Democracy Under Pressure: Special Interests vs. the Public Welfare.Stuart Chase

1945 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-163
Author(s):  
Robert C. Angell
Keyword(s):  
Special Interests ◽  
The Public

scholarly journals Vroue in die Sinoptiese Evangelies – méér as dekoratiewe karakters

2002 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yolanda Dreyer
Keyword(s):  
Gender Studies ◽  
Biblical Interpretation ◽  
Synoptic Gospels ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
The Public ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Full Humanity

Women in the Synoptic Gospels – more than decorative charactersThe aim of the paper is to show that the Synoptic Gospels represent different perspectives on Jesus and gender. From these perspectives Jesus’ narrated vision on the role of the male disciples and the women is described in order to explore some implications of the three visions in Mark, Matthew, and Luke. The focus is on developing a comprehensive philosophy which attests to the full humanity and personhood of women, the equal value of men and women as persons, and the public acknowledgement of their value. The paper demonstrates that gender studies in biblical interpretation can contribute not only to the special interests of women, but also in a broader sense to society as a whole.

Special Interests and the Interstate Commerce Commission, II

1933 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 899-917 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Pendleton Herring
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Interstate Commerce Commission ◽  
Administrative Process ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Influences ◽  
Interstate Commerce

In the juristic sphere, the Interstate Commerce Commission is charged with enforcing and interpreting certain statutes, hearing and weighing evidence, and rendering formal judgment when the facts have been ascertained. But the recognized judicial character of this work does not render the Commission immune from efforts to influence its judgments. The struggles of contending economic groups and political influences give rise to actions intolerable in a court of law and to repeated efforts to obtain favorable decisions through the use of propaganda. The Commission performs its duties in surroundings far from neutral, and must cope with pressures too powerful to be exorcised by simple exhortation or condemnation. The problem is one of canalizing influences which cannot be eliminated, to the end that they may increase rather than decrease the efficiency of the administrative process and that the public interest may not be submerged in the undertow of sectional and political cross-currents.

scholarly journals Special Interests versus the Public Interest in Policy Determination

10.1596/28251 ◽  
2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon C. Rausser ◽  
Gérard Roland
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
The Public

Interest Groups, Iron Triangles and Representative Institutions in American National Government

1984 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas L. Gais ◽  
Mark A. Peterson ◽  
Jack L. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
National Government ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
The Public

President Carter will perhaps be remembered most for his perceived incompetence, an impression produced largely by his inability to forge coalitions in Congress, and by his failure as an ‘outsider’ to intervene effectively in the established policy-making processes in Washington. In his farewell address, Carter alluded to what he believed to be the source of his troubles – the fragmentation of power and decision-making exploited by influential special interests. Carter believed that he was trapped in a web of organized groups allied with well-placed congressional and bureaucratic sympathizers seeking to protect their narrowly defined interests and frustrating his own broader vision of the public good.

Reflections on Congress

Congress ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 290-300
Author(s):  
Benjamin Ginsberg ◽  
Kathryn Wagner Hill
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
American People ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Negative Image ◽  
The Public

This chapter looks at several common complaints about Congress. When Americans are asked why they have a negative image of the Congress, three factors appear to stand out. First, Congress is seen as having slow and cumbersome procedures that interfere with “getting the job done.” Second, Congress is seen as polarized, with members unwilling to develop the compromises needed to serve the public interest. Third, Congress is seen as corrupt, serving lobbyists, special interests, and campaign contributors rather than the American people. The chapter thus considers whether these charges amount to a serious indictment of Congress, its members, and its procedures.

Democracy under Pressure: Special Interests vs. the Public Welfare

1945 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 58
Author(s):  
Robert C. Hartnett ◽  
Stuart Chase
Keyword(s):  
Public Welfare ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
The Public

Bureaucratic Discretion and Deliberative Democracy

2011 ◽  
pp. 3500-3516
Author(s):  
Christian Hunold ◽  
B. Guy Peter
Keyword(s):  
Public Administration ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Effective Means ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Administrative Discretion ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
The Public ◽  
Bureaucratic Discretion ◽  
Positive Image ◽  
Industrialized Democracies

Administrative discretion is both a strength and a weakness of contemporary political systems. Governments could not govern without the capacity to fill in legislation with detailed administrative regulations. Further, these regulations tend to reflect far more substantive information about the subjects being regulated than would most legislation coming from the legislature or decisions reached by the courts. The weakness of using discretion in rulemaking is the lack of legitimacy of these rules. Bureaucracies have a less than positive image in most industrialized democracies, and it is often assumed that their decisions are made to aggrandize their own institutional interests, or to serve “special interests” rather than the public. Thus, in order to make rulemaking more legitimate, effective means of oversight and participation for the public as a whole are required. We argue that many of the existing means of oversight are not as effective asthey once may have been. This is true largely because of the volume and complexity of rulemaking activity. In addition, the demands of the public in most democracies for more opportunities for effective participation mean that rulemaking that is done without the opportunity for the public to involve itself is suspect. The deliberative turn in thinking about participation, especially within public administration, may provide the public with opportunities for greater direct oversight, and perhaps also greater legitimacy for the rules adopted.

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