Norwood Russell Hanson. The Gödel theorem. An informal exposition. Notre Dame journal of formal logic, vol. 2 (1961), pp. 94–110.

1962 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-472
Author(s):  
Alonzo Church
Keyword(s):  
Formal Logic ◽  
Gödel Theorem

ALGEBRA OF PREDICATES AND RELATED GEOMETRIC MODELS CREATION IN REGARDS OF UNIFIED STATE EXAM IN INFORMATICS (RUSSIAN EGE)

2019 ◽  
pp. 40-47
Author(s):  
E. A. Mironchik
Keyword(s):  
Geometric Model ◽  
Main Idea ◽  
Formal Logic ◽  
High Complexity ◽  
Geometric Models ◽  
Complexity Problem ◽  
Logical Expression ◽  
State Examination

The article discusses the method of solving the task 18 on the Unified State Examination in Informatics (Russian EGE). The main idea of the method is to write the conditions of the problem utilizing the language of formal logic, using elementary predicates. According to the laws of logic the resulting complex logical expression would be transformed into an expression, according to which a geometric model is supposed to be constructed which allows to obtain an answer. The described algorithm does allow high complexity problem to be converted into a simple one.

¿Razonamos en función de nuestro conocimiento general? Un estudio de las interacciones entre el procesamiento de la información y la inferencia lógica

2015 ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
Miguel López Astorga
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Teaching And Learning ◽  
Learning Processes ◽  
Formal Logic ◽  
Conditional Reasoning ◽  
General Knowledge

RESUMENEn este trabajo, analizamos un experimento sobre el razonamiento condicional de Staller, Sloman y Ben-Zeev (2000). En dicho experimento, los sujetos parecen manifestar un comportamiento contrario a las prescripciones de la lógica formal. Nosotros lo revisamosy descubrimos todas las variables que es preciso atender en los procesos de enseñanza y aprendizaje, variables que no siempre son consideradas por los docentes.Palabras clave: condicional, conocimiento general, inferencia, procesamiento de la información, representación mental.DO WE REASON ACCORDING TO OUR GENERALKNOWLEDGE? A STUDY ABOUT INTERACTIONSBETWEEN INFORMATION PROCESSING AND LOGICALINFERENCEABSTRACTIn this paper, I analyze an experiment about conditional reasoning presented by Staller,Sloman and Ben-Zeev (2000). In that experiment, the subjects’ behavior seems contradictory to prescriptions of formal logic. I check it and I discover all the variables that we need to deal with them in teaching and learning processes, despite that such variables are notalways checked by the teachers.Keywords: conditional, general knowledge, inference, information processing, mentalrepresentation.

Samuel Beckett's Debt to Aristotle: Cosmology, Syllogism, Space, Time

2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Cordingley
Keyword(s):  
Trinity College ◽  
Space Time ◽  
Formal Logic ◽  
Trinity College Dublin ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Creative Transformation ◽  
Cosmic Order

This essay argues for the presence of Aristotelian ideas of cosmic order, syllogism, space and time in Beckett's . It accounts for how such ideas impact upon the novel's 'I' as he attempts to offer a philosophical 'solution' to his predicament in an underworld divorced from the revolving heavens. Beckett's study of formal logic as a student at Trinity College, Dublin and his private study of philosophy in 1932 is examined in this light; particularly his “Philosophy Notes,” along with some possible further sources for his knowledge. The essay then reveals a creative transformation of Aristotelian ideas in which led to formal innovations, such as the continuous present of its narrative.

Hegel's Conception of the Study of Human Nature

1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 32-47
Author(s):  
H. B. Acton
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Dialectical Materialism ◽  
Philosophy Of History ◽  
Formal Logic ◽  
Human Society ◽  
Royal Family ◽  
Dialectical Method ◽  
English Speaking ◽  
The Creation

It is easy to understand why Hegel's philosophy should be little studied by English-speaking philosophers today. Those who at the beginning of the twentieth century initiated the movement we are now caught up in presented their earliest philosophical arguments as criticisms of the prevailing Anglo-Hegelian views. It may now be thought illiberal to take much interest in this perhaps excusably slaughtered royal family, and positively reactionary to hanker after the foreign dynasty from which it sometimes claimed descent. Hegel was a systematic philosopher with a scope hardly to be found today, and men who, as we say, wish to keep up with their subject may well be daunted at the idea of having to understand a way of looking at philosophy which they suspect would not repay them for their trouble anyway. Furthermore, since Hegel wrote, formal logic has advanced in ways he could not have foreseen, and has, it seems to many, destroyed the whole basis of his dialectical method. At the same time, the creation of a science of sociology, it is supposed, has rendered obsolete the philosophy of history for which Hegel was at one time admired. In countries where there are Marxist intellectuals, Hegel does get discussed as the inadvertent forerunner of historical and dialectical materialism. But in England, where there is no such need or presence, there do not seem to be any very strong ideological reasons for discussing him. In what follows I shall be asking you to direct your thoughts to certain forgotten far-off things which I hope you will find historically interesting even if you do not agree with me that they give important clues for an understanding of human nature and human society.

Relative identity, singular reference, and the Incarnation: a response to Le Poidevin

2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER HUGHES CONN
Keyword(s):  
Formal Logic ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
Direct Theory ◽  
The Trinity

AbstractIn this article I object to Le Poidevin's (2009) contention that relative identity is beset with an infinite metaphysical regress. I argue, first, that since Le Poidevin's regress argument presupposes a direct theory of reference, it does not apply to accounts of relative identity which reject this account of reference. I argue, second, that Le Poidevin's regress is not inevitable for one who accepts a direct account of reference, since it does not apply to the formal logic of relative identity which van Inwagen uses to articulate and defend the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

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