The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics

1996 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 1132-1155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avinash Dixit ◽  
John Londregan
Keyword(s):  
Special Interests ◽  
Redistributive Politics

Divisions offer venue for special interests

1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Sleek
Keyword(s):  
Special Interests

Toward Unity among Environmentalists

1995 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan G. Norton
Keyword(s):  
Resource Use ◽  
Wide Spectrum ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Environmental Issues ◽  
Value Systems ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Unified Approach ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
The Past ◽  
Control Growth

Today, six out of ten Americans describe themselves as "active" environmentalists or as "sympathetic" to the movement's concerns. The movement, in turn, reflects this millions-strong support in its diversity, encompassing a wide spectrum of causes, groups, and sometimes conflicting special interests. For far-sighted activists and policy makers, the question is how this diversity affects the ability to achieve key goals in the battle against pollution, erosion, and out-of-control growth. This insightful book offers an overview of the movement -- its past as well as its present -- and issues the most persuasive call yet for a unified approach to solving environmental problems. Focusing on examples from resource use, pollution control, protection of species and habitats, and land use, the author shows how the dynamics of diversity have actually hindered environmentalists in the past, but also how a convergence of these interests around forward-looking policies can be effected, despite variance in value systems espoused. The book is thus not only an assessment of today's movement, but a blueprint for action that can help pull together many different concerns under a common banner. Anyone interested in environmental issues and active approaches to their solution will find the author's observations both astute and creative.

Democracy Under Pressure: Special Interests vs. the Public Welfare.Stuart Chase

1945 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-163
Author(s):  
Robert C. Angell
Keyword(s):  
Special Interests ◽  
The Public

State Policy Control and Local Deviation: The Case of Immigration

2021 ◽  
pp. 0160323X2110008
Author(s):  
Brittany Blizzard ◽  
Jocelyn M. Johnston
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Significant Influence ◽  
Mixed Method ◽  
State Policy ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Policy Control ◽  
Local Support ◽  
Local Deviation ◽  
Immigration And Customs Enforcement ◽  
Method Approach

State preemption of local government discretion is examined through the lenses of county cooperation with federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and “immigration federalism.” Through a mixed-method approach, we examine why counties collaborate with ICE as well as how and why they deviate from state preemptions on local support for immigration. Analysis of a sample restricted to Georgia and Texas, states with especially robust preemptive anti-immigrant laws, suggests that special interests—those related to immigrant-dependent industries important to county economies—have significant influence over county decisions to minimize cooperation with ICE.

scholarly journals Power to the People: Checking Special Interests in California

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Stacy B. Gordon Fisher ◽  
Kimberly L. Nalder ◽  
Matthew Lesenyie
Keyword(s):  
Special Interests ◽  
The People

Economic Actors' Lobbying Influence on the Prospects for War and Peace

2013 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 863-888 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen G. Brooks
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Economic Globalization ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Government

AbstractPolitical scientists and economists have long been interested in the role of special interests in the policymaking process. In the past few years, a series of important new books have argued forcefully that the lobbying activities of economic actors have an important influence on the prospects for war and peace. All of these analyses claim that whether economic actors enhance or decrease the likelihood of conflict ultimately depends on the domestic political balance between economic actors who have a strong vested interest in pushing for peace versus those that do not. I advance two contrary arguments. At least among the advanced states, I posit there are no longer any economic actors who will be favorable toward war and who will lobby the government with this preference. All of the identified mechanisms that previously contributed to such lobbying in these states have been swept away with the end of colonialism and the rise of economic globalization. In particular, I show that the current structure of the global economy now makes it feasible for foreign direct investment to serve as an effective substitute for conquest in a way that was not possible in previous eras. My second argument concerns those economic actors in advanced states with a preference for peace. I posit that it has become unnecessary for them to directly lobby the government to avoid war on economic grounds because economic globalization—the accumulation of decisions by economic actors throughout the globe—now has sufficiently clear economic incentives for leaders.

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