  
The Self ◽  
Moral Ideals ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
General Elections

This article seeks to connect the ethics of civil disobedience with the practices of golput (abstaining from voting), that is, purposeful abstention from voting in Indonesia's general elections. By describing golput as a form of civil disobedience—for its ability to mobilize on principle; for its aims to achieve certain moral ideals—I argue that golput comprises the conscientious and soft-resistance of many citizens, in their struggle for civil rights. Evangelicals and their churches ought to perceive this issue of social ethics primarily within the framework of theology, not politics. Indeed during Indonesia's Reformasi era many of democracy's ideals—including justice and prosperity—have been misused for the fulfillment of the self-interest of the few people in power. Indonesian Christians, therefore, have a responsibility to act against such abuses of power, necessitating a theological framing for understanding the praxis of golput as a form of civil disobedience.

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